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Abstract
We shed light on a money-for-privacy trade-off in the market for smartphone applications
(“apps”). Developers offer their apps at lower prices in return for greater access to personal
information, and consumers choose between low prices and more privacy. We provide evidence
for this pattern using data from 300,000 apps obtained from the Google Play Store (formerly
Android Market) in 2012 and 2014. Our findings show that the market’s supply and demand
sides both consider an app’s ability to collect private information, measured by the apps’s use of
privacy–sensitive permissions: (1) cheaper apps use more privacy–sensitive permissions; (2) given
price and functionality, demand is lower for apps with sensitive permissions; (3) the strength
of this relationship depends on contextual factors, such as the targeted user group, the apps’s
previous success and its category. Our results are robust and consistent across several robustness
checks, including the use of panel data, a difference-in-differences analysis, the use of “twin” pairs
of apps, or the use of various measures of privacy-sensitivity and app demand.
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1 Introduction
Striking a balance between “too little” and “too much” privacy protection in digital technologies and
markets poses a non-trivial challenge for regulators and society as a whole. On the one hand, the
market success of new digital technologies may greatly depend on the services’ ability to collect and
analyze enough personal information (Aziz and Telang, 2015; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011; Johnson,
2013b). The resulting products have enormous potential for offering better information flows, better
choices, efficiency and increased welfare. On the other hand, widespread unease and loss of trust in
the market could result when providers store too much personal data (Acquisti, Brandimarte, and
Loewenstein, 2015; Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman, 2016; Miller and Tucker, 2009).1 Ultimately, too
much data collection may also carry significant societal risks.2
In this paper, we analyze data from around 300,000 smartphone applications (“apps”) to inform
the debate about optimal levels of privacy protection. Using data from Google’s Android Market,
we study the extent to which private information resembles a second “means of payment” on both
sides of the market for apps.3 Specifically, we use our data to analyze three research questions:
1. Do app developers request access to more sensitive data in exchange for lower prices?
2. Do users avoid installing apps with permissions that access privacy-sensitive data?
3. Are app users’ privacy concerns context dependent?
Our results provide the first large-scale empirical evidence on a money-for-privacy trade-off on
both sides in the app market: App developers trade greater access to personal information for
lower prices, and consumers choose between lower prices and greater privacy. More precisely, our
results suggest that: (1) App developers ask for more privacy-sensitive permissions if they offer a
free app than if they offer a paid app; (2) consumers take this trade-off into account and show
up to 6 percent less demand for apps that ask for privacy-sensitive permissions; (3) the negative
relationship between permissions and downloads depends on the app’s context. Factors such as
trust, the targeted user group (e.g., mature users) or the sensitivity of the app’s context (e.g., in
health-related apps) moderate the relationship’s strength.
1According to the Pew Research Center, 68% of adults believe current laws to protect individuals’ online privacy
are insufficient (Rainie, Kiesler, Kang, Madden, Duggan, Brown, and Dabbish, 2013).
2We refer to real historical experience, e.g., in Europe or Asia, where too much data in the wrong hands contributed
to totalitarianism, persecution, mass murder, and war.
3We use “second means of payment” metaphorically, because both parties agree to exchange the developer’s service
for the user’s data, and then developers exchange user information for money or services of third parties (comparable
to a complementary medium of exchange, a tradable asset, or a valuable resource). We do not suggest that private
data satisfies the definition of a full-fledged and widely accepted currency, with established exchange rates.
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Our data are relevant and informative for analyzing the money-for-privacy trade-off. The Android
Market for apps has a large number and variety of products and is of high economic value. In most
app categories, users can choose among many alternatives. Privacy is salient, as users are shown the
list of permissions requested by an app prior to installation. This policy creates a setting in which
the money-for-privacy trade-off can be meaningfully studied, because we can discern 136 distinct
permissions and record each app’s permission requirements in 2012. We combine this information
on each app’s ability to collect personal information with a rich dataset on 300,000 apps from
Google’s Android Market. The data cover publicly available app-specific information, including each
app’s number of installations, its price, and even each app’s closest competitors. We collected data
repeatedly in 2012 (over five months) and once in 2014. We augmented these data with information
from AppAnnie.com and the Apple’s App Store, to add further information about apps and contrast
performance among operating systems.4
Our inference is based on a full cross section, on panel datasets, on “app siblings” consisting of
a free and paid version of the same app, and on a difference-in-differences-style analysis of demand
for apps. Our results emerge consistently for both the supply and demand side across these different
datasets and in various specifications. The findings are robust to using alternative measures of
demand, other outcomes such as survival, different ways of measuring privacy-sensitive permissions,
and considering subsegments of the market. They are also robust to an IV approach that instruments
for app prices or to leveraging our data on “app siblings” – a free version and a paid version of the
same app – to identify and account for category-specific permissions (e.g., running apps that need to
track location). A second source of identification comes from a cross-platform comparison between
Android and Apple’s iOS. We leverage the difference between Apple’s and Google’s notification
policies regarding permissions and show that an app’s download ranks in Android are worse than in
Apple’s iOS if they require sensitive permissions. This finding corroborates our baseline conclusions.
Our paper follows the usual structure. Two online appendices contain additional supporting
materials and cover the data in more detail.
2 Related Literature
By highlighting the money-for-privacy trade-off on both sides (demand and supply) of the market
for mobile apps, we contribute to two streams of the literature: A large stream on the value of
4For several robustness checks, we further augmented our database with information from Alexa.com and data
collected using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
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privacy and a growing stream on the mobile app market. Additionally, we hope to inform both
policy makers and legal scholars concerned with privacy in mobile apps about the trade-offs in this
sensitive market.
A central stream of the literature has studied the value of privacy both for the demand and the
supply side of markets. The key idea in the literature about the value of privacy is that consumers
or users can be compensated for sharing information about their data or their activities with service
providers and other parties. Whereas the large majority of the papers in the previous literature have
investigated this idea in theoretical models, experiments, or surveys, we use a large observational
dataset. Moreover, we are the first to use such data to analyze the role of privacy in the market for
mobile apps, a market with unseen potentials for collecting information about users. A major ad-
vantage of our setting is that the privacy permissions are unusually clearly communicated. Whereas
past work found little demand for privacy, especially with permissive default settings (e.g. Gross
and Acquisti (2005)), the observed choices in the present setting reflect many deliberate choices by
consumers to download apps with privacy being a component of that bundle. Thus, our setting
adds an additional angle to the existing debate, because our inference is based on the users’ actual
choices in a new and highly privacy-sensitive market.
To motivate our research questions we can draw from a wealth of existing theoretical studies of
privacy. Specifically, in most theoretical papers that model the demand side, the cost of privacy
to consumers arises either as nuisance from too aggressively targeted ads that may trigger costly
avoidance efforts (Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png, 2008; Johnson, 2013b), or from a firm’s ability to use
knowledge about a user’s preferences to price discriminate (Taylor, Conitzer, and Wagman, 2010;
Wathieu, 2002).5 Existing literature identifies three key moderators of aggregate privacy concerns:
(1) the composition of consumers, (2) trust-inspiring measures by firms, and (3) the nature and
amount of the requested private information (Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman, 2016; Chellappa and
Sin, 2005; Chellappa, Sambamurthy, and Saraf, 2010). Similar factors arise in our empirical context
and will be analyzed in section 6.3, where we used the model by Chellappa, Sambamurthy, and
Saraf (2010) as a framework to guide our analysis of moderating factors.6 Note that the empirical
5Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman (2016) and Tucker (2012) provide surveys. Taken together, these models find that
reduced privacy is disadvantageous for consumers. Firms can use customer information, such as purchase history, to
charge personalized prices in electronic retailing settings (Acquisti and Varian, 2005; Conitzer, Taylor, and Wagman,
2012; Taylor, 2004). However, increasing the cost of anonymity can benefit consumers up to a point, after which the
effect is reversed (Taylor, Conitzer, and Wagman, 2010). Spiegel (2013) shows in the context of software production
that free software in a bundle with (targeted) ads could improve welfare if the cost of producing software is low.
Reduced privacy enables the provision of valuable services “for free” and can create benefits for users.
6Chellappa, Sambamurthy, and Saraf (2010) set up a mechanism design problem in which a monopolist faces
consumers who have heterogeneous privacy concerns and decides on an optimal menu of personalization with possible
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literature also studied other sources of privacy concern than targeting and price discrimination. Such
additional concerns arise from direct discrimination (e.g., in hiring, housing, health-care or credit
markets), or from fears of errors, improper access, or secondary uses (e.g., identity theft) of personal
information (Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman, 2016). Compared to price discrimination and targeted
advertising, consumers’ concerns about direct discrimination or identity theft could be higher.7 Such
concerns might be among the key factors that moderate the demand for privacy in our analysis. For
example, we find evidence that consumers’ concerns vary with an app’s context, by showing that
users are more cautious in especially sensitive settings, such as health-related apps.
More generally, users demand privacy and attribute value to not being targeted or “seen” in many
settings (Marthews and Tucker, 2017; Turow, King, Hoofnagle, Bleakley, and Hennessy, 2009). The
demand for privacy was found to change over time and to depend on context or framing (Acquisti,
John, and Loewenstein, 2013; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2012; Gross and Acquisti, 2005). Such findings
are related to the so-called “privacy paradox” (cf. Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman, 2016; Norberg,
Horne, and Horne, 2007), which is a major topic of debate in the existing literature, and refers to the
large difference between the estimates from observational vs. experimental/survey-based evidence.
We contribute an additional piece of evidence to this debate, because we use observational data on
the app market, in which the use of personal data is a clearly communicated part of the bundle.
In other words, we contribute to the empirical literature on the value of privacy by measuring
the managerially relevant magnitude of consumers’ demand for privacy, using large transaction-
based data that reflect revealed preferences in the market for mobile apps. Existing empirical
estimates of the value of private information in online markets (rather than mobile apps) are based
on experimental and survey data. The estimated valuations ranged from zero to very large numbers
(Beresford, Kübler, and Preibusch, 2012; Carrascal, Riederer, Erramilli, Cherubini, and de Oliveira,
2013; Grossklags and Acquisti, 2007; Racherla, Babb, and Keith, 2011; Tsai, Egelman, Cranor, and
Acquisti, 2011). Our results suggest that the consumers’ revealed valuations for privacy in the 2012
mobile app market were so low that a business model which offers a privacy preserving app for small
payment is not viable for most contexts or applications.
subsidization. Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2015) studied the money vs. privacy trade-off in a model in
which suppliers compete on both dimensions (price and privacy) of a two-sided market, as pioneered by Armstrong
(2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2003).
7For example, by 2008, the self-reported valuations for protection against improper access and secondary use were
found to range from USD 30 to USD 50 (Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png, 2008, 2007). High exposure of personal information
through a smartphone can lead to identity theft, and users’ behavior can even affect the privacy of uninvolved friends,
or the information security of their company by increasing the risk of successful “Choice and Chance” attacks. (Pu
and Grossklags, 2016; Ransbotham and Mitra, 2009).
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For the supply side, that is for firms, a similarly rich literature has documented that user data
are valuable. We extend this notion to the market for mobile apps. Data collection on the internet
is inexpensive, but it enhances the effectiveness of targeted advertisement, which affects revenues for
content sites (Aziz and Telang, 2015; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011; Tucker, 2012, 2014).8 Moreover,
digital services, such as apps or websites, can directly track their customers to learn who uses their
service and how they use it (Hu, Zeng, Li, Niu, and Chen, 2007; Mobasher, Cooley, and Srivastava,
2000). Thus, user data can help service providers to better understand their customer’s needs and
how to improve their service (Bertschek and Kesler, 2017; Tambe, Hitt, and Brynjolfsson, 2012).
The overwhelming insight from this literature is that user data can be a valuable resource for the
firm. We add to it, by highlighting, for the first time, that developers offer their products at lower
prices in exchange for additional data from their users.
Our paper also closes a gap in a second more recent stream of research, which used observational
data to shed light on the market for mobile apps but did not focus on the role of privacy (Askalidis,
2015; Bresnahan, Orsini, and Yin, 2014; Carare, 2012; Chaudhari and Byers, 2017; Davis, Muzyrya,
and Yin, 2014; Ershov, 2016; Ghose and Han, 2014; Li, Bresnahan, and Yin, 2016; Liu, Nekipelov,
and Park, 2014; Liu, 2017; Yin, Davis, and Muzyrya, 2014).9 Their findings have increased our
understanding of the app market but left room for studies that focus on the role of private user
data. The paper most similar to ours (Savage and Waldman, 2014) uses survey-based data to
estimate users’ average valuation of the data that users typically share with developers. They find a
valuation of USD 4, which implies that offering more privacy could be a profitable market positioning
for app developers.10 Our results based on observational data suggest that privacy-preserving app
strategies may not be economically viable.11 This difference both reaffirms the privacy paradox and
shows the importance of considering observational data based on market transactions to understand
the role of private user data in the market for mobile apps.12
8 Specifically, restricting the use of private data in advertising can reduce the success of targeted advertising
and the revenue generated. More generally, websites differ considerably in how intensely they collect user data, and
privacy policies can affect user behavior (Johnson, 2013a; Preibusch and Bonneau, 2013).
9Pioneering papers focused on identifying key drivers of app demand and estimating their importance. Other
recurring themes are the relationship between innovation and quality in app markets, developers’ strategic behavior,
or their strategies for establishing a new app in the market (e.g., paying users to download the app onto their devices
in order to obtain a position on the list of the most downloaded apps). Structural models analyzed demand and app
developers’ resulting platform choice (Android or iOS).
10They use a valuation scheme based on providing information about privacy relevant aspects of the data and ask
users their willingness to accept. They also cannot say much about the developer dimension.
11Specifically, we show that consumer demand responds very little to potentially privacy-endangering permissions,
which is in line with considerably lower consumer valuation for privacy and implies our conclusion.
12More technical studies have been done on the precise meaning of certain permissions and what they imply for
the privacy of the device’s owner (see, e.g., Chia, Yamamoto, and Asokan, 2012; Sarma, Li, Gates, Potharaju, Nita-
Rotaru, and Molloy, 2012), or investigate the potential intrusiveness of apps (e.g., Chia, Yamamoto, and Asokan,
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To summarize, little is known about the role of private data in the market for mobile apps. We
close this gap by highlighting the money-for-privacy trade-off on both sides (demand and supply) of
this highly data-driven market. We show that users prefer and value apps with greater respect for
their privacy, which confirms earlier research.13 In addition, we highlight app developers’ willingness
to trade forgone revenue for personal user information. Thus, user data are a valuable resource
for developers, by which an emerging market can subsidize the creation of innovative products.
We complete the picture by showing the context dependence of privacy concerns for mobile apps.
Among these context-dependent factors are a developer’s outside reputation, the existence of privacy
policies, or an app’s category (cf. Acquisti, Brandimarte, and Loewenstein, 2015).
3 Background: Data Sharing in the Mobile App Industry
We begin this section by discussing the app market’s background and setup with regard to private
data and then turn to the developers’ ability to resell an app’s data.
3.1 The App Market
In 2007, Apple introduced the iPhone. The device triggered a radical transformation of mobile
communication in which screen-only smartphones replaced their predecessors. One of the main
competitive advantages of the iPhone and its successors was a large app ecosystem. Apps allow
users to tailor their devices to their needs by enabling multiple uses in addition to traditional
phone calls and text-based apps. In 2008, the first smartphone using Google’s Android Operating
System (Android OS) was released. Although users adopted initial versions slowly, Android gained
popularity in 2010 and now dominates the market in most countries. According to the International
Data Corporation (IDC, 2015), the Android OS reached a market share of around 75 percent in
2012. In 2015, revenue from the mobile app store was nearly $40 billion and is expected to reach
$100 billion in 2020 (App Annie, 2016).
In addition to the Android OS, Google also introduced its own platform for the distribution of
apps, originally called Android Market but renamed Google Play Store in mid-2012. It serves as a
distribution channel for apps, books, movies, music, and newspapers. By the end of 2012, the Google
2012; Fahl, Harbach, Muders, Baumgärtner, Freisleben, and Smith, 2012). Other studies investigate how platform
architecture affects smartphone users’ willingness to pay premiums to limit exposure of their personal information
(Egelman, Felt, and Wagner, 2013). Sutanto, Palme, Tan, and Phang (2013) suggest storing user information on the
device to overcome the personalization vs. privacy paradox and document a positive effect on demand. Two studies
by Lin, Amini, Hong, Sadeh, Lindqvist, and Zhang (2012) and Lin, Hong, and Sadeh. (2014) analyze more than one
million apps’ privacy-related behaviors. They summarize these behaviors using a grade scale, ranging from A+ (most
privacy sensitive) to D (least privacy sensitive; cf. http://privacygrade.org/faq [retrieved: 11/5/2016]).
13Even though our lower-bound estimates suggest lower valuations than previous studies.
6
Play Store offered approximately 400,000 apps, and in 2015 the number increased to 1.5 million.
Google distinguishes thirty categories of apps, such as Communication, Education, Productivity,
Shopping or Weather apps as well as Games. The latter category, consisting of Arcade & Action,
Brain & Puzzle, Cards & Casino, Casual, Racing, and Sports Games apps, make up around 17
percent of our estimation sample.
A central feature of the Android app ecosystem is its permission system. This system is specific
to the Android OS and provides a setting in which the money-for-privacy trade-off can be mean-
ingfully studied. First, developers can choose among standardized blocks of information, so-called
permissions, in which some enable access to a user’s location, communication, browsing behavior,
and so on. Before their installation, apps must declare which permissions they require and must
request these from the users. More precisely, the system provides a list of permission names along-
side a short explanation for each permission requested. Users must accept this list and explicitly
acknowledge that they are granting these permissions to proceed with the installation. Alternatively,
if they feel uncomfortable about the set of permissions requested, they can cancel the installation.
Note that such explicit consumer consent for the set of permissions does not exist in Apple’s iOS,
in which this information remains implicit before installation. In essence, this procedure has been
in place since 2012, despite the rapid growth of the Android Market.
In 2012, developers could choose among 136 predefined permissions.14 This large number illus-
trates the quantity and diversity of information app developers can potentially collect about app
users. Appendix Figure A2 illustrates the way in which permissions were displayed in the Android
Market in 2012.15 Since then, Google has introduced several small modifications in how permissions
are displayed to the user. Before 2014, the list of permissions showed permission names next to
short explanations of the permissions. Since 2014 the system shows only the names of aggregated
permission groups (though users can open a more detailed dialogue for each permission group). Still,
users must approve of the permission list before proceeding with installation.16
3.2 Monetization and Trading of App Data
Developers can monetize their apps via four main channels. According to AppBrain (2016), around
20 percent of the apps in the Google Play Store are paid apps, whereas the remaining 80 percent
14As of March 2017, the count stands at 148 permissions (although the precise contents of some permissions
changed; see http://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission.html).
15Although requested permissions were displayed slightly differently on smartphones, the text of the permissions’
descriptions is identical in both versions (mobile and browser) of the Play Store. The layout is almost identical.
16Since 2016, Google allows users to withdraw individual permissions from an app after installation. However, this
only affects recent versions of the Android OS (starting with version 6.0.
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of apps are free.17 Alternative revenue channels are in-app advertising, in-app purchases, and data
trade. The size of these alternative revenue channels has been relatively stable since 2012 except
for in-app purchases, which were introduced shortly before our period of observation.18 In 2012,
when we collected our data, the “freemium” model based on in-app purchases barely existed. Since
then, a marked increase has occurred in the use of this model, in which users may install the apps
without paying but must pay to unlock usefull additional functions. The two other channels, in-app
advertising and data trade, were already common.
Data sharing for monetization purposes is common in the mobile app industry, as in many
online markets (see, e.g., Woodcock, 2017 and references therein). Christl and Spiekermann (2016)
and OECD (2013) survey several studies that show that apps commonly shared data with third
parties.19 They also provide a brief discussion of the data-sharing business model and the three
main channels that developers have to exploit app usage data to generate revenues: (1) The most
important channel is using information about users to sell targeted advertising.20 This channel
has arguably been the powerhouse of the market for free apps, representing a sizable industry.21
The value in this industry is generated from collecting and aggregating individuals’ digital traces
from various sources (e.g., an app), in order to profile users’ location (Dubé, Fang, Fong, and Luo,
2017; Fong, Fang, and Luo, 2015) and behavior for targeted advertising.22 Yet, although this type
of information brokerage potentially offers greater efficiency in matching the ads, sharing the data
implies that the app users’ information is passed on, and their safety depends solely on the integrity
of the developer’s advertising partner. (2) Another prominent channel of data flows arises when
17Android’s app developers receive 70 percent of the app price, and 30 percent goes to distribution partners and
operating fees (see https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/112622?hl=en).
18In 2011, Google added in-app billing to Android Market, allowing apps to sell in-app products (see
http://android-developers.blogspot.de/2011/04/new-carrier-billing-options-on-android.html).
19The pieces of information most common transmitted about the user are identifying information (name, e-mail
address, phone ID, gender, age, or birthdate), location data, contacts, and usage data. Sometimes “data input” (e.g.
search terms) is transmitted as well. This information is more sensitive in some contexts, such as health, than in
others (Appthority, 2014; Schmidt, ten Venne, and Eikenberg, 2012; Zang, Dummit, Graves, Lisker, and Sweeney,
2015). Most of these studies are based on very small samples. For example, Seneviratne, Kolamunna, and Seneviratne
(2015) studied the apps installed on the phones of 338 users and identified 124 different trackers in 509 unique apps
in Australia, Brazil, Germany, and the United States. Trackers were categorized as: “advertising” (e.g., Google
Ads, Millennial Media, Inmobi, Mopub), “analytics” (e.g., Flurry, Google Analytics, Comscore, Health and Amazon
Insights, Localytics, Kontagent, Apsalar), and “utilities” (e.g., Crashlytics, Bugsense). Moreover, they found that 50
percent of these users were exposed to more than 25 trackers.
20Successful apps with sufficient traffic are able to sell their advertising space directly on the market. However,
doing so is costly for less successful apps, which can achieve better targeting by sharing their data with a third-party
broker. Such data brokers can provide advertisers with access to users from a bigger pool of multiple apps (and
developers to more advertisers).
21Peer-reviewed estimates are not available. Existing estimates range from several hundred million to several billion
US dollars (OECD (2013) based on Beales (2010)).
22To use ads (even without targeting), developers need access to a phone’s network state to simplify communication
between ad library and the ad server. For targeting consumers, developers frequently access a phone’s fine location
and permission which allows identifying the app’s user (READ_PHONE_STATE; see e.g. Book et al., 2013).
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developers trade their data for valuable third-party services. A good example of such services is
app analytics. App analytics help developers gain insight on who uses their app when and where,
along with which other processes on the phone are simultaneously being used. Combined with the
developer’s own knowledge of the user’s in-app behavior, this can be a useful input for improving the
app or, again, for advertising purposes. As with third-party advertising, the secondary usage of the
user data depends on the analytics site’s own policy and integrity. (3) Finally, app developers can
trade their data with third parties in several other common ways. For example, they can exchange
their data for direct monetary benefit. Such data can be purchased by known industry analysts
such as Alexa.com or by lesser-known data aggregators. As with third-party libraries, the secondary
usage of the user data depends on the analytics site’s policy and integrity.
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
We first describe our main dataset and then turn to our two alternative datasets (Section 4.2). The
descriptive analysis in Section 4.3 illustrates two key findings about the money-for-privacy trade-off
in the market for mobile apps.
4.1 Main Data and Variables
For our main dataset, we extracted all publicly available information on nearly all the products
available in the Google Play Store in 2012 (around 300,000 apps). We collected the data on a
monthly basis from April to September 2012. Appendix Figure A1 shows the design of Google’s app
store in 2012, which corresponds to the information we were able to collect. Using this information,
we created two main datasets: (1) a cross section of all apps available in April 2012 and (2) a
balanced monthly panel of apps that were available from April 2012 until September 2012 and had
within-variation in the number of privacy-sensitive permissions. In addition, we collected a cross
section of data in 2014 to analyze long-term outcomes. Also, for some of the robustness checks, we
used additional data sources, such as Alexa.com, Amazon Mechanical Turk, PrivacyGrade.org, and
AppAnnie.com.
Given our research questions, we need three main types of information: a price measure, a
demand measure, and a measure of an app’s ability to collect private information about users. In
the following, we introduce and discuss each of these measures as well as the core control variables.
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Main Outcome Variables: Our first main outcome is the price of apps. We directly observe
price (in euros) in the data. We measure (1) the decision to provide a free app or a paid app as a
dummy (DPaid = 1, if the app is paid) and (2) the price if a paid app is offered (ln price). Our second
main outcome is demand, which we observe with two measures. Our first measure of app demand is
the monthly change in the number of ratings (∆Ratings). Alternatively, we use the monthly change
in the number of installations (∆Installations). Both proxies measure the number of new customers
who consider the benefits of installing an app greater than the cost of paying the product’s price
or the associated loss of privacy. The two demand measures are highly correlated (see Figure 1
and Appendix A.2). The high correlation is not surprising given that users have to install an app
in order to rate it. Our preferred demand variable is the change in the number of ratings, since
we observe the exact number of ratings, whereas the number of installations is observed only in
discrete step-size form with 17 levels (e.g. 11-50, 51-100, 101-500 installations), which leads to low
intertemporal variation in a panel specification.23 It is well known that both ratings and installations
are not without drawbacks, for example, because both can be purchased by developers to promote
their app (Li, Bresnahan, and Yin, 2016) and only a small fraction of users who install an app might
actually use or rate it (Hu, Zhang, and Pavlou, 2009).24 Hence, we show the robustness of our
findings with respect to the choice and definition of our demand measure in Section 6.4. There and
in our main demand specifications, we use several alternative demand measures based on ratings,
installations, rankings, and alternative time windows.25 The industry’s most relevant measure for
an app’s demand or usage would be daily active users (DAU), but this measure is not available,
because it is only known by an app’s developer team.
FIGURE 1
23The discrete measure introduces attenuation bias through noise in the dependent variable.
24Purchased ratings or installations could be problematic for our empirical strategy for two reasons: (1) Widespread
fraudulent reviews or installations could lead to considerable noise in our dependent variable, which might result in
attenuation bias, and small estimates; (2) If apps consistently differ in their strategies to encourage ratings and in their
data collection behavior, our results might be biased. Specifically, if apps that use more permissions more actively
recruit raters, this would bias our coefficients toward zero. To address the first concern, we compared installations and
ratings and found little evidence for fake ratings as a widespread phenomenon. “Hiring” ratings is most effective for
young (Muchnik, Aral, and Taylor, 2013) and sometimes intermediate apps, which begin to have imitators (copycats).
However, it is less likely to have an effect on monthly changes in later periods. We address the second issue, which
is of critical importance, in our panel fixed-effects specifications, but it may affect the cross-section estimation with
attenuation bias. We also do not see many such sudden peaks in ratings over time.
25In Appendix A.2 we discuss the close relationship between our main demand measure and our measures based
on app rankings. However, app rankings are available only for the most successful apps, which limits the scope of this
comparison to a small and arguably selected set of apps.
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Identifying the Privacy Sensitivity of Apps: To measure an app’s ability to collect private
information, we take advantage of the fact that, as described earlier, Google provides precise de-
tails on the permissions an app uses. This feature allows us to understand exactly which private
information an app can collect about the app user. Among the 136 permissions available to app
developers, some can be considered innocuous with respect to the privacy of the user, while oth-
ers grant an app access to sensitive information. Based on an extensive literature review (Dini,
Martinelli, Matteucci, Petrocchi, Saracino, and Sgandurra, 2012; Jeon, Micinski, Vaughan, Fogel,
Reddy, Foster, and Millstein, 2012; Mylonas, Theoharidou, and Gritzalis, 2013; Sarma, Li, Gates,
Potharaju, Nita-Rotaru, and Molloy, 2012; Taylor and Martinovic, 2016), we were able to identify
a total of 25 privacy-sensitive permissions, which allow apps to access information about users’ ID,
location, profile, or communication (see Appendix Table A1). These potentially problematic permis-
sions include “fine (GPS) location,” which allows access to the user’s current location, “read browser
data,” which grants access to a user’s browsing history and their bookmarks, or “read contact data,”
which allows an app to access the user’s contact data. Based on this classification, we construct our
main variable of interest (DPrivacy), which is a dummy equal to one if an app uses at least one of
the 25 privacy-sensitive permissions and zero otherwise. To capture the intensity of an app’s ability
to collect private information, we additionally use the number of privacy-sensitive permissions in
an app (#Privacy). In addition, we evaluate our findings when using other, alternative privacy
measures in section 6.4. These measures include (1) a category-specific modification of our baseline
measure, (2) a classification based on Google’s assessment of problematic permissions, (3) a clas-
sification derived by hiring 400 classifiers at Amazon Mechanical Turk, and (4) a classification to
account for the fact that apps require internet access to transmit user information. Appendix Tables
A1 and A2 summarize all classifications applied and describe all privacy-sensitive permission. In
addition, these tables show the details of how we grouped the privacy-sensitive permissions into four
subgroups: location-, profile-, communication-, and ID-specific permissions.
Control Variables: In addition to our main variables, we also observe a rich set of app-specific
characteristics relevant for explaining app supply and demand: the app category, the average rating,
the code size, the required version of Android OS, developer-specific information (name of developer,
number of its other apps, top developer status, etc.), and the app’s description (length, number of
screenshots, video) and permissions related to internet access (DInternet) and advertising (DAds).26
26DAds equals one if an app uses the ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission (see Table A1). Around 80
percent of ad libraries in 2013 used this permission, which simplifies communication between ad library and the ad
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Also, we use the section “users who viewed this also viewed” to identify app-specific competitors and
to construct three additional control variables: the average price of competing apps, competitors’
average number of installations, and the average rating of competing apps. Finally, to control
for an app’s functionality unrelated to the ability to collect private information, we include in all
specifications the number of unproblematic permissions to which an app has access (#CleanPerm).
For a list and definition of our key variables, see Appendix Table A2.
4.2 Two Alternative Datasets
In addition to our two main datasets (cross section and balanced panel from 2012), we additionally
use a set of app pairs and a set of apps for which we could retrieve app download rankings from
2012 in both the Google Play Store and Apple’s App Store. We use these two alternative datasets
for robustness checks that control for the unobserved heterogeneity of apps. We also use the second
one to show the close relationship between app download rankings and our demand measure.
App Pairs: App developers often offer two versions of the same app, a free version and a paid
version. The paid version typically offers some advantages over the free version: It may offer
additional functionality, contain less advertising, or require fewer (privacy-sensitive) permissions.27
We identified pairs within our cross-section dataset, which consist of app siblings with the same
functionality.28 To do so, we used a two-to-three-step procedure. First, we used a word-processing
algorithm that identified app pairs with the same name except for the addition of one of the following:
“free,” “paid,” “lite,” “full,” “demo,” “pro,” “premium,” “donate,” “trial,” “plus” (which results in 7,211
app pairs). Second, within this broad set of pairs, we identified those for which the code size of the
paid version is not larger than that of the free version and for which the description of both apps
is more or less the same length.29 This gives us a sample of 1,999 pairs. Third, to identify an even
more rigorously matched subset of app pairs we manually checked the description of the remaining
server (see e.g. Book et al., 2013). For the provision of targeted advertisement, especially READ_PHONE_STATE
(which allows identifying app users) and ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION seem to be of high relevance.
27Introducing sensitive permissions in the free but not the paid version is the most explicit instance of a money-
for-privacy trade-off. A typical, though not ideal, pair consists of a free “lite” version and the full (paid) version of
the same app, in which the free version has more permissions but less functionality. In our research, we can use
pairs to find unnecessary permissions, because the paid version is the proof that the same app can run without that
permission. This inference is valid even if the paid version of the app offers more features than the free version, if
only the paid app does not offer less functionality.
28By “functionality,” we mean the utility-generating service to the user. Ads, for example, might imply code and
functionality, but their purpose is generating (data-driven) revenue for the developer (not increasing user satisfaction).
29According to our procedure, a pair’s free app is of the same code size or a little larger (on average, 300 KB
larger). In the full cross-section, the free apps are smaller (on average > 3MB smaller), so we attribute the difference
in the matched pairs to the developer’s monetization strategy. A pair’s length of description differs by less than 30
percent.
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app pairs and kept those whose description indicated no difference in functionality. The versions in
this last set of pairs should thus differ only in price, permissions, and possibly the existence of ads.
This most restrictively matched sample consists of 354 pairs and excludes app siblings with identical
descriptions if the text mentioned any differences between free and paid versions.
Android and iOS App Ranking: Many apps are offered for both Google’s Android OS and
Apple’s iOS. This fact allows us to compare the relative success of apps in both systems and the
extent to which it depends on their use of privacy-sensitive permissions. We used AppAnnie.com
to retrospectively collect (in 2016) the apps’ rankings from 2012 for both OS. Unfortunately, in
2016, we found only a small number of 192 (mostly successful) apps for which the app ranking
from 2012 was available for both OS. Nevertheless, the dataset allows a rigorous comparison across
platforms. Unlike in our main datasets, which contain global success measures, such as the worldwide
number of installations, rankings are available only at a country-specific level. Thus, we collected
and aggregated rankings for seven large markets: Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, the
UK, and the US. For these countries, we have rankings for April and September 2012. For free apps,
we use the overall free app rank, and for paid apps we use the overall paid ranking.30 Based on
the collected country-, time-, and OS-specific ranks we compute average OS-specific values for each
app. We use the order of these average values to construct our own OS-specific in-sample rankings,
which are designed to ensure that the values are comparable across OS and limit the potential effect
of outliers. Using these standardized in-sample rankings, we construct two measures of relative app
success on the two operating systems (∆RankiOS−And): We compute (1) the difference between
rankings for Android OS and iOS based on the average OS-specific rankings that we were able to
collect for the two versions of the app, and (2) the same difference but based only on the ranking
information of the largest market, i.e., the US.31 This dataset contains up to 192 apps observed in
both OS.
4.3 Descriptive Evidence
Before providing descriptive evidence on two key results of this paper, we discuss the summary
statistics of the variables in our main datasets.
30In addition to overall rankings we include category-specific rankings, e.g., for games, weather, or education apps.
31Specifically, we compute average rankings by app and OS based on time- and country-specific ranks (up to 7
countries and 2 points in time per OS, i.e., up to a total of 14 ranks). Using these average values, we create a new
in-sample ranking that ranks apps by the order of their average rank values and ranges from 1 to 192 for each OS
(because we have 192 apps available). In the estimation, we use the difference between the standardized rank we
generated for the iOS version and the one from the Android version (i.e., iOS rank minus Android rank).
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Summary Statistics: Table 1 provides an overview of the most relevant variables in our main
datasets. For each dataset, the left column shows averages for free apps, and the right column shows
those for paid apps. The first set of columns (cols. 1-2) shows permission use in the entire cross
section of apps, consisting of 177,193 observations.32 Free apps are installed more often and have a
lower average rating. Crucially, an average free app is more likely to use potentially privacy-sensitive
permissions and will require more such permissions than an average paid app. For example, free apps
use on average 1.19 privacy-sensitive permissions, whereas paid apps use only 0.52 such permissions.
Similarly, 50 percent of the free apps have at least one privacy-sensitive permission, while only 28
percent of the paid apps use such permissions. This relation does not change when we compare
alternative groups of privacy-sensitive permissions, and this pattern also holds on our three other
datasets: the panel dataset of apps that have within variation in the number of privacy-sensitive
permissions over time (cols. 3-4), one of our sets of matched app pairs (cols. 5-6), and the set of apps
for which we were able to retrieve app rankings from 2012 for both Android OS and iOS. Despite
covering very different subsets of apps, all four datasets show consistent patterns with respect to the
differences in the permission use by free and paid apps: No matter how we look at the data, free
apps always request more privacy-sensitive permissions than paid apps. This holds for essentially
all criteria we analyzed, and this pattern is found even when we match pairs of apps that come
from the same developer and have the same functionality. In the appendix (available online), we
provide additional information (Appendix Table A2) and summary statistics for the cross-sectional
data (Appendix Table A3) and pairs (Appendix Table B1).
Below, we document two key results about the supply side. First, some mainly free apps request
permissions that are not necessary for their functionality. We conjecture that these unnecessary
permissions are used for monetization. Second, privacy-sensitive permissions are more likely to
appear in free apps than in paid apps. This indicates a negative relationship between price and
permission use. Both results suggest a trade-off between price and privacy. Consumers can choose
between apps that are cheaper but request more privacy sensitive information and apps that are
more expensive but more privacy respecting.
Unnecessary Permissions: We use both the full sample of app pairs and the sample of selected
app pairs to study whether apps request permissions without needing them for their functionality.
In both datasets, the paid version serves as a technological reference, because the paid version can
32The discrepancy between our sample and the full population of around 300,000 apps is mainly due to excluding
apps that were unavailable in some of the monthly waves in our panel analysis, lacked key variables, had zero
installations or ratings, or are outliers with respect to our main demand measure.
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be safely assumed to provide the same or even more functionality than the free one.33 Hence, any
permission that is present in the free version but not in the paid sister is unnecessary in terms of
functionality, and can be expected to be related to monetization.
Figure 2 compares the number of privacy-sensitive permissions in a pair’s free and paid versions.
Panel (a) shows how frequently we observed a given difference in permissions for the full pair sample.
A frequency of 280 for a value of 2 means that we find 280 pairs for which the free version requested
two permissions more than the paid version. Panel (b) shows the same comparison for the selected
sample of app pairs, for which we ensured that functionality does not differ between apps. Across
both samples, we find more pairs in which the free version requires more privacy-sensitive permissions
than the paid one. Particularly in panel (b), the paid version hardly ever requests more permissions
than its free counterpart. We conclude that several of the free versions request unnecessary, privacy-
sensitive permissions, which are not required for their functionality.
FIGURE 2
Price and Permissions: When we analyze all apps, we see that developers, who charge zero
prices, are more likely to request more privacy-sensitive permissions. Figure 3 shows the 10 most
frequently used privacy-sensitive permissions and contrasts the share of free and paid apps that
request them. All privacy-sensitive permissions are more common in free apps. Developers choose
between either offering their apps free with additional privacy-sensitive permissions or charging a
fee but including fewer privacy-sensitive permissions.
FIGURE 3
The goal of the subsequent sections is to provide rigorous econometric evidence of the trade-off
that is implied by the key findings we just presented.
5 Empirical Framework
This section discusses our empirical framework. The first subsection presents an overview of our
estimation approach for the supply side. Subsequently, we discuss estimation of the demand side.
33Because a free sibling is available, it is hard to imagine that users would be willing to pay a positive amount for
less functionality, such that if two siblings have any difference in functionality, we assume that the paid app sibling
provides more functionality.
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5.1 Supply-Side Estimation
We run two types of correlational supply-side regressions to provide insights on the role of private
information for app developers. First, we examine the choice of the business model. Specifically, we
analyze how the developer’s decision to offer a free app or a paid app is related to the app’s use of
privacy-sensitive permissions. Our estimation equation is:
DPaidi = α+ βD
Privacy
i + θXi + εi, (1)
where DPaidi is a dummy equal to zero if the app i is free, and εi is the error term. The dummy
DPrivacyi is equal to one if an app requires at least one privacy-sensitive permission. A negative
β indicates that free apps are more likely to request privacy-sensitive permissions.34 The control
variables Xi are: the number of unproblematic permissions, a dummy for ad-related permissions, a
dummy for internet access, dummies for the app category and the maturity level (e.g., “recommended
for users aged 13+”), the average rating (in logs), the code size (in logs), the app version, the length
of the app description (in logs), the number of screenshots, a dummy for the existence of a video,
a top-developer dummy, the number of apps by the developer (in logs), the average number of
installations of the developer’s other apps (in logs), the minimum and the maximum compatible
Android OS version, and information about all of the competing apps’s characteristics.
In a second specification we restrict our sample to paid apps and study how price levels are
related to the use of privacy-sensitive permissions. The estimation equation is:
lnPricei = α+ βD
Privacy
i + θXi + εi, (2)
where the dependent variable is the log-standardized price of an app. A negative coefficient β
indicates a lower price for apps that require privacy-sensitive permissions. We stress that these
cross-sectional regressions do not account for unobserved heterogeneity.
Panel Data Analysis: We apply two main strategies to address the concerns over unobserved
heterogeneity and to validate our results on alternative data structures. In our first approach to
control for unobserved heterogeneity, we use a panel specification. We include an app fixed effect
(αi) and estimate our model based on within-app variation. We combined the cross-sections from
April and September 2012 to form a panel covering our observation period of five months. Analyzing
the within-app variation focuses on changes in price or the app’s business model and allows us to
34Apps with privacy-sensitive permissions are β × 100 percent less likely to be paid.
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control for unobserved heterogeneity. However, this approach is limited by the small number of apps
that changed price or switched business model during our sample period. For the business model,
we estimate the following fixed-effects model:
DPaidit = αi + βD
Privacy
it + θXit + εit, (3)
where αi captures unobserved heterogeneity of app i and t represents the month. We estimate the
analogous relationship for the price of apps (provided they request payment) and use the waves from
April and September 2012 for both specifications.
App Pairs: Our second main strategy to deal with unobserved heterogeneity exploits variation
within pairs of apps, in which the free and the paid version of an app differ mainly in price and the
number of permissions they use. These app pairs shed light on the money-for-privacy trade-off, as
perceived by developers. As explained in Section 4.2, this is because the paid version serves as a
technological reference that allows us to identify permissions that likely serve purposes other than
facilitating the app’s core services. The regression equation is:
DPaidpi = αp + βD
Privacy
pi + θXpi + εpi,
where αp controls for unobserved heterogeneity of app pair p. This framework is valid if we can ensure
that the two siblings have identical functionality. Hence the need to identify app pairs without any
discernible difference in functionality, which differ only in permissions and price.35 We can run this
regression only for the app’s business model choice, because one of the siblings is free by definition.
5.2 Demand-Side Estimation
Our baseline specification to analyze the relationship between app demand and permissions is based
on the cross-section sample. We model demand as a function of its permissions, its price Pricei, and
the same set of control variables Xi as in the supply side specifications. We estimate the following
baseline model:
lnDemandi = α+ βD
Privacy
i + γ lnPricei + θXi + εi. (4)
In the main specification, we approximate Demandi for app i by its change in the number of ratings
in that month (∆Ratings), and in our robustness checks we use installation-based measures. Again
β is the coefficient of interest, indicating that the use of a certain permission comes with a β × 100
35For any remaining differences in functionality, our results would continue to be biased toward zero if greater
functionality is in the paid version and is positively correlated with price or more (privacy-sensitive) permissions.
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percent change in demand. Prices are in logs, so that γ can be interpreted as own-price elasticity.36
Since OLS is sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity we test our results using (1) a 2SLS model,
(2) a panel approach (3) a difference-in-differences style analysis between Android OS and iOS, and
(4) an extensive series of robustness checks, which we present in the following section.
Endogeneity of Prices, Permissions, and Exit: Both permissions and price are strategic
choices for the developer. Hence, the estimated demand coefficients might suffer from endogeneity
bias. For monetary prices, endogeneity is well understood and usually leads to an upward bias in the
estimated price coefficients (Wooldridge, 2010). We address this issue using standard instruments for
price, such as cost shifters including the code size and the number of apps a developer offers (Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995; Hausman, 1996; Nevo, 2000).37 Using 2SLS techniques, we test whether
our coefficients of interest (privacy-sensitive permissions) are affected by the potential endogeneity
in monetary prices. We show these results, which confirm our baseline findings, in Appendix Table
A10.
The second source of potential endogeneity is permissions. If developers charge a higher “permis-
sion price” for unobserved high quality, this could introduce a positive correlation between permis-
sions and the error term. The resulting estimation bias would be in the same upward direction as for
the monetary price. We attempt to reduce the effect of unobserved quality using panel estimation
techniques and our difference-in-differences-style approach.38 Any remaining correlation would lead
to an upward bias in the regression coefficients, and a truly negative coefficient would be biased
toward zero. Without an instrument, we can only provide a lower-bound estimate of the effect of
permissions on demand. While it is hard to find the ideal instrument for this source of endogeneity,
we can use developer’s and competitors’ behavior as an instrument. Specifically, we use the same
developer’s share of apps with privacy-sensitive permissions (excluding the focal app) as our first
set of instrumental variables (IV). Alternatively, we use the share of the competing apps that use
privacy-sensitive permissions as a second IV. While both approaches suffer from limitations, they
are good predictors of the app’s permission choices and arguably do not directly depend on the app’s
success. Again, the results are shown in Appendix Table A10 of Appendix A.1.
36A 1 percent price change leads to a γ percent change in expected demand.
37Given product quality, neither code length nor the number of products by a developer should generate utility
for the user, but reflect the production cost and developer experience as well as potential for code sharing. As an
alternative, “Hausman instruments” could be used in the panel, but the variation in prices is too small. Furthermore,
note that free apps have a constant (zero) price, such that no instrumentation is required in their case.
38However, if permissions are introduced at a later point, even a panel approach could fail. In our favor, the
endogeneity problem is somewhat mediated by the fact that functionality and offering pairs of apps are strategic
choices. Developers must make these choices and introduce the implied permissions before demand can be observed.
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A third source of endogeneity could be a survivor bias that could affect our cross section speci-
fications. This is because our cross-section consists only of survivors (until 2012) and the likelihood
of app survival might depend on an app’s use of permissions. If app survival is negatively related to
permission use, e.g., through app demand, we would only observe apps that are relatively successful
such that a potentially negative permission effect on demand would again be underestimated. To
study whether the use of privacy-sensitive permissions is related to apps’ likelihood of survival, we
correct for the potential bias from this selection process. We provide results based on Heckman selec-
tion models (Heckman, 1979), which confirm our baseline findings, in Appendix Table A10(Appendix
A.1).
Our remaining strategies to deal with the threats to identification are based on using different
data structures that aim to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity.
Panel Data Analysis: In our first approach to tackling unobserved heterogeneity, we use an app
fixed effect (αi) to estimate a panel regression model. We thus only exploit within-app variation
to address the concern that we cannot observe all heterogeneity between apps in the cross-sectional
analysis, despite our rich set of control variables. In particular, unmeasured quality and functionality
of apps could be positively correlated with both app demand and permission use (resulting in an
upward bias). To address this concern, we estimate the following fixed-effects specification:
lnDemandit = αi + βD
Privacy
it + γ lnPriceit + θXit + εit. (5)
where Demandit is measured as the monthly change in the number of ratings, and the interpretation
of the coefficient of interest, β is the same as for the cross-sectional results. A negative coefficient
would indicate that increased permission use comes with a subsequent decrease in demand.
Difference-in-Differences-Style Analysis: Our second strategy to tackle the challenge of un-
observed heterogeneity between apps is a difference-in-differences-style analysis. Specifically, we
compare the relative performance of apps with and without privacy-sensitive permissions that are
available both on Android OS and iOS and are successful enough that we could obtain their 2012
download ranking retrospectively. We run the following regression:
∆RankiOS−Andi = α+ βD
Privacy
i + γ#CleanPermi + εi,
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with∆RankiOS−Andi being defined as the difference between app i’s Apple and Android standardized
in-sample download ranks (iOSRanki − AndroidRanki).39 A negative β-coefficient indicates that
apps that use privacy-sensitive permissions have a lower download rank in Apple’s OS compared to
Android’s OS (i.e., they are downloaded relatively more often in iOS than in Android OS). This
approach exploits the fact that the Apple platform is less explicit about app permissions when users
download the apps than the Android counterpart. Therefore, Apple users may be less aware than
Android users about the private information they are sharing through the app. We thus obtain
two points of observations from each platform and can difference out the innate app characteristics
in this comparison. This allows us to measure the effect of app permissions more precisely.40 The
downside of this analysis is the small and selective sample, which consists of only 192 apps in the
top segment. However, while this analysis can only complement our main analysis of the demand
side, it can do so with a relevant set of widely used apps and an especially clean design.
6 Results
We first analyze whether cheaper apps request more privacy-sensitive permissions. Second, we
present our results on the demand side. Third, we analyze circumstantial factors (such as the
reputation of app developers), robustness, and the implied valuations of private data.
6.1 Money vs. Privacy on the Supply Side
[Table 2 (MAIN SUPPLY RESULTS) HERE]
Table 2 shows descriptive regressions that relate the supply side’s pricing choices to the use of
privacy-sensitive permissions. The two outcomes of interest are the app’s business model (cols. 1-6)
and the price charged, given that it was positive (cols. 7-10). All these regressions control for a large
set of variables that could drive app supply. These controls include the number of unproblematic
permissions and permissions that are related to ads and internet access. Columns 1-6 analyze the
developer’s decision to offer a free app or a paid app. The dependent variable is a dummy, which
equals 1 if users have to pay a positive price for downloading the app. Columns 1 and 2 analyze
the cross section, columns 3 and 4 use the panel of apps that change their business model at least
once over the five-month sample period. Hence, we use only the first and the last wave of our
39As described in section 4, we provide two versions of this measure which are based on average OS-specific
download ranks (1) according to the average rank in seven countries and (2) exclusively according US ranks.
40We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this specification.
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panel in these regressions. Columns 5 and 6 use the app pairs. In the cross section, we find that
apps that require privacy-sensitive permissions are 3.3 percent more likely to be free. Also when
we use the number of permissions to measure the presence of privacy sensitive permissions, we find
that apps are more likely to be free when they have one or more sensitive permissions.41 Thus, the
correlational results confirm the descriptive evidence showing that “a price comes with fewer privacy-
sensitive permissions.” This applies to both the presence of any privacy-sensitive permissions (col.
1) and the number of sensitive permissions (col. 2). The panel regressions in columns 3 and 4
highlight two patterns. First, less than 1 in 1000 apps switches its business model and the number
of permissions it uses over a period of five months. This low percentage suggests that the choice
of the pricing model is a strategic decision, which is not easily adjusted. Second, when using the
Dummy that indicates a switch between models, we find that moving from paid to free coincides
with an insignificant increase in the likelihood that the app requests privacy-sensitive and ad-related
permissions. However, analyzing the number of privacy-sensitive permissions (col. 4), we see that
more such permissions come with a weakly significantly lower likelihood that an app is paid. Our
analysis of the app pairs (cols. 5 and 6) confirms the cross sectional patterns even more strongly.
If one of the siblings uses sensitive permissions, it is 15.6 percent more likely to be the free version,
which again is confirmed if we use the number of permissions rather than the dummy variable.
In columns 7-10, we analyze the determinants of paid apps’ price level. Columns 7 and 8 show
cross section results, while columns 9 and 10 use the panel data. First, note that only around 47,000
apps (26.75%) have a positive price, and of those, only 211 apps (less than 1%) had any variation in
price and the number of permissions over the five-month period of observation. As in the business
model, the price of an app is hardly ever adjusted. In the cross section, in both specifications, we
see an insignificant correlation between using privacy-sensitive permissions and prices. As discussed
in section 5, the cross section coefficient for permissions could be confounded by functionality and
other factors. We can control for such unobserved heterogeneity in panel estimations, and indeed we
see a much stronger and weakly significant negative relationship in the panel. Although the scope
of our panel estimation is limited by the small number of apps that can be included, this negative
relationship is in line with the notion that apps might be trading privacy-sensitive permissions for
a lower price (and vice-versa).
41We find a coefficient equal to 0.024 which suggests that each additional permission increases the probability that
the app is free by 2.4 percent. When using the dummy DPrivacy and the number of permissions #Privacy together,
we find the dummy to be insignificant and the coefficient of #permissions still equals 0.024. We further investigate
the marginal effect in Appendix Table A4.
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Further supply-side results are shown in Appendix Table A4. In columns 1-4, we vary the
specification in the supply-side regressions to highlight further findings. Column 1 shows that apps
are more likely to be free when the number of privacy-sensitive permissions increases. In column
2, we show that developers strategically use privacy-sensitive permissions in free apps only together
with internet access, which highlights that data collection (via permissions) is more valuable for
developers if they can easily transfer the data from the app (via internet access). Columns 3 and 4
use our category-specific privacy measure (see Appendix A.3 for more details on this measure). In
columns 5-10, we contrast games and non-games, analyze moderating factors and show the results
for even more restrictively matched app pairs.
Taking all supply specifications together, we conclude that developers are trading access to
privacy-sensitive information for money. Pay strategies are particularly associated with more privacy
for the users, because paid apps request fewer sensitive permissions.
6.2 Demand-Side Analysis
[Table 3 (MAIN DEMAND RESULTS) HERE]
Cross Section: Table 3 shows our main results for the relationship between app demand and the
presence of privacy-sensitive permissions. We show (1) descriptive regressions for the full cross section
(cols. 1-3), (2) fixed-effects panel regressions (cols. 4 and 5), and (3) a difference-in-differences-style
(DiD) analysis (cols. 6 and 7). The demand measure (dependent variable) is the monthly change
in the number of ratings (in logs). Column 1 shows the raw correlation between permissions and
demand. Absent any control variables, the coefficients for both the privacy-sensitive permission
dummy and the number of nonsensitive permissions have positive signs, which are presumably re-
lated to confounding factors. More permissions could be related to greater functionality, which leads
to more demand. After we add control variables and controls for permissions that allow internet
access and to show ads (col. 2), the positive coefficient of the dummy capturing privacy-sensitive
permissions becomes negative (-6.5%) and significant. In contrast, the coefficient of unproblematic
permissions remains positive and significant throughout all cross-section-based specifications. Also
the coefficient for ad-related permissions is positive, which points to the need for more rigorous
estimation strategies, such as panel techniques. In column 3 we use the number of privacy-sensitive
permissions as an alternative measure of potential intrusion. Also with this measure we find a sig-
nificant and negative coefficient for privacy-sensitive permissions, whereas we find a positive one for
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unproblematic permissions.42 Both columns (2 and 3) document that privacy-sensitive permissions
are associated with lower demand.
Panel Data Analysis: Columns 4-7 in Table 3 probe the robustness of our cross section results
by accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity of apps. Columns 4 and 5 show the results of our
fixed-effects panel regression analysis. We run a fixed-effects panel regression for apps that changed
the number of privacy-sensitive permissions during our period of observation. The results show that
privacy-sensitive permissions are associated with lower demand, independently of whether we look at
the presence of any (dummy) or the number of sensitive permissions. Similarly, the introduction of
ads is no longer positive (unlike in the cross section, where ads are associated with greater demand,
due to potential endogeneity).
Difference-in-Differences-Style Analysis: Our second approach to tackle unobserved hetero-
geneity is a DiD-style comparison of the same app’s success in both the Google Play Store and in
Apple’s App Store. In columns 6 and 7 we compare the difference in apps’ download rankings in
Google’s Play Store and Apple’s App Store for apps that request sensitive permissions to the differ-
ence in the rankings for apps that do not request such permissions. Column 6 uses the aggregated
rankings of seven countries whereas column 7 uses only US rankings. In both estimations, the value
of the within-app rank difference between the two OS (iOS minus Android) is weakly significantly
smaller for apps that require privacy-sensitive permissions, which indicates that apps with privacy-
sensitive permissions perform relatively poorly on Android’s platform.43 Specifically, our results
suggest a difference in the rank difference of the two groups of apps equal to 12.6 ranks for the
results based on the broader set of countries and a difference of 15 ranks for the US-based results.
Thus, both specifications confirm the cross section-based results, indicating a negative relationship
between privacy-sensitive permissions and demand.
Above, we have presented our baseline result. Consumers have lower demand for apps that
request privacy-sensitive permissions. We now move on to analyze moderators that amplify or reduce
42The coefficient for#Privacy of 0.021 suggests a 2.1 percent lower demand for each additional permission. However,
when estimating the dummy DPrivacy and the number of permissions #Privacy jointly, we find a significant coefficient
of -0.049 for DPrivacy and the coefficient of #Privacy is significant at -0.011 which suggests a non-linear effect, which
we further investigate in column 1 of Appendix Table A9.
43Already the raw mean values of the OS-specific rankings confirm this finding: The mean rank of apps with(out)
privacy-sensitive permissions in the iOS is 50.2(58.5) whereas in the Android OS these mean values equal 52.4 (with
such permissions) and 52 (without such permissions). Thus, in the iOS apps with privacy-sensitive permissions have
a lower mean rank, i.e., they are more successful than apps without such permissions. In contrast, in the Android
OS, if one group has a higher mean rank, it is the group of apps with privacy-sensitive permissions, i.e., apps using
such permissions in the Android OS are less successful than apps that do not use such permissions.
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the size of this relationship (Table 4) in subsection 6.3. Section 6.4 then provides an extensive series of
robustness checks that aim to reduce the role of unobserved heterogeneity in the cross section. Also,
we use alternative measures of demand and of privacy, apply alternative estimation specifications,
and split our estimation sample into various subsamples.
6.3 Moderating Factors on the Demand Side
Previous literature (cf. Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman, 2016) has shown that the role of privacy
concerns depends on an app’s context. In this subsection we analyze how privacy concerns for mobile
apps depend on their context. We take inspiration from a framework by Chellappa and Sin (2005)
which highlights the trade-offs that consumers face when choosing how much personal information to
share in exchange for better services. Chellappa, Sambamurthy, and Saraf (2010) embed these trade-
offs in a formal mechanism design problem that captures three key moderators of aggregate privacy
concerns, that arise in our empirical context: (i) the composition of consumers, (ii) trust-inspiring
measures by firms, and (iii) the nature and amount of the requested private information.44 Three
predictions can be derived from this model (and the broader privacy literature in general). First, if
developers can implement trust-inspiring measures, privacy concerns are reduced, that is, users are
more willing to adopt products that request sensitive information. Second, we expect differences
in the willingness to share sensitive information among subgroups of the total population of users
- specifically, we expect mature users to be more aware or cautious than younger users in adopting
privacy-sensitive apps. Third, and lastly, users might more hesitantly adopt apps with the ability
to collect personal information if they operate in sensitive contexts, in which the shared information
might be abused or used to discriminate against the consumer. Examples of such contexts are
health-related or financial apps.
In Table 4 we highlight examples in which trust (cols. 1-4), the targeted user group (cols. 5-6),
and the sensitivity of the shared information (cols. 7-8) indeed moderate the relationship between
privacy sensitive permissions and app demand: For each of these factors, we separately estimate apps
of a specific type (e.g., apps that have a privacy policy) and apps that do not satisfy the criterion.
The coefficient of interest is DPrivacy and, specifically, we compare the coefficient for two groups of
apps and analyze whether it is equal for both groups or not. This analysis serves a double function.
44 In Chellappa, Sambamurthy, and Saraf (2010) consumers have heterogeneous privacy concerns, and a monop-
olist uses technology to reduce the disutility from requesting personal information. The monopolist offers a menu
and decides on optimal personalization with and without subsidization. The model’s technology parameter allows
accommodating trust-inspiring measures or extending personalization disutility beyond nuisance from targeting to
accommodating worries about very sensitive information, or other sources of concern, such as identity theft or em-
barrassment.
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First, if privacy concerns drive our results, the relationship of interest should vary by context as
theory predicts. Second, we can generate additional insights into how and in which contexts privacy
concerns matter in the market for mobile apps.
[Table 4 (MODERATING FACTORS) HERE]
In columns 1-4 of Table 4, we analyze the role of apps’ past success and trust-enhancing measures
such as privacy policies. Columns 1 and 2 study how the effects vary for top apps with a very large
user base (i.e. apps with more than 75,000 installations). Among apps with a very large user
base, we observe no negative correlation between the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions and
demand, whereas for less successful apps the negative effect prevails. Columns 3 and 4 estimate how
the relationship of interest differs for apps that are transparent about their privacy policy. Apps
that publish a directly accessible privacy policy in the Google Play Store would be expected to
inspire additional trust from app users. Indeed, among apps with an easily accessible privacy policy,
sensitive permissions have no statistically significant effect.45 Columns 5-6 in Table 4 analyze the
role of privacy concerns for different user groups. Columns 5-6 look at how the coefficient estimates
differ for apps that are not suitable for children or young adults. Privacy might be a greater concern
in such apps, because they target a different group of users, who are, on average, more privacy
sensitive.46 The significantly more negative coefficient for DPrivacy in column 5 highlights that
mature users (or no indication) avoid privacy sensitive permissions more actively, while apps that
are suitable for children are less punished for using privacy-sensitive permissions.47 In columns 7-8,
we separately analyze the most sensitive category of apps, medical and health-related apps, because
we would expect the relevance of privacy concerns to differ for this category.48 Indeed, we see that
users of medical and health-related apps seem to avoid privacy-sensitive permissions more than users
of other genres.
This subsection highlights that reputation, the app’s target group, and the sensitivity of the
app’s context moderate the negative relationship between using privacy-sensitive permissions and
45Similar findings emerge for apps from “top developers” (which receive a visible badge from the Play Store ad-
ministration) or when we separately analyze corporate apps or apps from large and well-known websites (Facebook,
Amtrak, banks, Starbucks, etc.; cf. Appendix Table A7). Note that we do not claim that these coefficients measure
the causal relationship. We point out, however, that we control for the mere fact that apps with privacy policies might
be published by more experienced suppliers (and possibly are better apps).
46The results could also be explained by differences in the type of content.
47Similar results emerge for games (cf. Appendix Table A7). In this group of apps, users reveal the least sensitive
information, and many users are children or young adults.
48Besides a general reluctance to digitize health-related information, users might suspect developers to have incen-
tives for sharing their information with insurance companies, for which health-related information about users and
their health-related behaviors is very valuable.
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app demand. We found the strongest positive moderating effect for well known apps and for apps
that adopt a privacy policy. The strongest negative moderation was found for health-related apps.
In Appendix Tables A7 and B5 we show the robustness of these results to considering alternative
moderating factors or different specifications.
6.4 Robustness
We begin this section by discussing the results of our alternative supply-side estimations (Appendix
Table A4). Specifically, we show that the main results do not change if we use more rigorous match-
ing or subsamples and that the moderating factors from the demand-side analysis are also present on
the supply side. We then move on to the robustness of our demand-side results. We show additional
panel specifications (Appendix Table A5), and more DiD results (Appendix Table A6). In addition,
we analyze alternative demand measures (e.g., installation-based demand measures; Appendix Ta-
ble A8), different ways of measuring privacy-sensitive permissions (Appendix Tables A9 and A14),
employing alternative estimation strategies (Appendix Tables A10), and considering/omitting sub-
segments of the market (Appendix Tables A7, and A11).
6.4.1 Supply Side
The supply side is robust to using alternative definitions of privacy and subsamples:
In Appendix Table A4 we test the robustness of our supply-side results that analyze the business
model choice, that is, the dependent variable is again the dummy equal to one if an app is a paid
version. In columns 1-6, we varied the specification in the supply-side regressions to verify both
that our results do not depend on our privacy variable and that they hold within subsamples of our
data such as games and normal apps. The main cross section results do not depend on the choice
of the specific privacy measure. For increasing numbers of privacy-sensitive permissions, apps are
more likely to be free (column 1). Column 2 shows that developers use privacy-sensitive permissions
in free apps only together with internet access, highlighting that data collection (via permissions)
requires internet access to transfer the data from the app. In columns 3-4, we use our category-
specific privacy measure and show that our results are robust to this context-specific definition of
privacy-intrusiveness (see Appendix A.3 for more details on this measure). Columns 5 and 6 show
that our baseline finding holds for both non-game apps (column 5) and games (column 6). For both
groups, we find a negative significant effect.
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Supply-side results are robust to including moderating factors and to using more rig-
orously matched app pairs: In columns 7-10 in Appendix Table A4, we analyze the role of
moderating factors on the supply side and restrict the pairs dataset even further to rule out un-
observed heterogeneity as an explanation of our results. Columns 7 and 8 show that the role of
reputation as a moderating factor is just as influential for the supply side as for the demand side.
In column 7 we separately analyze apps with a large user base (more than 10,000 installations),
and in column 8 we analyze apps that are associated with a popular website (low traffic rank on
Alexa.com). Such apps are generally less likely to be paid versions, but if they are paid, they are
more likely to require privacy-sensitive permissions. Columns 9 and 10 analyze the robustness of our
supply-side results from the app pairs data by applying more restrictive matching for the pairs data:
here we only consider pairs with no difference in description and code length, which was verified by
human coders. These results show again that privacy-sensitive permissions are more likely in free
apps, independent of how restrictive we are in our matching of the app pairs.
Taken together, these results confirm our baseline findings for the supply side in Table 2.
6.4.2 Demand Side
Panel estimations are robust to using alternative samples and specifications: Next,
we run alternative panel fixed-effect regressions, which use an alternative set of controls, employ
alternative datasets and vary the explanatory variable of interest. This check ensures that our
demand-side results do not critically depend on our choice of controls, the sampling, or the variable
of interest. In Appendix Table A5 we show these additional panel fixed-effect regressions. The
estimated coefficient of interest remains essentially unchanged for the specification in column 1,
where we include only a reduced set of controls (we include only alternative sets of permissions) or
when the data are limited to apps that introduced permissions, but no major update to functionality,
during our period of observation (column 3). Moreover, we see similar results when analyzing the
number of sensitive permissions, rather than an indicator of their presence (cols. 4-6). Finally, the
panel results are also robust to using a category-specific definition of privacy-sensitive permissions,
as shown in Appendix Table A14. Altogether, the main results are confirmed, and the estimated
effect of introducing permissions is even a bit larger when we restrict the sample to apps without
any improvements in functionality.
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DiD-style comparison is robust to using alternative measures of the ranking difference:
In Appendix Table A6 we test the robustness of our DiD-style setup to alternative methods of
computing the difference in iOS and Android rankings as well as to splitting the sample into game and
non-game apps. As before, the dependent variable captures differences in the download rankings of
an app on the two platforms (iOS App Store rankings minus Google Play Store rankings). Columns
1, 2, 5, and 6 compare the apps’ average rankings in the seven countries for which we collected
rankings, whereas columns 3 and 4 use only US ranks. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 3
is difference between the simple ranking averages, whereas in columns 2 and 4 we use the difference
between the newly created in-sample ranks within the OS (as in the baseline demand table), which
is based on the average download rankings we observed on AppAnnie.com. Columns 5 and 6 also
use the difference between the in-sample rankings based on the average download ranks but contrast
games (col. 6) with other apps (col. 5). All specifications except specification 6, which covers only
games, show a significant negative effect for privacy-sensitive permissions.49 This corroborates that
apps with privacy-sensitive permissions are on average more successful in the Apple iOS than in the
Android OS where these permissions are visible to the user before the app is installed. Thus, the
results reaffirm our baseline demand results despite using a completely different sample of apps and
a completely different identification approach.
Demand-side results are robust to using alternative demand and app popularity mea-
sures: In Appendix Table A8 we verify that our main findings for the demand side do not depend
on our preferred demand measure. Specifically, we estimate our main specification with eight ten al-
ternative demand measures based on ratings (cols. 1 and 2), the direct measure of installations (cols.
3-5), and three measures of predicted monthly new installations (cols. 6-8). Our main demand-side
results remain the same, independent of whether we use measures based on installations or measures
based on ratings or of how we vary the time window of ratings- or installation growth (cols. 1-5).
Similarly, when we use predicted changes in the number of installations (cols. 6-8), our results
are also confirmed. In columns 6-8 we apply three measures of predicted installation numbers.
For each of the measures, we exploit the cross-section information on changes in ratings to predict
changes in installation numbers. In column 6, we predict monthly installation changes in April 2012
based on the observed change in the number of ratings. In column 7, we predict installation changes
49The insignificant effect for games is in line with additional alternative results, which show that a weaker or even
an insignificant relationship between privacy-sensitive permissions and demand exists for games (see Appendix Tables
A7 and B5).
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between April and September 2012 based on the observed change in ratings during this period. For
both specifications, we use a parametric log-log-specification to predict the change in the number of
installations (cf. cols. 2 and 4 of Appendix Table A12). In column 8 of Appendix Table A8 we use
a measure of non-parametrically predicted monthly installations in April 2012.
Finally, in columns 9 and 10 we study how the existence of privacy-sensitive permissions affects
apps’ popularity as measured by their average ratings. In column 9 the dependent variable is the
average rating in April 2012 (which is between one and five stars), whereas in column 10 it is the
average rating between April and September 2012. Both specifications indicate that apps receive
worse ratings if they use privacy-sensitive permissions.
Demand-side results are robust to using alternative privacy measures: We verify that
our results do not depend on our workhorse definition of what is considered “privacy sensitive” by
estimating our main specification with multiple alternative definitions. Specifically, in Appendix
Table A9 we show our main regression for eight alternative privacy measures. These measures
include Google’s own classification, the definition by Sarma, Li, Gates, Potharaju, Nita-Rotaru, and
Molloy (2012), a category-specific measure, and one derived via classifiers from Amazon Mechanical
Turk. The results show that the negative relationship between privacy-sensitive permissions and
demand holds across six of the eight measures that we consider, and in column 7 only one out of
four permission groups has a positive coefficient.50 The only measure with a positive relationship is
the privacy grade provided by Lin, Hong, and Sadeh. (2014), which grades apps’ privacy intrusiveness
in 2014 for a subsample of our data. The positive coefficient indicates that demand is higher for
apps with a bad privacy grade. This finding was unexpected but could be explained by the fact that
the privacy grades are based on analyzing app’s software libraries, which is possible only if apps
use standard software libraries. Using such libraries might require a certain level of experience and
professionalism and thus might pick up unobserved developer quality.
As in our baseline results, DAds and the number of unproblematic permissions are positively
associated with demand in all specifications, which indicates that unproblematic permissions, unlike
privacy-sensitive permissions, do not lead to lower demand but might capture functionality and
therefore might have a positive coefficient.51 We also would like to highlight the results in column
7, where we distinguish between permissions by type. Two out of four permission groups have a
50That DID would have a positive coefficient is surprising at first sight, but the permission was hard to recognize
for users as intrusive in 2012, as it was called “READ_PHONE_STATE.”
51Recall, though, that DAds has a negative effect when using within variation in our panel data in Table 3.
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negative, significant coefficient (DLocation, DProfile), one coefficient (DCommunication) is insignificant,
and one (DID) seems to be positively associated to demand. Even though they are based on
an analysis of the cross section, these findings might indicate that users have different degrees of
willingness to share certain types of information and warrant further research using individual user-
level data. Moreover, we analyze category-specific privacy-sensitive permissions in additional depth.
The “category-specific” definition takes into account that privacy is context dependent, and considers
that apps in a certain category might need access to certain data to perform their services.52 In
Appendix A.3 we discuss the measure, and especially in Appendix Table A14, we show the main
demand-side results for the cross section and panel also hold if we use the category-specific definition.
Demand-side results are robust to accounting for censoring, selection, network effects,
and endogeneity: We also run the main regressions with alternative estimation methods to verify
that our demand-side findings are not merely due to our OLS-specification. In Appendix Table A10
we use Tobit estimation to account for the possibility of censoring in the dependent variable (cols.
1-2). In addition, in columns 3 and 4 we provide results from Heckman selection models, where we
model apps’ survival between April and September 2012 (col. 3) as well as apps’ survival between
2012 and 2014 (col. 4). We also include controls that account for potential network effects (col.
5) and introduce instruments for potential endogeneity in prices and developers’ use of permissions
(cols. 6-9). None of these alternative specifications drastically changes our baseline findings.
Sample splits and success: In Appendix Table A7 we show that alternative moderating factors
highlight similar patterns as documented in Table 4. The table analyzes the moderating role of the
following factors: (1) top developer-status (cols. 1-2), (2) apps connected or not connected to a well
known website (using Alexa ranks) (cols. 3-4), (3) games vs. non-games (cols. 5-6), and (4) pricing
strategy (cols. 7-8). Also for these moderating factors, the strength of the effect varies along similar
lines as in our main results.
Next, we test whether our main result is robust to excluding the most and the least successful
apps.53 This robustness check allows us to exclude the possibility that only a few apps drive our
results and provides additional insights into the anatomy of our main demand-side results. Appendix
Table A11 shows that excluding the most successful apps (5% of apps with the highest demand;
cols. 1 and 2) and excluding both the most and least successful apps (those without any new rating
52E.g., a running app needs access to its user’s location.
53We thank one of the anonymous referees for suggesting this additional test.
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in April 2012; cols. 5 and 6) does not change our findings. We found an insignificant permission
coefficient only by disregarding the least successful apps (cols. 3 and 4). However, this finding is
not robust to including a dummy that equals one if an app already has a user base of more than
10,000 installations as well as an interaction term with privacy-sensitive permissions. Doing so, we
also find a negative significant effect for privacy-sensitive permissions for that sample. The dummy
and the interaction term together capture the influence of an app’s reputation (as in the analysis
of moderating factors). This finding corroborates the role of reputation as a moderating factor and
suggests that large and established apps may have easier access to sensitive user data than other
players. Unknown apps face a penalty for requesting privacy-sensitive information.54
6.5 Implied Valuations
We now turn to discussing the value of privacy-sensitive permissions, as implied by our demand
and supply estimates. We do so by comparing the estimated demand coefficient for privacy-sensitive
permissions with the own-price elasticity of apps. Both higher prices and the use of sensitive permis-
sions are associated with lower demand. From the cross-section results the coefficient for apps that
use sensitive permissions is about 0.9 times the size of that corresponding to a 1 percent increase in
price. The panel estimates indicate that ratio is 1.5, suggesting that the penalty for using sensitive
permissions is equal to the penalty corresponding to a 1.5 percent higher price. The average price
of paid apps of 2 euros implies a lower bound “willingness to avoid” of 2-3 euro cents. We reiterate,
however, that our work suffers from limitations, and we consider our coefficients to be lower-bound
estimates of the effect of introducing such permissions, because of the endogeneity concerns that
result from imprecise demand measures and unobserved app quality. Hence, the implied valuations
should be used carefully, and any policy implications require validation with individual-level or
experimental data.
To derive a valuation for data on the developer side, a first meaningful way of quantifying this
value can be based on columns 1-2 in Table 2, where we observe that a privacy-sensitive permission
is associated with a 15 percent higher probability that an app is free. Multiplying this by the average
price of a paid app (2 euros) gives an estimate of 30 euro cents. We find a similar value if we use the
results from the price choice model (Table 2, col. 9). The coefficient of privacy-sensitive permissions
(-0.118) indicates that developers are willing to reduce the app price by around 12 percent if the app
has a privacy-sensitive permission. This implies a price reduction of 24 euro cents for the average
54Alternatively, we split the sample by apps’ past success and verified that the negative relationship between
demand and privacy-sensitive permissions is not driven by a specific segment of apps with large or small user bases.
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paid app. Again, these estimates suffer from severe limitations, and they are likely confounded by
other sources of income that the free apps can generate (building a user base, etc.). We leave it to
future research to evaluate the developers’ valuations more precisely.
7 Discussion
We document that private information plays a critical role in the market for mobile apps, because
it resembles a second “means of payment.” On the supply side, app developers ask for more
privacy-sensitive permissions in exchange for a free app, or they offer a less privacy-sensitive app
for a higher price. On the demand side, we observe fewer installations for apps that request more
privacy-sensitive permissions. Together these results highlight a money-for-privacy trade-off in the
market for mobile apps.
We use various subsets of data to obtain our results: a full cross section, panel data, carefully
selected app siblings, and a DiD-style strategy that compares the same app on the two biggest app
platforms. We can show the relationship for both the supply and demand for apps, and our extensive
set of robustness checks highlights the robustness of our findings. Our conclusions persist across
(1) different ways of quantifying intrusiveness, (2) several alternative classifications to measure the
sensitivity of permissions (Google’s own classification, the definition by Sarma, Li, Gates, Potharaju,
Nita-Rotaru, and Molloy (2012), a category-specific measure, and one derived via classifiers from
Amazon Mechanical Turk), (3) several conceptualizations of demand (ratings, installations, first-
differences, etc.), and (4) several alternative estimation approaches.
Two patterns emerge from our analysis. First, we find economically significant demand-side
effects.55 To be precise, our (lower-bound) estimate of consumers’ willingness to avoid sharing
personal information is between 2 and 3 euro cents. These estimates are between the extremes
of the privacy valuations found in experimental work and other contexts (Beresford, Kübler, and
Preibusch, 2012; Carrascal, Riederer, Erramilli, Cherubini, and de Oliveira, 2013; Grossklags and
Acquisti, 2007). However, our estimates are considerably smaller than previous estimates for apps
based on surveys (Savage and Waldman, 2014), even though the Android OS makes the information
very explicit. The potential explanations include: (1) Users might simply show behavioral biases and
overstate their preference for privacy in surveys or experiments. (2) We provide only lower-bound
estimates of the users’ true reaction to privacy sensitive permissions, because of data limitations in
our demand measure and the challenge of fully isolating the effect of privacy sensitivity from that of
55Note that our data predate increased public awareness of data collection by the US National Security Agency.
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functionality. (3) Having too much unstructured information about permissions might be like having
no information at all. While the first explanation stresses the importance of using observational
data for appropriately estimating consumers’ valuations, the third hypothesis could align our small
coefficients with the findings of Savage and Waldman (2014), who found that consumers valued an
app’s access to private information much more negatively, but only after receiving information about
the permissions’ implications. To test whether information overflow is the underlying reason, simple
pieces of summary information should suffice to reduce the gap between earlier findings and ours.56
The second key pattern in our analysis emerges from our analysis of moderating factors. We
confirm users’ generally negative attitude toward privacy-sensitive permissions but also show that
this finding does not always hold. The strength of the relationship depends on the context as well
as app and user characteristics, which confirms previous research (Acquisti, John, and Loewenstein,
2013; Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman, 2016; Chellappa and Sin, 2005; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2012).
For example, the negative effect of permissions is weaker if privacy-sensitive permissions are common
in an app category or if it is likely that a consumer is relatively young. However, the negative
relationship between demand and permissions can also become stronger. If an app is in more
sensitive categories (such as health-related apps), intrusive permissions are associated with even
lower demand. This finding suggests that users are aware of the value of specific types of personal
information and share it more cautiously. Trust appears to be the most prominent factor, as is
documented by the insignificant effect of sensitive permissions on apps that adopt a privacy policy
and on widely adopted apps that already have a large user base. Supplementary results show
similar patterns for apps by top developers or apps that can be associated to widely used websites
(via Alexa.com). Consumers who care but do not fully understand all permissions might create this
pattern, because they might rationally prefer apps that are well known to those that are unknown.
On the positive side, such behavior allows established firms to improve their products based on
consumer data, which can increase quality. On the negative side, users’ reliance on outside reputation
might create a barrier to entry: well established apps can gather user information more easily than
newcomers, reinforcing the arguments in Campbell, Goldfarb, and Tucker (2015) and potentially
reducing innovation in the app market.
Our work suffers from several limitations, which offer avenues for further research. Although
56Suggestions include a traffic light scale of an app’s intrusiveness (Tsai, Egelman, Cranor, and Acquisti, 2011)
or local storage of the user’s information on their device (Sutanto, Palme, Tan, and Phang, 2013). Our supporting
analysis (Online Appendix Table B5) indeed indicates that Google’s “maliciousness warning” is associated with greater
avoidance. However, caution is needed, since such schemes might make it harder for developers to monetize the private
information on free apps which could reduce both supply and the adoption of apps.
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we do our best to scrutinize the robustness of our main results, we do not have ideal data. We
do not have access to the exact numbers of installations and even more precise information on an
app’s characteristics, quality, or use of ads and have to approximate these variables. Approximation
carries the risk of picking up confounding influences from ads or unmeasurable aspects of quality. We
address these concerns by intensely testing the robustness of our findings, and we further validate
our main findings on more rigorously matched subsamples. However, these strategies involve their
own compromises, such as smaller datasets, the risk of attenuation bias, and lower significance
levels. Future work could improve our research by using the exact installations numbers or daily
active users, which is developers’ most preferred measure of usage. Moreover, we cannot completely
eliminate two problems: (1) Time-variant unobserved heterogeneity cannot be controlled by a panel
fixed effect.57 (2) When conditioning on apps without functionality improvement, we fail to observe
developers who introduce sensitive and unnecessary permissions alongside a new feature. This caveat
reduces the power of our specification. Similarly, the analyzed moderating factors do not change
over time, which disallows a panel analysis. Hence, these additional results are based on conditional
correlations in the cross section. For example, the weaker negative relationship between permissions
and demand for younger consumers should be validated with user-level data. Such information is
needed to decide whether young users install apps with too little reflection or whether older users
are too cautious. Hence, great care is warranted before any policy changes can be implemented in
this potentially sensitive two-sided market, and further research must carefully evaluate the effects
of policy changes that aim to highlight the potential intrusiveness of an app. Lastly, further research
should analyze developers’ dynamic strategies to gain access to data in the market for mobile apps.
In sum, we see our findings as a first step in understanding the role of privacy in app markets.
Any policy implications that we suggest should be validated with individual-level or experimental
data. We believe that such a careful evaluation would be a fruitful avenue for further research.
Hence, significant unleveraged potentials might exist to further improve the performance of the
market, especially in sensitive categories.
8 Conclusion
The so-called American perspective on privacy views it as a property right (Camp, 1999). This
perspective is interesting to managers, as it suggests that private information can be negotiated
57E.g., if many apps introduce permissions at exactly the same stage of their development, and if this were positively
correlated with installation or review growth, then we would overestimate the effect;
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between firms and consumers. Our paper speaks to this view and documents trade-offs with respect
to privacy-sensitive information for both firms and consumers in the market for mobile apps. The app
market is economically relevant and offers previously unknown potential for collecting information
about consumers. A money-for-privacy trade-off in this market matters, because it suggests a cost
for greater privacy protection, independent of whether such protection is desired.
We base our evidence on large observational data that reflect revealed preferences. We analyzed
information on nearly all the apps in Google’s Android Market in 2012 (around 300,000 apps). We
augmented the data with additional information from Alexa.com, privacygrade.org, and AppAn-
nie.com. Using these data, we study the role of privacy in both the supply and demand for mobile
apps. Specifically, we study (1) whether developers use app permissions to collect private informa-
tion about users (e.g., information about their communication behavior, location and profile), and
(2) how consumers’ installation behavior is related to privacy-sensitive permissions.
Using several datasets, with alternative measures of intrusiveness and multiple specifications,
we document that private information plays a prominent role on both sides of this market: App
developers offer either a lower price for a more privacy-sensitive app or a higher price for more privacy.
Consumers choose between these two options (privacy and money), and we indeed find a small but
robust and economically significant negative relationship between permissions and demand.
In addition, the sensitivity of consumers toward apps’ permissions was found to depend on the
app’s context: Demand is lower for apps with content that is rated as appropriate for older users, or
in more sensitive categories, such as health-related apps. The negative correlation between demand
and permissions disappears for known apps and apps that adopt a privacy policy. This differential
behavior is in line with consumers who find it difficult to evaluate whether they are installing a
privacy-endangering product and react by favoring brands and apps that have been widely adopted.
Yet, we also found more cautious behavior in sensitive contexts, such as health, which suggests that
consumers are considering costs and benefits when sharing their information.
Our results suggest that the app market is a favorable environment for established apps who seek
to collect information about their consumers. The flip-side interpretation of this result is that the
resulting lack of trust of unknown app developers might constitute a significant barrier to entry. Such
a barrier could point to suboptimal innovative performance of the market for mobile apps especially
in “sensitive” categories, such as health-related apps. If consumers lack sufficient knowledge to rely
on their judgment regarding privacy-sensitive permissions, a simple certificate or label by a third
party (e.g., a traffic light symbol) might help to reduce this entry barrier.
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Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Main Datasets
Cross Section Panel Pairs Android-iOS
Free Paid Free Paid Free Paid Free Paid
Outcome Measures:
∆ Ratings 9.23 2.31 89.07 34.19 67.33 6.08 27107.85 807.74
∆ Installations 3178 105 16559 743 8213 93 1.5e+06 61333
Ratings 158.53 44.50 1083.07 372.03 623.53 81.05 1.7e+05 5096.88
Installations 43374 1936 1.9e+05 11719 1.3e+05 2740 2.7e+07 2.7e+05
Price 0.00 2.01 0.00 4.41 0.00 1.37 0.00 3.04
Permissions:
#TotalPerm 4.10 2.32 8.08 6.67 3.78 3.10 11.17 5.71
DPrivacy 0.50 0.28 0.87 0.76 0.49 0.40 0.95 0.60
#Privacy 1.19 0.52 2.82 1.88 0.93 0.70 3.40 1.03
#CleanPerm 2.92 1.80 5.26 4.79 2.85 2.40 7.77 4.68
DPrivCatSpec 0.22 0.09 0.52 0.27 0.14 0.08 0.38 0.12
DMTurkEP2 0.12 0.08 0.22 0.27 0.12 0.12 0.39 0.11
DGoogle 0.35 0.16 0.66 0.49 0.25 0.21 0.64 0.20
DSarmaetal 0.47 0.25 0.85 0.70 0.46 0.35 0.90 0.52
DID 0.32 0.14 0.69 0.47 0.30 0.22 0.76 0.42
DLocation 0.29 0.10 0.61 0.31 0.21 0.12 0.46 0.17
DCommunication 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.18 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.06
DProfile 0.21 0.11 0.45 0.41 0.19 0.18 0.57 0.22
DInternet 0.81 0.44 0.98 0.85 0.82 0.56 1.00 0.86
DAds 0.55 0.21 0.89 0.63 0.56 0.31 0.91 0.60
Control Variables:
Average Rating 3.91 3.99 3.98 4.07 3.79 4.14 4.38 4.21
Size (in KB) 2192 3928 3684 8886 3207 3039 10324 13034
Length Description 730 996 1004 1612 877 874 1717 2019
Number Screenshots 3.36 3.69 4.08 5.25 3.73 3.87 5.56 5.17
Dummy: Video 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.47 0.59
Dummy: Top-Developer 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.61 0.43
Apps by Developer 92 127 63 34 14 14 10 8
Average Installations of Developer 74231 58691 1.4e+05 1.6e+05 57843 91749 1.1e+07 2.5e+06
Observations 128921 48272 30131 2964 1999 1999 94 98
Notes: The table provides an overview over the most important variables, and shows the corresponding descriptive statistics for
the four main datasets in this paper. For each dataset we show two columns, where the left column shows averages for free apps
and the second column for paid apps. The first two columns show the summary statistics for the entire cross section. The second
pair of columns (Col. 3-4) shows those for our panel data set consisting of apps having varied their use of privacy-sensitive
permissions at least once between April and September 2012. Columns 5 and 6 use the data set consisting of app-pairs where
the paid version of the app has the same or a smaller code size and where both apps have more or less the same description
length. Columns 7 and 8 show statistics for those apps for which we were able to collect for 2012 information on app ranks both
in the Play Store and in the iOS store.
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Figure 1: Relationship between New Installations and New Ratings
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Notes: The figure displays the relationship between apps’ log number of new installations and their log number of
new ratings. A linear trend is added. The data used is an aggregated version of the cross-section data set used in the
estimation sections.
Figure 2: Difference in Privacy-Sensitive Permissions between Free and Paid Twin-Apps
(a) Full Pairs Sample (N = 7211)
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(b) Selected Pairs Sample (N = 354)
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Notes: Both figures compare free and paid versions of an app-pair. On the x-axis we show the differences in the
number of privacy-sensitive permissions when comparing the pair’s free and paid version (= number of privacy-
sensitive permissions of the free app minus the number of privacy-sensitive permissions of the paid twin). The y-axis
shows the frequency, with which each difference occurs. Panel (a) shows those frequencies for the full pairs sample,
whereas panel (b) shows them for the selected sample of app pairs where we ensure that the functionality between
apps does not differ. In most cases both versions request the same number of permissions (80% of all pairs, and 59%
of the pairs with matched functionality). While the difference in average permission usage is less pronounced when
analyzing all pairs, the free app is much more likely to request sensitive permissions once we condition on observing
a difference. This pattern emerges for both pair samples, and is strongest on the pairs with no discernable difference
in functionality (1151 vs. 267 (or 80% vs. 20%) overall and 142 vs. 4 (or 97% vs. 3%) on pairs with matched
functionality).
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Figure 3: Frequency of Top 10 Privacy-Sensitive Permissions - Free & Paid
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Notes: This diagram shows how often privacy-sensitive permissions are used, both by free and paid apps.
The majority of apps do not use these permissions. However, given such permissions are used, free apps
use them more frequently than paid apps. The data used is equal to the cross-section data set used in
the estimation sections.
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Table 2: Main Supply Side Results
Business Model Choice (DPaid) Price Choice (Log. Price)
Cross-Section Panel Pairs Cross-Section Panel
DPrivacy -0.033*** -0.104 -0.156*** 0.012 -0.119*
(0.002) (0.261) (0.042) (0.008) (0.070)
#Privacy -0.024*** -0.150* -0.137*** -0.005 -0.060**
(0.001) (0.086) (0.025) (0.004) (0.025)
#CleanPerm 0.005*** 0.011*** -0.003 0.035 0.204*** 0.226*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.048** 0.068***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.030) (0.023) (0.025) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.023)
DInternet -0.219*** -0.225*** -0.627** -0.582** -0.496*** -0.517*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.004 -0.015
(0.003) (0.003) (0.290) (0.246) (0.037) (0.038) (0.007) (0.007) (0.085) (0.083)
DAds -0.119*** -0.124*** -0.347 -0.165 -0.535*** -0.547*** 0.014 0.014 -0.003 -0.039
(0.002) (0.002) (0.301) (0.250) (0.036) (0.036) (0.009) (0.009) (0.119) (0.112)
Constant 0.094*** 0.090** 10.787*** 9.913*** 3.495** 3.291** 0.060 0.065 -2.943*** -3.558***
(0.035) (0.035) (2.840) (2.754) (1.533) (1.520) (0.106) (0.106) (0.870) (0.835)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176000 176000 96 96 3998 3998 47079 47079 422 422
Num. of Groups 48 48 1999 1999 211 211
Mean of dep. Var. 0.27 0.27 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.53 0.53
SD of dep. Var. 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.62
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.322 0.963 0.971 0.618 0.622 0.223 0.223 0.177 0.183
Notes: The table shows the relationship between privacy-sensitive permissions and the strategic choices of app developers: the choice of the business model
in Columns 1-6, and the price choice in Columns 7-10. In Columns 1-6 the dependent variable DPaid measures the developer’s decision to offer their app for
money or for free. It takes the value 1 if users have to pay to download the app. Columns 1 and 2 show descriptive regressions based on the cross-section of
data, where the independent variable of interest is (1) an indicator for one or more privacy-sensitive permissions (DPrivacy in Column 1) or (2) the number of
privacy-sensitive permissions (#Privacy in Column 2). Columns 3 and 4 show panel fixed effects regressions where we restrict the sample to such apps which
changed both the number of privacy-sensitive permissions and the business model at least once between April and September 2012. Here, we use only the first
and the last wave of our data to maximize the within variation. Columns 5 and 6 use data on app-pairs where the paid version of the app has the same or a
smaller code size and where both apps have more or less the same description length. Columns 7-10 show the results for price-level choices (of paid apps). The
dependent variable is the app’s price (in logs). Columns 7 and 8 show cross sectional regressions, and Columns 9 and 10 show panel fixed effects regressions
based on the first and last wave of our data, where we restrict the sample to such apps which change both the number of privacy-sensitive permissions and
their price at least once. In all specifications we drop outliers with respect to app prices, i.e. apps with prices above 8 Euros. All of these regressions control
for the number of clean permissions and permissions that are needed to show ads. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Main Demand Side Results
Cross-Section (Log.∆Ratings) Panel (Log.∆Ratings) Difference-in-Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DPrivacy 0.012 -0.065*** -0.059*** -12.660* -14.988**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.020) (6.634) (7.215)
#Privacy -0.021*** -0.014**
(0.003) (0.007)
#CleanPerm 0.111*** 0.037*** 0.041*** -0.010** -0.005 0.849 1.011*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.643) (0.605)
DInternet -0.200*** -0.211*** 0.003 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.054) (0.053)
DAds 0.236*** 0.230*** 0.002 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.033) (0.033)
Log. Price -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.044*** -0.043***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant -0.289*** -3.871*** -3.872*** 1.198** 1.201** 4.262 2.428
(0.007) (0.122) (0.122) (0.561) (0.563) (5.735) (6.327)
Category No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Month No No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 177193 177193 177193 33095 33095 192 162
Num. of Groups 6619 6619
Mean of dep. Var. 0.10 0.10 0.10 1.63 1.63 -0.24 -3.22
SD of dep. Var. 1.55 1.55 1.55 2.23 2.23 31.81 29.27
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.294 0.294 0.033 0.033 0.013 0.025
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand on three different
data sets: Columns 1-5 exploit our cross-section and panel data; Columns 6-7 show a difference-in-differences style setup between
Google’s Play Store and the iOS App Store. In Columns 1-5 the dependent variable is demand proxied by the log. number of
monthly new ratings of an app. Columns 1-3 contain cross-section results. Column 1 shows the raw correlation between the use
of privacy-sensitive permissions and demand. Column 2 adds in controls for the app’s observed characteristics. Column 3 uses
the number of privacy-sensitive permissions as privacy indicator. Columns 4-5 show panel fixed effects regressions for those apps
within our data set that varied their use of privacy-sensitive permissions at least once between April and September 2012. We
show the results for the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions (Column 4) and their number (Column 5). In Columns 6 and
7 the dependent variable is the difference between the app’s download ranks on the iOS App Store vs. Google Play Store. In
Column 6 this difference is based on the average download ranks of seven countries, whereas in Column 7 it is based only on US
ranks. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic permissions (#CleanPerm.). Heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Moderating Factors of the Demand Side Relationship
Top Apps Privacy Policy Maturity Level Med.&Health Apps
Log. ∆Ratings No Yes No Yes High Low Yes No
DPrivacy -0.068*** 0.008 -0.070*** 0.038 -0.109*** -0.054*** -0.151*** -0.060***
(0.008) (0.029) (0.009) (0.057) (0.019) (0.010) (0.043) (0.009)
#CleanPerm 0.029*** 0.014*** 0.033*** 0.054*** 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.029** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003)
DInternet -0.122*** -0.320*** -0.192*** -0.254*** -0.108*** -0.211*** -0.106** -0.203***
(0.008) (0.040) (0.009) (0.063) (0.019) (0.010) (0.041) (0.009)
DAds 0.188*** 0.364*** 0.229*** 0.225*** 0.292*** 0.222*** 0.180*** 0.238***
(0.008) (0.033) (0.009) (0.056) (0.025) (0.010) (0.042) (0.009)
Log. Price -0.048*** 0.003 -0.070*** -0.114*** -0.050*** -0.076*** -0.056*** -0.072***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Constant -3.470*** -4.694*** -3.753*** -4.497*** -3.467*** -3.980*** -3.811*** -3.865***
(0.106) (0.499) (0.122) (0.976) (0.247) (0.140) (0.669) (0.125)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 164157 13036 170658 6535 27843 149350 6218 170975
Mean of dep. Var. -0.14 3.16 0.06 1.11 -0.18 0.15 -0.08 0.11
SD of dep. Var. 1.27 1.54 1.52 2.02 1.38 1.58 1.38 1.56
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.293 0.285 0.371 0.305 0.291 0.270 0.295
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand for subsamples
of our data. App demand is measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. Columns 1 and 2 split the sample
into apps which have a high or a low stock of installations (more or less than 75000 installations). Columns 3 and 4 split the
sample into apps with and without a privacy policy. Columns 5 and 6 split them into apps which require a high (Column 5) or
low (Column 6) maturity of the user (apps are defined as appropriate for low maturity if they classified as being recommended for
’everyone’ or for ’low maturity’-users). Columns 7 and 8 split the sample into medical and health-related apps as well as into other
apps. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic permissions (#CleanPerm.). Heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A1: App Information in the Android Market 2012
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Table A1: Permission Definitions
Permissions (Group) Description (provided by Google)
DPrivacy
DID
READ_PHONE_STATE Allows an app to the read phone status and identity.
DLocation
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION Allows an app to access approximate location derived from net-
work location sources such as cell towers and Wi-Fi.
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Allows an app to access precise location from location sources
such as GPS, cell towers, and Wi-Fi.
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS Allows an apps to access extra location provider commands.
NFC Allows apps to control Near Field Communication.
DCommunication
INTERCEPT_OUTGOING_CALLS Allows an app to see the number being dialed during an outgoing
call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or
abort the call altogether.
READ_SMS Allows an app to read SMS and MMS messages.
RECEIVE_SMS Allows an app to monitor incoming SMS messages, to record or
perform processing on them.
RECEIVE_MMS Allows an app to monitor incoming MMS messages, to record
or perform processing on them.
RECORD_AUDIO Allows an app to record audio.
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH Allows an app to monitor incoming WAP push messages.
DProfile
READ_CONTACTS Allows an app to read the user’s contacts data.
READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS Allows an app to read (but not write) the user’s browsing history
and bookmarks.
READ_LOGS Allows an app to read the low-level system log files.
GOOGLE_AUTH Allows apps to see the usernames (email addresses) of the Google
account(s) you have configured.
ACCOUNT_MANAGER Allows an app to act as an AccountAuthenticator for the Ac-
countManager.
MANAGE_ACCOUNTS Allows an app to manage the list of accounts in the Account-
Manager.
GET_ACCOUNTS Allows access to the list of accounts in the Accounts Service.
USE_CREDENTIALS Allows an app to request auth tokens from the AccountManager.
READ_SYNC_STATS Allows applications to read the sync stats.
SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_READ Allows an app to allow access the subscribed feeds Content-
Provider.
CAMERA Allows an app to take pictures and videos.
ACCESS_DOWNLOAD_MANAGER Allows an app to access the download manager and to use it to
download files.
READ_INPUT_STATE Allows an app to record what you type and actions that you
take.
MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS Allows mounting and unmounting file systems for removable
storage.
DInternet
INTERNET Allows apps to open network sockets.
DAds
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows apps to access information about networks.
Source: http://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission.html and
https://android.izzysoft.de/applists/perms?lang=en.
A2
Table A2: List of Variables
Variable Description
∆Ratings Monthly change in the number of ratings
∆Installations Monthly change in the number of installations
Ratings Number of ratings
Installations Number of installations
∆RAprSep Change in the number of ratings between April and September 2012
∆R1214 Change in the number of ratings between 2012 and 2014
∆IApr Change in the number of installations in April 2012
∆IAprSep Change in the number of installations between April and September 2012
∆I1214 Change in the number of installations between 2012 and 2014
∆RankiOS−And Aggregated difference of app i’s iOS and Android rankings
(iOSAppStoreRanki −AndroidRanki)
Price Price of apps (in Euro)
DPaid Dummy equal to one if price > 0
#TotalPerm Number of total permissions
DPrivacy Dummy equal to one if an app uses at least one of the 25 privacy-sensitive
permissions from the groups DID, DLocation, DCommunication or DProfile
as defined by Table A1
#Privacy Number of privacy-sensitive permissions
#CleanPerm Number of unproblematic permissions (i.e. #TotalPerm −#Privacy).
DSarmaetal Dummy equal to one if the app uses at least one of the permis-
sions classified as privacy-sensitive by Sarma et. al (2012), i.e.
if it uses at least one of ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, AC-
CESS_FINE_LOCATION, INTERCEPT_OUTGOING_CALLS,
READ_CONTACTS, READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS, READ_SMS,
RECEIVE_SMS, RECEIVE_MMS, RECORD_AUDIO, RE-
CEIVE_WAP_PUSH, READ_LOGS or READ_PHONE_STATE
DGoogle Dummy equal to one if the app uses at least one ’potentially malicious’ per-
mission (as classified and indicated by Google), i.e. if it uses at least one
of the following permissions: sendsmsmessages, accessdownloadmanager,
interceptoutgoingcalls, addormodifycalendareventsandsend, sendsmsre-
ceivedbroadcast, accessextralocationprovidercomma, deleteapplications,
sendwappushreceivedbroadcast, enableapplicationdebugging, retrievesys-
teminternalstate, readsmsormms, directlycallanyphonenumbers, permis-
siontoinstallalocationprov, writebrowser39shistoryandbookmar, finegpslo-
cation, receivemms, mocklocationsourcesfortesting, receivewap, editsmsor-
mms, monitorandcontrolallapplicationl, receivedatafrominternet, direct-
lyinstallapplications, presskeysandcontrolbuttons, sendstickybroadcast,
readcontactdata, displaysystemlevelalerts, modifyglobalsystemsettings, re-
trieverunningapplications, readcalendarevents, enableordisableapplication-
compon, setpreferredapplications, reorderrunningapplications, receivesms,
directlycallphonenumbers, writecontactdata, writesubscribedfeeds
DPrivCatSpec Dummy equal to one if an app uses at least one category-specific privacy-
sensitive permission. We flag a privacy-sensitive permission as problematic
within a app category if paid apps of this category use this permission on
average less often than the overall average paid app (for more details see
section A.3)
Continued on next page
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Table A2 – continued from previous page
Variable Description
DMTurkEP2 Dummy equal to one if the app uses at least one of the privacy-sensitive
permissions classified as extremely problematic by Amazon MTurk survey
participants, i.e. if it uses at least one of READ_SMS, RECORD_AUDIO,
INTERCEPT_OUTGOING_CALLS, READ_LOGS
DPGrade Dummy equal to one if the app got a bad rating equal to ’B’, ’C’ or ’D’
from Lin et al. (2014.) (published on privacygrade.org in 2014), i.e. if it
got a rating indicating the app is privacy-intrusive
Average rating Average of the ratings the app has received so far (between 1 and 5 stars)
ARApr Average of the ratings the app has received in April 2012
ARAprSep Average of the ratings the app has received between April and September
2012
Size Code size of the app (in KB)
App description Length of the app description (in number of characters)
Number of screenshots Number of screenshots available in the app description
Video Dummy equal to one if a video is available in the app description
Top developer (DTopDev) Dummy equal to one if the app is provided by a top developer (measured
by a badge, awarded by Google)
Apps by developer (AppByDev) Number of available apps of the developer
Average installations of developer Average number of installations of the developer’s other apps
ShareDevPrivacy Share of other apps by developer which use at least on privacy-sensitive
permission
Average price of competitors Average price of competitor apps
Average installations of competitors Average installations of competitor apps
Average rating of competitors Average rating of competitor apps
ShareCompPrivacy Share of competitor apps which use at least one privacy-sensitive permis-
sion
App category Categorical variable indicating apps’ category
Maturity level Categorical variable indicating the recommended necessary maturity level
of app users (’everyone’, ’low maturity’, ’medium maturity’, ’high matu-
rity’, ’not rated’)
DMaturity Dummy equal to one if the app requires medium or high maturity or is not
rated
App version Version number of app
Minimum Android version Minimum compatible Android OS version
Maximum Android version Maximum compatible Android OS version
DNumInst Dummy equal to one if the app has accumulated 10000 or more installations
since its market entry
DTransp Dummy equal to one if the app has published a privacy policy, email and
website address that are directly accessible from the Play Store
DAlexaRank Dummy equal to one if the app has a high ranking on Alexa.com, i.e. its
website traffic rank is lower than 10000
DGame Dummy equal to one if the app is a game
DMedHealth Dummy equal to one if the app is a health or medical app
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Table A3: Summary Statistics - Cross-Section April 2012
mean sd min p10 p50 p90 max
Outcome Measures:
∆Ratings 7.35 29.78 0 0 0 12 403
∆Installations 2340 64892 0 0 0 0 22500000
Ratings 127.47 1026.34 1 1 7 142 160404
Installations 32085 2.1e+05 3 30 3000 30000 30000000
Price 0.55 2.41 0 0 0 1 136
Permissions:
#TotalPerm 3.62 3.77 0 0 3 9 114
DPrivacy 0.44 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
#Privacy 1.00 1.56 0 0 0 3 23
#CleanPerm 2.61 2.57 0 0 2 6 92
DPrivCatSpec 0.19 0.39 0 0 0 1 1
DMTurkEP2 0.11 0.31 0 0 0 1 1
DGoogle 0.30 0.46 0 0 0 1 1
DSarmaetal 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
DID 0.27 0.45 0 0 0 1 1
DLocation 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 1 1
DCommunication 0.06 0.24 0 0 0 0 1
DProfile 0.18 0.39 0 0 0 1 1
DInternet 0.71 0.45 0 0 1 1 1
DAds 0.46 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
Control Variables:
Average Rating 3.93 0.97 1 3 4 5 5
Size (in KB) 2665 5809 4 76 852 6500 461000
Length Description 803 791 7 172 509 1837 12285
Number Screenshots 3.45 1.89 0 2 3 6 8
Dummy: Video 0.10 0.31 0 0 0 1 1
Dummy: Top-Developer 0.01 0.07 0 0 0 0 1
Apps by Developer 101 388 1 1 6 186 3548
Average Installations of Developer 69998 6.8e+05 0 210 8157 130178 75000000
Observations 177193
Notes: The table provides summary statistics for our estimation sample based on the cross-section from April 2012. The
discrepancy between our sample and the full app population of around 300,000 apps is mainly due to excluding apps which (a)
were not available in some of the subsequent monthly waves we use for our panel analysis, (b) apps which lack relevant variables,
(c) apps which have a stock of zero installations or ratings as well as (d) outliers with respect to our main demand measure.
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Table A4: Alternative Supply Side Results
Privacy Measures Non-Games vs Games Moderating Factors App Pairs
DPaid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
#Privacy=1 -0.010***
(0.003)
#Privacy=2 -0.058***
(0.003)
#Privacy≥3 -0.111***
(0.004)
DPrivacy 0.012* -0.012*** -0.057*** -0.062*** -0.037*** -0.246***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.054)
DPrivacy ×DInternet -0.055***
(0.007)
DPrivCatSpec -0.102***
(0.003)
#PrivCatSpec -0.045***
(0.001)
DPrivacy ×DNumInst 0.144***
(0.003)
DNumInst -0.322***
(0.003)
DPrivacy ×DAlexaRank 0.046**
(0.018)
DAlexaRank -0.109***
(0.016)
#Privacy -0.199***
(0.029)
#CleanPerm 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.012*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.031 0.051**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.025)
DInternet -0.223*** -0.209*** -0.216*** -0.220*** -0.206*** -0.221*** -0.209*** -0.217*** -0.392*** -0.422***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.047) (0.047)
DAds -0.122*** -0.117*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.127*** -0.139*** -0.106*** -0.114*** -0.522*** -0.531***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.051) (0.048)
Constant 0.081** 0.085** 0.080** 0.087** -0.067* 0.087 0.127*** 0.133*** -0.411 -0.167
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.088) (0.034) (0.039) (0.687) (0.667)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176000 176000 176000 176000 145972 30028 176000 145126 708 708
Num. of Groups 354 354
Mean of dep. Var. 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.50 0.50
SD of dep. Var. 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.50
Adjusted R2 0.323 0.320 0.324 0.324 0.348 0.260 0.367 0.319 0.848 0.862
Notes: The table shows additional supply-side results for the developer’s choice of their business model. The dependent variable
is the developer’s decision to offer their app for money or for free (DPaid). Column 1 uses as privacy measure an individual
dummy for each number of privacy-sensitive permissions (1, 2 or 3 and more permissions). Column 2 uses a cross term equal
to one for apps which simultaneously use sensitive permissions and have access to the internet. Columns 3 and 4 use our
category-specfic privacy measures. Within a category we flag a privacy-sensitive permission as problematic only if paid apps of
this category use this permission on average less often than the overall average paid app. Columns 5 and 6 split the sample into
normal apps (Col. 5) and games (Col. 6). Column 7 adds a cross term for apps with a very large total number of installations
(10000 or more). Column 8 adds a cross term for apps that could be associated with a top-ranked website (on Alexa.com), i.e.
for a website with rank lower than 10000. Columns 9 and 10 analyze the most restrictive set of matched pairs (no difference in
description or only difference describes existence of ads, verified by human coders). In all specifications we drop outliers with
respect to app prices, i.e. apps with prices above 8 Euros. All of these regressions control for the number of clean permissions
and permissions that are needed to show ads. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Alternative Panel Demand Side Estimation Results
Log. ∆Ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DPrivacy -0.070*** -0.059*** -0.063**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.027)
#Privacy -0.023*** -0.014** -0.010
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
#CleanPerm -0.010** -0.010** -0.003 -0.000 -0.005 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
DInternet -0.003 0.003 0.033 -0.021 -0.014 0.012
(0.054) (0.054) (0.072) (0.054) (0.053) (0.071)
DAds 0.007 0.002 -0.041 -0.011 -0.014 -0.058
(0.033) (0.033) (0.043) (0.032) (0.033) (0.043)
Log. Price -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.037***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Constant 1.158*** 1.198** 0.749*** 1.156*** 1.201** 0.741***
(0.127) (0.561) (0.154) (0.128) (0.563) (0.155)
Category No Yes No No Yes No
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No No Yes No
Observations 33095 33095 15220 33095 33095 15220
Num. of Groups 6619 6619 3044 6619 6619 3044
Mean of dep. Var. 1.63 1.63 1.17 1.63 1.63 1.17
SD of dep. Var. 2.23 2.23 2.10 2.23 2.23 2.10
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.033 0.020 0.026 0.033 0.020
Notes: This table shows the results from fixed-effect panel regressions. The dependent variable is the log. number of monthly
new ratings of an app. We restrict our sample to apps within our data set that varied their use of privacy-sensitive permissions
at least once between April and September 2012. Columns 1-3 analyze the effect of introducing any privacy-sensitive permissions
(measured by the indicator DPrivacy ), whereas Columns 4-6 use the number of privacy-sensitive permissions as the variable
of interest. Columns 1 and 4 show the raw fixed effects regressions without controls. In Columns 2 and 5 we add control
variables and dummies to control for the apps’ categories. Columns 3 and 6 restrict the analysis to apps that introduced new
permissions without changing the app’s description (no change in the length of description). In all specifications we include
monthly fixed-effects and control for the number of unproblematic permissions. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A6: Alternative Difference-in-Differences-Style Estimation Results:
Global Ranks US Ranks Non-Games vs Games
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DPrivacy -116.468*** -12.660** -182.504*** -14.988** -25.368** 1.533
(35.327) (6.088) (58.130) (6.321) (10.316) (8.488)
#CleanPerm 0.266 0.849 0.344 1.011* 1.498** -1.310
(3.473) (0.598) (5.476) (0.595) (0.694) (1.263)
Constant 264.070*** 4.262 320.040*** 2.428 10.214 6.258
(29.120) (5.018) (48.089) (5.229) (9.514) (6.209)
Observations 192 192 162 162 96 96
Mean of dep. Var. 175.94 -0.24 176.85 -3.22 -1.07 0.59
SD of dep. Var. 188.76 31.81 274.05 29.27 32.96 30.78
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.013 0.059 0.025 0.062 -0.006
Notes: This table shows further demand side results from comparing the download ranks of an app in the iOS Appstore and
Google’s Play Store depending on whether it’s Android version uses privacy-sensitive permissions or not. The dependent variable
captures differences in the ranks on the two platforms (iOS App Store ranks minus Google Play Store ranks). Colums 1, 2, 5
and 6 compare the apps’ average ranks of the seven countries we collected ranks for, whereas Columns 3 & 4 use only the US
ranks. Columns 1 & 3 use as dependent variable the difference between the simple rank averages whereas Columns 2 & 4 use
as the dependent variable the difference between the newly created ranks within the operating system, which are based on the
average download ranks we observed on AppAnnie.com. Columns 5 & 6 also use the difference between the newly created ranks
based on the average download ranks but contrast games (Column 6) with other apps (Column 5). Heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A7: Alternative Moderating Factors
Top-Developer Alexa Rank Games Pricing Model
Log. ∆Ratings No Yes No Yes No Yes Free Paid
DPrivacy -0.065*** 0.088 -0.055*** 0.010 -0.082*** -0.020 -0.026** -0.121***
(0.009) (0.151) (0.010) (0.172) (0.010) (0.022) (0.011) (0.014)
#CleanPerm 0.036*** 0.097*** 0.035*** 0.051* 0.037*** 0.098*** 0.037*** 0.054***
(0.003) (0.031) (0.003) (0.028) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006)
DInternet -0.195*** 0.023 -0.187*** 0.152 -0.211*** -0.201*** -0.256*** -0.075***
(0.009) (0.231) (0.010) (0.264) (0.010) (0.024) (0.012) (0.013)
DAds 0.232*** 0.360** 0.226*** -0.251 0.228*** 0.157*** 0.241*** 0.039**
(0.009) (0.164) (0.010) (0.173) (0.010) (0.024) (0.010) (0.017)
Log. Price -0.071*** -0.108*** -0.071*** -0.107*** -0.068*** -0.095*** 0.000 0.099***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.024) (0.001) (0.002) (.) (0.007)
Constant -3.852*** -3.587* -3.832*** -6.650*** -3.398*** -5.120*** -3.557*** -3.416***
(0.123) (2.124) (0.136) (2.355) (0.140) (0.306) (0.152) (0.172)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176224 969 145367 771 147143 30050 128921 48272
Mean of dep. Var. 0.09 2.15 0.11 2.19 0.07 0.26 0.33 -0.50
SD of dep. Var. 1.54 2.25 1.55 2.09 1.52 1.70 1.65 1.06
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.538 0.298 0.348 0.280 0.370 0.285 0.262
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand for subsamples
of our data. App demand is measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. Columns 1 and 2 split the sample
into apps which are from a top developer (according to Google’s classification) or not. Columns 3 and 4 split the sample into
normal apps and games. Columns 5 and 6 split them into normal apps and games. Columns 7 and 8 split the sample into free and
paid apps. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic permissions (#CleanPerm.). Heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A8: Alternative Demand Measures
Ratings-Based Installations-Based Predicted New Installations Average Rating
∆RAprSep ∆R1214 ∆IApr ∆IAprSep ∆I1214 param. param. 1214 non-param. ARApr ARAprSep
DPrivacy -0.093*** -0.070*** -0.054*** -0.197*** -0.388*** -0.030*** -0.053*** -0.183*** -0.022*** -0.018***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.025) (0.036) (0.004) (0.007) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003)
#CleanPerm 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.010*** 0.014** -0.010 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.069*** 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
DInternet -0.220*** -0.250*** -0.078*** -0.206*** -0.317*** -0.092*** -0.163*** -0.416*** -0.054*** -0.056***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.025) (0.037) (0.004) (0.007) (0.026) (0.004) (0.004)
DAds 0.326*** 0.356*** 0.248*** 0.618*** 0.925*** 0.109*** 0.192*** 0.613*** 0.009** 0.014***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.037) (0.004) (0.007) (0.025) (0.004) (0.003)
Log. Price -0.114*** -0.173*** -0.038*** -0.113*** -0.307*** -0.033*** -0.058*** -0.201*** -0.002*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -4.583*** -5.540*** -3.557*** -6.936*** -13.206*** -2.248*** -3.083*** -6.608*** 0.354*** 0.360***
(0.156) (0.229) (0.196) (0.324) (0.505) (0.056) (0.100) (0.345) (0.055) (0.046)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176212 124482 177193 177193 126987 177193 177193 177193 68248 102594
Mean of dep. Var. 0.97 2.40 -0.42 0.86 4.63 -0.42 0.16 2.76 1.29 1.29
SD of dep. Var. 2.03 2.52 2.34 3.89 5.16 0.72 1.27 4.25 0.35 0.35
Adjusted R2 0.360 0.388 0.037 0.086 0.201 0.294 0.294 0.272 0.043 0.052
Notes: The table shows descriptive regressions analyzing the relationship between privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand by using various different demand and
app popularity measures. Columns 1 and 2 use alternative demand measures based on ratings, Columns 3-5 use demand measures based on installations, whereas Columns
6-8 use three measures of predicted new installations which we estimated based on the information about the number of new ratings. Columns 9 and 10 use the average
ratings of apps as a measure of app popularity. In Column 1 (2) the dependent variable is the log. number of new ratings between April and September 2012 (log. number
of new ratings between 2012 and 2014). In Column 3 the dependent variable is the log. number of new installations in April 2012. Columns 4 and 5 use the log. number of
new installations between April and September 2012 (Column 4) and between 2012 and 2014 (Column 5) as demand measures. In Columns 6-8 we apply three measures of
predicted download numbers. For each of the measures we exploit the cross-section information on changes in ratings to predict changes in installation numbers. In Column
6, we use a measure of predicted monthly installation changes in April 2012 which is based on the observed change in the number of ratings in this month (see Column 2
of Table A12). In Column 7, we use a measure of predicted installation changes between April and September 2012 which is based on the observed change in the number
of ratings in this period (see Column 4 of Table A12). In Column 8, we again use a measure of predicted monthly installation changes in April 2012 which is based on the
observed change in the number of ratings in this month (see Column 2 of Table A12), but instead of employing a parametric log-log-specification to the data, we employ a
non-parametric approach to it. In Columns 9 the dependent variable is the log. average of the ratings the app has received in April 2012, whereas in Column 10 it is the
log. average of the ratings the app has received between April and September 2012. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table A9: Alternative Privacy Measures
Log. ∆Ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
#Privacy=1 -0.054***
(0.010)
#Privacy=2 -0.087***
(0.014)
#Privacy≥3 -0.089***
(0.014)
DPrivacy -0.060*** -0.048*** -0.040*** -0.086***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.018)
DMTurkEP2 -0.021*
(0.013)
DPrivCatSpec -0.048***
(0.012)
DPGrade 0.148***
(0.020)
DPrivacy ×DInternet -0.057*** 0.025
(0.010) (0.019)
DID 0.046***
(0.009)
DLocation -0.200***
(0.014)
DCommunication -0.015
(0.016)
DProfile -0.034***
(0.011)
DSarmaetal -0.048***
(0.009)
#CleanPerm 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.048*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DInternet -0.202*** -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.288*** -0.192*** -0.204*** -0.201*** -0.202***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
DAds 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.260*** 0.236*** 0.235*** 0.219*** 0.235***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log. Price -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.094*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.071***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -3.878*** -3.872*** -3.880*** -3.785*** -3.878*** -3.867*** -3.914*** -3.870***
(0.122) (0.122) (0.123) (0.322) (0.123) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 177193 177193 177193 86834 177193 177193 177193 177193
Mean of dep. Var. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.51 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
SD of dep. Var. 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.71 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55
Adjusted R2 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.288 0.294 0.294 0.295 0.294
Notes: The table shows descriptive regressions analyzing the relationship between the presence of privacy sensitive permissions
and app demand. The dependent variable is demand for the app measured by log. number of monthly new ratings of an app.
The coefficient of interest analyzes the relationship between an app’s demand and our privacy measures. Each column presents
the results obtained when using an alternative privacy measure. Column 1 introduces an indicator for each number of permission
(having 1, 2, and 3 or more permissions). Column 2 uses a dummy variable which is equal to one if an app uses at least one
privacy-sensitive permission which was classified as very problematic by 450 microworkers we surveyed on Amazon’s mechanical
turk. In Column 3 we look at privacy sensitive permissions that are unusual for the app’s category. Within a category we
flag a privacy-sensitive permission as problematic only if paid apps of this category use this permission on average less often
than the overall average paid app. Column 4 uses the ’privacygrade’ by Lin, Hong, and Sadeh. (2014), that was made available
on privacygrade.org in 2014. The dummy is equal to one if the the app got a rating equal to ’B’, ’C’ or ’D’, i.e. a rating
indicating the app being privacy-intrusive. In Columns 5 & 6 we introduce a crossterm that is equal to one if an app uses both
at least one privacy-sensitive permission and has internet access. Column 7 disaggregates the privacy sensitive permissions into
functionality-related types of permissions. Column 8 uses an alternative definition of privacy-sensitive permissions from previous
research by Sarma, Li, Gates, Potharaju, Nita-Rotaru, and Molloy (2012), which defines only 12 permissions as privacy-sensitive.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A10: Alternative Estimation Specifications
Tobit Heckman Netw.Eff. IV-Privacy IV-Price
Log. ∆Ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DPrivacy -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.063*** -0.164*** -0.069*** -0.918*** -0.372*** -0.091*** -0.063***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.024) (0.007) (0.049) (0.017) (0.009) (0.017)
#CleanPerm 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.038*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.065*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.082***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Log. Installations 0.417***
(0.002)
DInternet -0.325*** -0.333*** -0.184*** -0.423*** -0.168*** -0.099*** -0.177*** -0.289*** -0.005
(0.020) (0.021) (0.010) (0.030) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017)
DAds 0.436*** 0.443*** 0.234*** 0.291*** 0.203*** 0.243*** 0.253*** 0.198*** 0.043**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.023) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
Log. Price -0.172*** -0.174*** -0.068*** -0.157*** 0.040*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.108*** -0.687***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.094)
Constant -8.802*** -8.975*** -3.533*** -5.781*** -6.472*** -4.141*** -4.305*** -3.970*** -3.300***
(0.266) (0.271) (0.127) (0.319) (0.100) (0.136) (0.141) (0.128) (0.197)
Category Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 177193 177193 185533 177193 177193 136040 137146 177193 48272
Mean of dep. Var. 0.10 0.10 0.10 2.40 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.50
SD of dep. Var. 1.55 1.55 1.55 2.52 1.55 1.55 1.56 1.55 1.06
Adjusted R2 0.534 0.256 0.324 0.269 0.047
Notes: The table analyzes the robustness of our main demand-side results to using alternative estimation strategies. The dependent variable is app
demand measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings, and the main variable of interest is a dummy that indicates the presence of privacy-sensitive
permissions. All columns show cross section results. Columns 1 & 2 show Tobit-regressions that account for the fact that the dependent variable might be
censored, especially might be left-censored at demand equal to 0. Column 1 sets the left-censoring limit to 0 new ratings, whereas in Column 2 in addition
a right-censoring limit equal to 5 is set. Columns 3 & 4 contain results from Heckman selection models, where the regression equation is identical to our
baseline cross-section demand specification, i.e. the dependent variable is the log. number of monthly or biannual new ratings, and the selection equation
models app survival. In column 3 survival is modeled by comparing apps which are observed throughout the period April to September 2012 to those
which are observed in April 2012 but which cannot be observed in later months. In column 4 survival is modeled by comparing apps within our baseline
cross-section from April 2012 which survive until 2014 to those which are observed in April 2012 but are not observed in 2014. In both selection models we
apply Heckman’s two-step consistent estimator and use the information on code size as the selection variable, i.e. we include the code size only in the selection
equation but not in the regression equation. In Column 5 we control for the existing user-base by including a control for the stock of existing installations
(log. number of installations). In Columns 6 and 7 we estimate a 2SLS model and instrument the variable of interest to account for the endogeneity of the
developers’ privacy model choice. In Column 6 we instrument the privacy-dummy by the share of competing apps which use privacy-sensitve permissions
(ShareCompPrivacy). In Column 7 we instrument the privacy-dummy by the share of the apps of the developer which use privacy-sensitive permissions
(ShareDevPrivacy). In Columns 8 and 9 we instrument the app price by using in both specifications two potential cost shifters: the log. code size and the
log. number of apps a developer offers in the Google Play Store. In Column 8 we use the full cross-section, whereas in Column 9 we use only the sample of
paid apps. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A11: Excluding the Most and Least Successful Apps
W/o Top-Apps W/o Flop-Apps W/o Top- and Flop-Apps
Log. ∆Ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DPrivacy -0.064*** -0.079*** -0.011 -0.086*** -0.030*** -0.050***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
DNumInst 1.545*** 1.303*** 0.946***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
DPrivacy ×DNumInst 0.036** 0.126*** 0.009
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
#CleanPerm 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.017*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
DInternet -0.114*** -0.093*** -0.197*** -0.172*** -0.092*** -0.090***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
DAds 0.170*** 0.154*** 0.182*** 0.188*** 0.102*** 0.116***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Log. Price -0.055*** -0.026*** -0.071*** -0.023*** -0.046*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -2.777*** -2.924*** -3.228*** -3.462*** -1.535*** -1.906***
(0.103) (0.090) (0.192) (0.167) (0.151) (0.135)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 168767 168767 79847 79847 71421 71421
Mean of dep. Var. -0.12 -0.12 1.44 1.44 1.09 1.09
SD of dep. Var. 1.23 1.23 1.44 1.44 1.04 1.04
Adjusted R2 0.231 0.416 0.240 0.409 0.149 0.303
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand for subsamples
of our data where we exclude the tails of the distribution with respect to our dependent variable, i.e. the most and the least
successful apps. App demand is measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. In Columns 1 and 2 we exclude
the most succesful apps, i.e. the upper 5 percentiles with respect to the number of new ratings in April 2012. In Columns 3 and
4 we exclude the least successful apps, i.e. those without any new ratings in April 2012. In Columns 5 and 6 we exclude both
groups, i.e. the upper 5 percent of most successful apps and those having no new rating in April 2012. In Columns 2, 4 and 6
we add a dummy which is equal to one if the app in the past had accumulated a stock of at least 10000 or more installations
and also add an interaction of this dummy with the privacy-dummy. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic
permissions (#CleanPerm.). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.2 Demand Measures
In this section we illustrate the relationship between apps’ installations and ratings as well as the
relationship between apps’ number of ratings and apps’ success measured by app ranks.
Relationship between Installations and Ratings: Our main measure of app demand is the
log. number of new ratings an app has received within a month. We use it as a demand proxy since
the optimal measure of app demand, the number of new installations, is a very noisy measure due
to the fact that the total number of installations is published in a discrete form (17 steps). More
explicitly, changes in the number of installations for most of the apps are observed only very rarely,
i.e. in most cases the monthly number of new installations is equal to zero, and in cases where
we observe a change in the number of installations this observed change most likely overstates the
true change in the monthly number of installations. However, since we have exact and continuous
information about the number of ratings of an app, we can use this as an alternative demand
measure. We can do so, since, as we show in the following, (changes in) the number of installations
and (changes in) the number of ratings are on average extremely closely related to each other.
To illustrate the relationship between both measures visually, Figure A3 shows for the April 2012
cross-section of free and paid apps the relationship between the log. number of installations and
the log. number of ratings. As can be seen, for both types of apps a strong positive relationship
between both measures exists.
Figure A3: Relationship between Level of Installations and Ratings for Free and Paid Apps
(a) Free Apps (N = 128921)
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Notes: Both figures display the relationship between apps’ log. number of installations and their log. number of
ratings. The left plot shows the relationship for free apps, whereas the right one contains that of paid apps. In
both cases a linear trend is added. The data used is equal to the cross-section data set from April 2012 used in the
estimation sections.
In addition, Table A12 shows more descriptive, econometric, evidence on the relationship be-
tween installations and ratings. The first column shows evidence on the relationship between log.
installations and log. ratings, where we find an estimation coefficient slightly above one and a R2 of
around 0.7. This indicates that an increase in the number of ratings by one percent comes with an
increase in the number of installations by around one percent. Columns 2 and 3 use the cross-section
from April 2012 and analyze the relationship based on changes in both variables within one month.
Column 2 uses all available observations, whereas Column 3 drops observations with no change in
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the number of installations in April. As can be seen, even in these cases where our measure of
monthly changes in the number of installations is extremely noisy (due to the short time period of
one month), we can observe for both versions a strong and positive relationship between installa-
tions and ratings. In Column 4 and 5 we also use the cross-section from April 2012 but analyze
changes between April and September. Column 4 uses all observations, whereas Column 5 drops
those which exhibit no change in installations between April and September. Doing so, the previous
finding of a strong and positive relationship is even more pronounced, which is not too surprising
since measurement error looses relative weight compared to the version based on monthly changes.
Columns 6 and 7 use the sample of observations for which we have information both in 2012 and
in 2014 and analyzes changes in installations and ratings within those two years. Column 6 uses all
observations, whereas Column 7 uses only those with changes in the number of installations between
2012 and 2014. Going one step further and exploiting changes within two years of observation, we
again find, as for the specification in levels, coefficients of around one and R2 values of 0.4 and 0.8.
To estimate the relationship in Column 8, which is based on aggregated data, we apply a two-step
approach: (1) First, we aggregate single data points into average ones. For doing so, we split the
sample, which is ordered by the number of new ratings, into 100 quartiles and then compute for
each quartile the average number of new ratings and new installations.58 (2) Second, based on the
log-values of the average data points we estimate a simple linear log-log model of the relationship
between new installations and new ratings, for which the results are given in Column 8. As can
be seen, an extremely close relationship between the log. number of new installations and the log.
number of new ratings exists, with an R2 close to one. Visually, this relationship is illustrated by
Figure 1.
Relationship between Ratings and App Ranks: In a second step we aim at illustrating the
close relationship between our demand measure and a demand measure based on app ranks. The
Google Play store, as well as Apple’s iOS store, provide app ranks for the most successful apps by
category. In table A13 we show the correlation between (a) app ranks which we compute based on
changes in apps’ number of ratings and (b) their official app ranks in the Google Play Store (taken
from App Annie). The correlation is given for apps for which we have an overall rank (Columns 1
to 3) and for apps for which we have a rank within the games category (Columns 4 to 6). Column 1
and 4 contain all apps, whereas Columns 2 and 5 use only apps which are for free, wherease Columns
3 and 6 analyze paid apps. The dependent variable is the official app rank, whereas the independent
variable is its rank based on the change in the number of ratings which we observe. In all regression
we do not include a constant.
A.3 Context-Dependent Privacy-Sensitive Permissions
In this robustness check, we test whether the main demand-side results are robust to using a context-
specific definition of privacy-sensitive permissions. We consider this relevant, since such a definition
allows to consider category-specific functionalities. For example, ’running’-apps can provide better
service if they are able to geo-locate their users, while other apps (e.g., a mail client) do not need
this ability. Thus, the use of certain permissions might allow an app to access private information
58Due to the skewed distribution of the data, STATA only generates 34 quartiles.
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Table A12: Relationship between Installations and Ratings
Level Growth Growth Apr-Sep Growth 12-14 Means
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log. Ratings 1.178***
(0.002)
Log. ∆ Ratings 0.461*** 0.938*** 0.955***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.024)
Log. ∆AprSep Ratings 0.815*** 0.952***
(0.005) (0.004)
Log. ∆1214 Ratings 1.132*** 0.929***
(0.005) (0.002)
Constant 4.518*** -0.463*** 6.752*** 0.073*** 6.158*** 1.966*** 5.815*** 5.959***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.026) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.076)
Observations 177193 177193 10988 176212 34620 125213 74040 34
Adjusted R2 0.720 0.094 0.427 0.181 0.609 0.318 0.788 0.980
Notes: The table shows descriptive econometric evidence on the relationship between installations and ratings. The first
Column shows the relationship in levels, i.e. the relationship between the log. number of installations and log. the number
ratings. Columns 2 to 8 contain estimates of the relationship in changes, i.e. the relationship between the log. number of
new installations and the log. number of new ratings. Columns 2 and 3 use the cross-section from April 2012 and analyze the
relationship based on changes in both variables within one month. Column 2 uses all available observations, whereas Column 3
drops observations with no change in the number of installations in April. In Column 4 and 5 we also use the cross-section from
April 2012 but analyze changes between April and September. Column 4 uses all observations, whereas Column 5 drops those
which exhibit no change in installations between April and September. Columns 6 and 7 use the sample of observations for
which we have information both in 2012 and in 2014 and analyzes changes in installations and ratings within those two years.
Column 6 uses all observations, whereas Column 7 uses only those with changes in the number of installations between 2012
and 2014. For the estimation in Column 8 we aggregate single data points into average ones by splitting the sample, which is
ordered by the number of new ratings, into 100 quartiles and then compute for each quartile the average number of new ratings
and new installations and then, based on the log-values of the average data points, we estimate a simple linear log-log model of
the relationship between new installations and new ratings. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A13: Relationship between Ranks based on Ratings and Ranks from App-Annie
All Apps Games
Free&Paid Free Paid Free&Paid Free Paid
RANKAllApps 0.880*** 0.855*** 0.893***
(0.023) (0.036) (0.029)
RANKGAMES 0.889*** 0.851*** 0.909***
(0.020) (0.033) (0.026)
Observations 407 180 227 465 207 258
Adjusted R2 0.774 0.729 0.796 0.787 0.729 0.818
Notes: The table shows correlations between (a) app ranks which we compute based on changes in apps’ number of ratings
and (b) their official app ranks in the Google Play Store (taken from App Annie). The correlation is given for apps for which
we have an overall rank (Columns 1 to 3) and for apps for which we have a rank within the games category (Columns 4 to 6).
Column 1 and 4 contain all apps, whereas Columns 2 and 5 use only apps which are for free, wherease Columns 3 and 6 analyze
paid apps. The dependent variable is the official app rank, whereas the independent variable is its rank based on the change in
the number of ratings which we observe. In all regression we do not include a constant. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A15
might be related to its functionality and might not only exist for collecting information about users.
In Table A14 we consider category-specific definitions of privacy-sensitive permissions, and tolerate
such permissions that are common and necessary for a certain category of apps.
Data and Variables: To identify category-specific permission requirements, we exploit the Play
Store’s category tree and analyze which permissions are common in each category and thus might
be required for the functionality of typical apps within this category. Based on this information we
generate an alternative measure of category-specific privacy-sensitive permissions, which takes the
categories usual functionality and permission-needs into account. We generate a dummy variable
DPrivcCatSpec which is equal to one if an app uses at least one privacy-sensitive permission which
is relatively unusual within the app’s category. Based on the cross-section data set from April
2012, we define permissions as relatively uncommon within an app category if paid apps of this
category use this permission on average less often than the overall paid app.59 Thus, a privacy-
sensitive permission is classified as problematic within a category if it is relatively uncommon in this
category, i.e. if a higher share of apps in other categories use this permission (for an overview about
which permissions are classified as category-specific privacy-sensitive in which category, see Table
A15).
Results: Table A14 shows the results which we obtained using the category-specific measure of
privacy-sensitive permissions. The dependent variable is as in the baseline specifications the monthly
number of new reviews, andDPrivcCatSpec indicates the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions that
are unusual for a given app category. We show four specifications using the cross-section (cols. 1-4)
and three different panel specifications (cols. 5-7). The results show that the negative demand effect
of category-specific privacy-sensitive permissions is statistically significant for the cross-section (cols.
1-4) and in two out of the three panel specifications (cols. 5-7). Only in specification 6, where we
control for time-varying factors but do not ensure that apps do not change their description over
time and thus might have changed their functionality, we find a negative but insignificant effect.
In Columns 1 and 2 we use the full sample and vary the number of controls. Column three
shows the results only for free apps and column 4 shows the results exclusively for paid apps. The
coefficient is largest for paid apps, suggesting that paying users avoid apps who request sensitive and
unusual permissions (which cannot be related to a functionality). Among the panel results, Columns
5 & 6 use the large panel, while Column 7 focuses on apps that did not update their description
of functionality (but changed their permissions). We see the strongest negative effect when apps
update their permission use without changing functionality in a visible way.
59We use paid apps for this definition, since we expect them to use to a higher degree only such permissions which
are necessary for their functionality, whereas free apps, according to our findings, do also use permissions which are
not necessary for the apps’ functionality but which are related to monetisation.
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Table A14: Using a Category-Specific Privacy Measure
Cross-Section Panel
Log. ∆Ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DPrivCatSpec -0.064*** -0.072*** -0.025** -0.156*** -0.039* -0.015 -0.062**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.028)
#CleanPerm 0.115*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.053*** -0.010** -0.011** -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
DInternet -0.204*** -0.258*** -0.080*** -0.021 -0.015 0.014
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.054) (0.053) (0.071)
DAds 0.233*** 0.240*** 0.037** -0.008 -0.011 -0.048
(0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.032) (0.033) (0.043)
Log. Price -0.071*** 0.000 0.100*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.037***
(0.001) (.) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
DOther 0.047*** 0.014 0.012 0.017
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.022)
Log. Length Desc. 0.261*** 0.279*** 0.133*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.023)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.062*** 0.079*** 0.010*** 0.041**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)
Number Screenshots 0.085*** 0.106*** 0.057*** 0.029**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
Dummy: Video 0.204*** 0.271*** 0.224*** -0.139**
(0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.058)
Log. Average Rating 0.200*** 0.372*** 0.083*** 0.272***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.098)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 1.130*** 1.150*** 1.142*** -0.178***
(0.058) (0.088) (0.082) (0.014)
App Version 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.030*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015)
Log. AppsByDev -0.113*** -0.168*** -0.046*** -0.161***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.029)
Log. InstByDev 0.183*** 0.236*** 0.100*** -0.011
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014)
Log. InstByComp -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.008*** 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.003*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. RatByComp -0.698*** -0.819*** 0.159** -0.028
(0.061) (0.078) (0.078) (0.129)
Min. Android Vers. -0.015 -0.029** 0.122*** 0.059
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.044)
Max. Android Vers. 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.144*** -0.145
(0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.096)
Constant -0.283*** -3.879*** -3.557*** -3.432*** 1.162*** 1.251** 0.740***
(0.008) (0.123) (0.152) (0.172) (0.128) (0.561) (0.154)
Category No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Month No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 177193 177193 128921 48272 33095 33095 15220
Num. of Groups 6619 6619 3044
Mean of dep. Var. 0.10 0.10 0.33 -0.50 1.63 1.63 1.17
SD of dep. Var. 1.55 1.55 1.65 1.06 2.23 2.23 2.10
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.294 0.285 0.262 0.026 0.033 0.020
Notes: The table shows descriptive regressions analyzing the relationship between the presence of category-specific privacy-
sensitive permissions and app demand. We look at privacy-sensitive permissions that are unusual for the app’s category. Within
a category we flag a privacy-sensitive permission as problematic only if paid apps of this category use this permission on average
less often than the overall average paid app. In Columns 1 to 4 we provide cross-sectional results, whereas Columns 5 to 7
contain panel results. Column 3 restricts the sample to free apps, whereas Column 4 uses paid apps. Columns 5 shows the
raw fixed effects regressions without controls, whereas in Column 6 we add control variables and dummies to control for the
apps’ categories and in Column 7 we restrict the analysis to apps that introduced new permissions without changing the app’s
description (no change in the length of description). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A15: Overview of Category-Specific Privacy-Sensitive Permissions
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Arcade & Action • ◦ • • • ◦ • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ ◦ • •
Books & Reference • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Brain & Puzzle • ◦ • • • ◦ • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • •
Business ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • ◦
Cards & Casino • ◦ • • • • • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Casual • • • • • ◦ • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Comics • • • • • ◦ • • • ◦ • • • • • • • • ◦ • • • • ◦ •
Communication ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦
Education • • ◦ • • • • • • • • ◦ ◦ • • • • • ◦ • • • • • •
Entertainment • • • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ • • • • • • • • • • •
Finance • • • • • ◦ • • • ◦ • • • ◦ • • • • • • ◦ • • • ◦
Health & Fitness • • • • ◦ • • • ◦ • • • • ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ • • • • •
Libraries & Demo ◦ • ◦ • • • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦
Lifestyle • • • • ◦ • • ◦ • • • • • ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ •
Media & Video ◦ ◦ ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • • ◦ • • ◦ •
Medical • • • • • ◦ • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • • ◦ •
Music & Audio ◦ ◦ • • • • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦
News & Magazines • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ •
Personalization • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • • • • • • •
Photography • • • • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • •
Productivity ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦
Racing • ◦ • • • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • • •
Shopping • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦
Social ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ •
Sports • • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦
Sports Games • • • • • ◦ • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • • • •
Tools ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Transportation ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • • •
Travel & Local • • • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • ◦ • • • ◦ •
Weather • • • • ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ • • • ◦ • • • • ◦ • • • • •
Notes: A ’•’ indicates that a permission is relatively uncommon in a category and is thus classified as category-specific privacy-
sensitive. A ’◦’ indicates that a permission is relatively common in a category and is thus classified as unproblematic. A
permission is defined to be relatively common within an app category if paid apps of this category use this permission on
average more often than the overall paid app.
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B Online Appendix B - Additional Evidence Detailed Regressions
B.1 Additional Descriptive Statistics
Table B1: Summary Statistics of the Pairs Datasets
Pairs I Pairs II Pairs III
Free Paid Free Paid Free Paid
∆ Ratings 73.81 8.80 67.33 6.08 81.16 2.65
∆ Installations 23895.46 456.34 8213.48 92.71 3833.90 101.76
Ratings 980.13 119.90 623.53 81.05 1420.45 62.58
Installations 2.1e+05 4428.21 1.3e+05 2739.82 4.1e+05 4167.34
#TotalPerm 3.63 2.99 3.78 3.10 4.39 2.18
DPrivacy 0.46 0.37 0.49 0.40 0.57 0.29
#Privacy 0.88 0.66 0.93 0.70 1.12 0.47
#CleanPerm 2.75 2.33 2.85 2.40 3.27 1.71
DPrivCatSpec 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.23 0.05
DMTurkEP2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.09
DGoogle 0.24 0.19 0.25 0.21 0.27 0.14
DSarmaetal 0.42 0.32 0.46 0.35 0.53 0.24
DID 0.27 0.19 0.30 0.22 0.40 0.15
DLocation 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.12 0.27 0.05
DCommunication 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
DProfile 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.13
DInternet 0.76 0.52 0.82 0.56 0.99 0.30
DAds 0.53 0.28 0.56 0.31 0.84 0.11
Price 0.00 1.46 0.00 1.37 0.00 1.19
Average Rating 3.85 4.20 3.79 4.14 3.93 4.21
Size (in KB) 3043.97 3734.91 3206.59 3039.23 2102.13 1848.41
Length Description 1052.04 1027.52 876.84 873.62 982.41 853.95
Number Screenshots 3.92 4.15 3.73 3.87 4.01 3.99
Dummy: Video 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.13
Dummy: Top-Dev. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Apps by Developer 33.55 33.55 14.47 14.47 10.60 10.60
Average Installations of Developer 58752.29 1.3e+05 57842.83 91748.60 65842.46 2.1e+05
Observations 14422 3998 708
Notes: The table provides an overview over the most important variables, and shows the corresponding descriptive statistics for
the three pairs datasets in this paper. For each dataset we show two columns, where the left column shows averages for free
apps and the second column for paid apps.
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B.2 Additional Robustness Checks
Note: This section is not intended for publication in the journal, instead we will make it available
online. This section presents additional results from robustness checks that had to be excluded from
the paper for reasons of space as well as more extensive descriptions of data sets and estimation
results presented in the paper.
B.2.1 Privacy and Demand: The Role of Apps’ Previous Success
We further analyze how the relationship between privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand
varies with an app’s past success. This robustness check shows that our main results are not driven
by either very successful or unsuccessful apps only. In Table B2, we divide the estimation sample
into four groups according to apps previous success.
Data Preparation and Additional Variables: To analyze how the relationship of interest
varies with previous app success, we split our cross-section sample into 20 quantiles according to the
total number of ratings an app has received so far. For example, those apps which are in the first
two quantiles have the greatest past success, and the highest stock of ratings. We then separately
estimated the relationship of interest for the apps in quantiles 1-2 (Column 1), quantiles 3-4 (Column
2), quantliles 5-10 (Column 3) and the remaining apps (quantiles 11 to 20) Column 4.
Results: As before, app demand in Table B2 is measured by the log. number of monthly new
ratings of an app. The coefficient of interest analyzes the relationship between an app’s downloads
and our measures of privacy-sensitive permissions. The dependent variable is app demand and the
variable of interest is an indicator for presence of privacy-sensitive permissions (DPrivacy). Column 1
analyzes the top 10% most successful apps. Column 2 analyzes the top 10-20% most successful apps.
Column 3 focuses on the top 20-50% most successful apps, and column 4 analyzes the remaining
50% of least successful apps. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic permissions
(CleanPerm.), and for an app’s other observed characteristics on the Play Store (the app’s price,
description, ratings, categorical dummies, etc.). We also control for internet access, and ad-specific
permissions.
While the coefficient of interest is insignificant for the top 10% of the apps, it is largest in
columns 2 and 3, i.e. for intermediate apps, and somewhat weaker for unsuccessful apps. These
findings highlight, that our main results are driven by the large mass of “average” apps, and that
they actually apply to top apps to a far lesser extent. Moreover, the findings in this robustness check
confirm the insights from the analysis in Table B5, and especially the finding, that successful apps
almost do not have to worry about using privacy-intrusive permissions. However, apps that are not
in the top-segment are faced with a negative relationship of permissions and demand, suggesting
that they are at a competitive disadvantage compared to bestselling apps.
B.2.2 User Assessment and Survival
In Table B3 we explore whether apps with fewer intrusive permissions induce higher user satisfaction
and are more likely to survive. Given our results for demand effects of privacy-sensitive permissions,
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Table B2: Samples based on Past App Success
1st-10th pct 11th-20th pct 21st-50th pct 51st-100th pct
Log. ∆Ratings (1) (2) (3) (4)
DPrivacy -0.016 -0.133*** -0.090*** -0.026***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.013) (0.006)
#CleanPerm 0.011*** 0.013** 0.013*** 0.004***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
DInternet -0.204*** -0.121*** -0.092*** -0.021***
(0.034) (0.029) (0.014) (0.005)
DAds 0.420*** 0.394*** 0.264*** 0.088***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.013) (0.006)
Log. Price -0.085*** -0.065*** -0.049*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
DOther 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.065*** 0.023***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.013) (0.006)
Log. Length Desc. 0.321*** 0.201*** 0.137*** 0.064***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.002)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.120*** 0.100*** 0.056*** 0.013***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001)
Number Screenshots 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.059*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
Dummy: Video 0.032 -0.074** 0.019 0.014*
(0.028) (0.032) (0.018) (0.008)
Log. Average Rating 2.183*** 1.226*** 0.557*** 0.019***
(0.089) (0.061) (0.022) (0.004)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 0.387*** -0.029 -0.086 -0.008
(0.062) (0.128) (0.092) (0.045)
App Version -0.051*** -0.080*** -0.023*** -0.009***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.002)
Log. AppsByDev -0.025*** -0.003 -0.024*** -0.031***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001)
Log. InstByDev 0.115*** 0.048*** 0.058*** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001)
Log. InstByComp 0.041*** 0.012** -0.006** -0.008***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.024*** 0.001 -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Log. RatByComp -0.671*** -0.422** -0.247*** -0.223***
(0.187) (0.167) (0.091) (0.040)
Min. Android Vers. 0.681*** 0.786*** 0.413*** 0.074***
(0.036) (0.033) (0.017) (0.006)
Max. Android Vers. 0.274*** 0.322*** 0.234*** 0.060***
(0.082) (0.064) (0.026) (0.010)
Constant -7.316*** -5.818*** -4.139*** -1.517***
(0.447) (0.369) (0.173) (0.073)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17711 17396 51021 91065
Mean of dep. Var. 2.91 1.37 0.20 -0.74
SD of dep. Var. 1.67 1.47 1.21 0.60
Adjusted R2 0.340 0.308 0.193 0.080
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand for subsamples
of our data which are defined according to apps past success. App demand is measured by the log. number of monthly new
ratings of an app. We split our cross-section sample into 20 quantiles according to the total number of ratings an app has received
so far. In Column 1 we estimate our model for those apps which are in the first two quantiles, i.e. which have the highest stock
of ratings. In Columns 2 apps from the 3rd and 4th quantile are used. In Column 3 apps from the 5th to the 10th quantile are
analyzed. In Column 4 the remaining apps, i.e. those from the 11th to the 20th quantile are used. All specifications control
for the number of unproblematic permissions (CleanPerm.). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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we expect average apps that use privacy-sensitive permissions also to face lower user-satisfaction
and, ultimately, lower survival rates.
Data Preparation and Additional Variables: Table B3 explores the relationship between
apps’ use of privacy-sensitive permissions and two alternative success measures: apps’ average ratings
(Columns 1-4) and their long-run survival rates (Columns 5-6). All results are based on the cross-
section from April 2012. In Columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the log. average value of the
ratings the app has received in April 2012. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is the log.
average value of the ratings the app has received between April and September 2012. In Columns 5
and 6 we analyze app survival over two years. The dependent variable is a dummy which equals one,
if an app from April 2012 was still available in 2014 (i.e. if we observe it in the data set we collected
in 2014). All specifications control for the number of unproblematic permissions (CleanPerm.).
Results: The first four columns show that apps which do not use privacy-sensitive permissions
or do use less privacy-sensitive permissions are rated better by users. Moreover, apps which use
privacy-sensitive permissions are also less likely to survive until 2014, as can be seen in Columns 5
and 6. In short, the demand side results carry over to user satisfaction and survival.
B.2.3 Moderating Factors (Alternative Specifications)
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Table B3: User Assessment and Survival
User Assessment (Avg. Rating) Survival (DSurviver)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DPrivacy -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.028***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
#Privacy -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
#CleanPerm 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.003*** -0.005*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DInternet -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.056*** -0.060*** -0.041*** -0.046***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
DAds 0.009** 0.006 0.014*** 0.012*** -0.025*** -0.030***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log. Price -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DOther 0.006* 0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005* -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log. Length Desc. 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.012*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number Screenshots 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dummy: Video 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.007** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 0.007 0.006 -0.013 -0.014 -0.041*** -0.042***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
App Version 0.004** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. AppsByDev -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.061*** -0.061***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. InstByDev 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** -0.001 -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Log. InstByComp -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. PriceOfComp -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log. RatByComp 0.449*** 0.446*** 0.436*** 0.434*** -0.051*** -0.051***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Min. Android Vers. -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.044*** -0.044***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Max. Android Vers. 0.020** 0.020** 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Log. Average Rating 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.354*** 0.353*** 0.360*** 0.361*** 1.130*** 1.126***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.046) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 68248 68248 102594 102594 177193 177193
Mean of dep. Var. 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 0.73 0.73
SD of dep. Var. 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.45 0.45
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.044 0.052 0.052 0.118 0.119
Notes: This table shows the relationship between apps’ use of privacy-sensitive permissions and two alternative success mea-
sures: apps’ average rating (Columns 1-4) and their long-run survival (Columns 5-6). All results are based on the cross-section
from April 2012. In Columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the log. average of the ratings the app has received in April
2012. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is the log. average of the ratings the app has received between April and
September 2012. In Columns 5 and 6 the dependent variable is a dummy which is equal to one, if an app from April 2012
was still available in our data set collected in 2014. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic permissions
(CleanPerm.). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B4: Alternative Moderating Factors
Top-Developer Alexa Rank Games Pricing Model
Log. ∆Ratings No Yes No Yes No Yes Free Paid
DPrivacy -0.065*** 0.088 -0.055*** 0.010 -0.082*** -0.020 -0.026** -0.121***
(0.009) (0.151) (0.010) (0.172) (0.010) (0.022) (0.011) (0.014)
#CleanPerm 0.036*** 0.097*** 0.035*** 0.051* 0.037*** 0.098*** 0.037*** 0.054***
(0.003) (0.031) (0.003) (0.028) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006)
DInternet -0.195*** 0.023 -0.187*** 0.152 -0.211*** -0.201*** -0.256*** -0.075***
(0.009) (0.231) (0.010) (0.264) (0.010) (0.024) (0.012) (0.013)
DAds 0.232*** 0.360** 0.226*** -0.251 0.228*** 0.157*** 0.241*** 0.039**
(0.009) (0.164) (0.010) (0.173) (0.010) (0.024) (0.010) (0.017)
Log. Price -0.071*** -0.108*** -0.071*** -0.107*** -0.068*** -0.095*** 0.000 0.099***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.024) (0.001) (0.002) (.) (0.007)
DOther 0.053*** -0.293** 0.070*** 0.137 0.023** 0.144*** 0.016 0.022
(0.009) (0.129) (0.010) (0.164) (0.010) (0.027) (0.011) (0.015)
Log. Length Desc. 0.262*** 0.492*** 0.277*** 0.372*** 0.255*** 0.291*** 0.280*** 0.135***
(0.004) (0.084) (0.004) (0.087) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.063*** -0.008 0.062*** 0.200*** 0.050*** 0.117*** 0.080*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.065) (0.002) (0.054) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Number Screenshots 0.085*** 0.050** 0.083*** 0.221*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.105*** 0.057***
(0.002) (0.026) (0.002) (0.040) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Dummy: Video 0.199*** 0.347*** 0.191*** 0.910*** 0.204*** 0.177*** 0.271*** 0.225***
(0.012) (0.134) (0.013) (0.224) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016) (0.018)
Log. Average Rating 0.198*** 0.747*** 0.204*** -0.216 0.167*** 0.355*** 0.371*** 0.083***
(0.007) (0.228) (0.008) (0.300) (0.008) (0.020) (0.010) (0.007)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 0.000 0.000 0.949*** 0.638** 1.026*** 1.295*** 1.151*** 1.169***
(.) (.) (0.065) (0.292) (0.074) (0.092) (0.088) (0.082)
App Version 0.029*** -0.161* 0.032*** -0.027 0.029*** 0.017* 0.039*** 0.036***
(0.004) (0.083) (0.004) (0.153) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Log. AppsByDev -0.113*** -0.387*** -0.110*** 0.148 -0.105*** -0.180*** -0.169*** -0.047***
(0.002) (0.072) (0.002) (0.126) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Log. InstByDev 0.183*** 0.192*** 0.188*** 0.154*** 0.179*** 0.203*** 0.236*** 0.100***
(0.002) (0.040) (0.002) (0.032) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. InstByComp -0.008*** 0.041 -0.008*** -0.037 -0.007*** 0.003 -0.010*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.035) (0.002) (0.047) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.010*** 0.045** 0.011*** -0.003 0.008*** 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.018) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. RatByComp -0.721*** 0.399 -0.776*** -0.043 -0.696*** -1.085*** -0.823*** 0.148*
(0.061) (0.967) (0.067) (1.341) (0.067) (0.147) (0.078) (0.078)
Min. Android Vers. -0.012 -0.580*** -0.011 -0.302 -0.025** 0.039 -0.029** 0.125***
(0.010) (0.193) (0.012) (0.195) (0.011) (0.028) (0.013) (0.015)
Constant -3.852*** -3.587* -3.832*** -6.650*** -3.398*** -5.120*** -3.557*** -3.416***
(0.123) (2.124) (0.136) (2.355) (0.140) (0.306) (0.152) (0.172)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176224 969 145367 771 147143 30050 128921 48272
Mean of dep. Var. 0.09 2.15 0.11 2.19 0.07 0.26 0.33 -0.50
SD of dep. Var. 1.54 2.25 1.55 2.09 1.52 1.70 1.65 1.06
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.538 0.298 0.348 0.280 0.370 0.285 0.262
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand for subsamples
of our data. App demand is measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. Columns 1 and 2 split the sample
into apps which are from a top developer (according to Google’s classification) or not. Columns 3 and 4 split the sample into
normal apps and games. Columns 5 and 6 split them into normal apps and games. Columns 7 and 8 split the sample into free and
paid apps. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic permissions (#CleanPerm.). Heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B5: Moderating Factors (Alternative Specifications)
Reputation User Groups Visibility
Log. ∆Ratings TopDev Installs. Priv. Policy Alexa Maturity Games Med&Health Warning
DPrivacy -0.067*** -0.077*** -0.079*** -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.131*** -0.058*** -0.032***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
DPrivacy ×DTopDev 0.303***
(0.116)
DPrivacy ×DNumInst 0.101***
(0.025)
DNumInst 2.530***
(0.019)
DPrivacy ×DTransp 0.397***
(0.041)
DTransp 0.291***
(0.030)
DPrivacy ×DAlexaRank 0.613***
(0.133)
DAlexaRank 0.926***
(0.099)
DPrivacy ×DMaturity -0.070***
(0.018)
DMaturity 0.105***
(0.017)
DPrivacy ×DGame 0.318***
(0.019)
DGame -0.635***
(0.055)
DPrivacy ×DMedHealth -0.181***
(0.032)
DMedHealth -0.055**
(0.028)
DPrivacy ×DGoogle -0.084***
(0.012)
#CleanPerm 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.040***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DInternet -0.200*** -0.141*** -0.198*** -0.186*** -0.199*** -0.206*** -0.200*** -0.205***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
DAds 0.235*** 0.204*** 0.232*** 0.224*** 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.236*** 0.229***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log. Price -0.071*** -0.049*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.071***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DTopDev 0.962*** 0.550*** 1.047*** 0.904*** 1.139*** 1.139*** 1.151*** 1.138***
(0.091) (0.047) (0.058) (0.064) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
DOther 0.052*** 0.057*** 0.052*** 0.071*** 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.052***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log. Length Desc. 0.263*** 0.209*** 0.256*** 0.278*** 0.262*** 0.261*** 0.262*** 0.262***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.063*** 0.047*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.062***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number Screenshots 0.085*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy: Video 0.204*** 0.155*** 0.186*** 0.193*** 0.205*** 0.191*** 0.204*** 0.203***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Log. Average Rating 0.199*** 0.173*** 0.199*** 0.203*** 0.199*** 0.194*** 0.199*** 0.199***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
App Version 0.029*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log. AppsByDev -0.114*** -0.096*** -0.113*** -0.110*** -0.113*** -0.118*** -0.114*** -0.113***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. InstByDev 0.184*** 0.121*** 0.181*** 0.187*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.183***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. InstByComp -0.007*** -0.020*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.011*** 0.000 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. RatByComp -0.703*** -0.198*** -0.705*** -0.776*** -0.702*** -0.752*** -0.707*** -0.706***
(0.061) (0.053) (0.061) (0.067) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Min. Android Vers. -0.015 0.106*** -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 -0.010 -0.015 -0.014
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Max. Android Vers. 0.170*** 0.158*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.169*** 0.170***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant -3.879*** -3.686*** -3.791*** -3.844*** -3.882*** -3.257*** -3.872*** -3.884***
(0.122) (0.104) (0.122) (0.136) (0.122) (0.132) (0.122) (0.122)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 177193 177193 177193 146138 177193 177193 177193 177193
Interaction 0.236 0.024 0.317 0.555 0.054 0.187 -0.239 -0.116
SE of Interaction 0.116 0.025 0.042 0.133 0.021 0.018 0.032 0.012
Mean of dep. Var. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
SD of dep. Var. 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.56 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55
Adjusted R2 0.294 0.459 0.298 0.304 0.294 0.295 0.294 0.294
Notes: This table analyzes factors that moderate the relationship between privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand. In
each specification we add interaction-terms to analyze the moderating role of reputation and user groups. Columns 1-4 analyze
measures of developer or app reputation/success, whereas columns 5-7 analyze the role of user groups. The dependent variable is
demand measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. Column 1 adds an interaction of privacy-sensitiveness
with a dummy for ’top developers’ (measured by a badge, awarded by Google). Column 2 adds an interaction and a dummy
which is equal to one if the app had accumulated 75000 or more installations since its market entry. Column 3 adds an interaction
and a dummy which is equal to one if the app is transparant about its origin and privacy policy, i.e. if it has published a privacy
policy, email and website address that are directly accessible from the Play Store. Column 4 adds an interaction and dummy
which is equal to one if the app has a high ranking on Alexa.com, i.e. its website traffic rank is lower than 10000. Column 5
uses a dummy which is equal to one if the app is a high maturity app, i.e. if it requires medium or high maturity or is not rated
at all. In Column 6 it is equal to one if the app is a game. Column 7 contains a dummy which is equal to one if the app is a
health or medical app. In Column 8 we use a interaction term which is equal to one if the app uses at least one privacy-sensitive
permission and one permission for which Google provides in its permission description a warning, which states that a malicious
app with this permission could create harm to the user. All specifications control for the app’s observed characteristics on the
Play Store (the app’s price, description, ratings, categorical dummies, etc.), and also control for internet access, and ad-specific
permissions as well as unproblematic permissions. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.3 Main Estimation Tables - Detailed Version
Table B6: Main Supply Side Results
Business Model Choice (DPaid) Price Choice (Log. Price)
Cross-Section Panel Pairs Cross-Section Panel
DPrivacy -0.033*** -0.104 -0.156*** 0.012 -0.119*
(0.002) (0.261) (0.042) (0.008) (0.070)
#Privacy -0.024*** -0.150* -0.137*** -0.005 -0.060**
(0.001) (0.086) (0.025) (0.004) (0.025)
#CleanPerm 0.005*** 0.011*** -0.003 0.035 0.204*** 0.226*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.048** 0.068***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.030) (0.023) (0.025) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.023)
DInternet -0.219*** -0.225*** -0.627** -0.582** -0.496*** -0.517*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.004 -0.015
(0.003) (0.003) (0.290) (0.246) (0.037) (0.038) (0.007) (0.007) (0.085) (0.083)
DAds -0.119*** -0.124*** -0.347 -0.165 -0.535*** -0.547*** 0.014 0.014 -0.003 -0.039
(0.002) (0.002) (0.301) (0.250) (0.036) (0.036) (0.009) (0.009) (0.119) (0.112)
DOther 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.363*** 0.546*** -0.153** -0.155** 0.119*** 0.121*** -0.015 -0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.110) (0.139) (0.068) (0.067) (0.008) (0.007) (0.076) (0.077)
Log. Length Desc. 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.133 0.124 -0.607*** -0.601*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.160** 0.133**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.092) (0.111) (0.203) (0.201) (0.004) (0.004) (0.069) (0.064)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.032*** 0.031*** -0.591*** -0.605*** -0.186*** -0.177*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.040 0.045
(0.001) (0.001) (0.187) (0.154) (0.037) (0.037) (0.002) (0.002) (0.033) (0.033)
Number Screenshots 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.111*** 0.131*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.040* 0.038*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.035) (0.041) (0.015) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.023)
Dummy: Video -0.003 -0.002 -0.432 -0.208 0.055 0.040 0.045*** 0.045*** -0.123 -0.162
(0.003) (0.003) (0.282) (0.283) (0.120) (0.124) (0.008) (0.008) (0.112) (0.108)
Log. Average Rating -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.063 0.295 0.370*** 0.372*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.036 -0.069
(0.003) (0.003) (0.111) (0.241) (0.051) (0.050) (0.007) (0.007) (0.138) (0.137)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 0.186*** 0.184*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.000 0.000
(0.015) (0.014) (.) (.) (.) (.) (0.030) (0.030) (.) (.)
App Version -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.142 -0.194* -0.192*** -0.191*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 0.069 0.083*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.150) (0.109) (0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.053) (0.049)
Log. AppsByDev 0.021*** 0.022*** -1.619** -1.236* 0.000 0.000 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021 -0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.793) (0.693) (.) (.) (0.002) (0.002) (0.094) (0.094)
Log. InstByDev -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.488*** -0.407*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.017 0.011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.120) (0.119) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.019)
Log. InstByComp -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.052* -0.048 -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.030) (0.035) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.012)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.017*** 0.017*** -0.001 0.002 0.007** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.003 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.011)
Log. RatByComp 0.189*** 0.188*** -0.147 -0.450 1.344*** 1.351*** -0.526*** -0.531*** 0.331 0.566
(0.017) (0.017) (0.409) (0.390) (0.228) (0.227) (0.048) (0.048) (0.448) (0.430)
Min. Android Vers. -0.045*** -0.045*** -1.124*** -1.262*** -0.229 -0.191 -0.061*** -0.061*** 0.057 0.126
(0.003) (0.003) (0.238) (0.229) (0.160) (0.147) (0.008) (0.008) (0.153) (0.138)
Max. Android Vers. 0.026*** 0.026*** 1.371*** 1.135*** -0.256 -0.260 0.040** 0.039** 0.264*** 0.291***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.380) (0.319) (0.176) (0.177) (0.019) (0.019) (0.053) (0.052)
Constant 0.094*** 0.090** 10.787*** 9.913*** 3.495** 3.291** 0.060 0.065 -2.943*** -3.558***
(0.035) (0.035) (2.840) (2.754) (1.533) (1.520) (0.106) (0.106) (0.870) (0.835)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176000 176000 96 96 3998 3998 47079 47079 422 422
Num. of Groups 48 48 1999 1999 211 211
Mean of dep. Var. 0.27 0.27 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.53 0.53
SD of dep. Var. 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.62
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.322 0.963 0.971 0.618 0.622 0.223 0.223 0.177 0.183
Notes: The table shows the relationship between privacy-sensitive permissions and the strategic choices of app developers: the
choice of the business model in Columns 1-6, and the price choice in Columns 7-10. In Columns 1-6 the dependent variable
DPaid measures the developer’s decision to offer their app for money or for free. It takes the value 1 if users have to pay to
download the app. Columns 1 and 2 show descriptive regressions based on the cross-section of data, where the independent
variable of interest is (1) an indicator for one or more privacy-sensitive permissions (DPrivacy in Column 1) or (2) the number of
privacy-sensitive permissions (#Privacy in Column 2). Columns 3 and 4 show panel fixed effects regressions where we restrict
the sample to such apps which changed both the number of privacy-sensitive permissions and the business model at least once
between April and September 2012. Columns 5 and 6 use data on app-pairs where the paid version of the app has the same
or a smaller code size and where both apps have more or less the same description length. Columns 7-10 show the results for
price-level choices (of paid apps). The dependent variable is the app’s price (in logs). Columns 7 and 8 show cross sectional
regressions, and Columns 9 and 10 show panel fixed effects regressions where we restrict the sample to such apps which change
both the number of privacy-sensitive permissions and their price at least once. In all specifications we drop outliers with respect
to app prices, i.e. apps with prices above 8 Euros. All of these regressions control for the number of clean permissions and
permissions that are needed to show ads. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table B7: Main Demand Side Results
Cross-Section (Log.∆Ratings) Panel (Log.∆Ratings) Difference-in-Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DPrivacy 0.012 -0.065*** -0.059*** -12.660* -14.988**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.020) (6.634) (7.215)
#Privacy -0.021*** -0.014**
(0.003) (0.007)
#CleanPerm 0.111*** 0.037*** 0.041*** -0.010** -0.005 0.849 1.011*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.643) (0.605)
DInternet -0.200*** -0.211*** 0.003 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.054) (0.053)
DAds 0.236*** 0.230*** 0.002 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.033) (0.033)
Log. Price -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.044*** -0.043***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011)
DOther 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.022 0.024
(0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.022)
Log. Length Desc. 0.263*** 0.262*** 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.023) (0.023)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.044*** 0.043***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.017)
Number Screenshots 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.029** 0.027**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011)
Dummy: Video 0.204*** 0.204*** -0.138** -0.139**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.058) (0.059)
Log. Average Rating 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.267*** 0.272***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.098) (0.098)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 1.139*** 1.136*** -0.206*** -0.179***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.016) (0.014)
App Version 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.029* 0.032**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015)
Log. AppsByDev -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.161*** -0.157***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.029) (0.029)
Log. InstByDev 0.184*** 0.183*** -0.011 -0.011
(0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.014)
Log. InstByComp -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. RatByComp -0.707*** -0.703*** -0.030 -0.031
(0.061) (0.061) (0.129) (0.129)
Min. Android Vers. -0.015 -0.014 0.058 0.056
(0.010) (0.010) (0.044) (0.044)
Max. Android Vers. 0.170*** 0.170*** -0.143 -0.137
(0.020) (0.020) (0.096) (0.097)
Constant -0.289*** -3.871*** -3.872*** 1.198** 1.201** 4.262 2.428
(0.007) (0.122) (0.122) (0.561) (0.563) (5.735) (6.327)
Category No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Month No No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 177193 177193 177193 33095 33095 192 162
Num. of Groups 6619 6619
Mean of dep. Var. 0.10 0.10 0.10 1.63 1.63 -0.24 -3.22
SD of dep. Var. 1.55 1.55 1.55 2.23 2.23 31.81 29.27
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.294 0.294 0.033 0.033 0.013 0.025
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand on three different
data sets: Columns 1-5 exploit our cross-section and panel data; Columns 6-7 show a difference-in-differences style setup between
Google’s Play Store and the iOS App Store. In Columns 1-5 the dependent variable is demand proxied by the log. number of
monthly new ratings of an app. Columns 1-3 contain cross-section results. Column 1 shows the raw correlation between the use
of privacy-sensitive permissions and demand. Column 2 adds in controls for the app’s observed characteristics. Column 3 uses
the number of privacy-sensitive permissions as privacy indicator. Columns 4-5 show panel fixed effects regressions for those apps
within our data set that varied their use of privacy-sensitive permissions at least once between April and September 2012. We
show the results for the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions (Column 4) and their number (Column 5). In Columns 6 and
7 the dependent variable is the difference between the app’s download ranks on the iOS App Store vs. Google Play Store. In
Column 6 this difference is based on the average download ranks of seven countries, whereas in Column 7 it is based only on US
ranks. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic permissions (#CleanPerm.). Heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B8: Moderating Factors of the Demand Side Relationship
Top Apps Privacy Policy Maturity Level Med.&Health Apps
Log. ∆Ratings Low High No Yes High Low Yes No
DPrivacy -0.068*** 0.008 -0.070*** 0.038 -0.109*** -0.054*** -0.151*** -0.060***
(0.008) (0.029) (0.009) (0.057) (0.019) (0.010) (0.043) (0.009)
#CleanPerm 0.029*** 0.014*** 0.033*** 0.054*** 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.029** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003)
DInternet -0.122*** -0.320*** -0.192*** -0.254*** -0.108*** -0.211*** -0.106** -0.203***
(0.008) (0.040) (0.009) (0.063) (0.019) (0.010) (0.041) (0.009)
DAds 0.188*** 0.364*** 0.229*** 0.225*** 0.292*** 0.222*** 0.180*** 0.238***
(0.008) (0.033) (0.009) (0.056) (0.025) (0.010) (0.042) (0.009)
Log. Price -0.048*** 0.003 -0.070*** -0.114*** -0.050*** -0.076*** -0.056*** -0.072***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
DOther 0.047*** 0.122*** 0.050*** 0.067 0.116*** 0.040*** 0.057 0.053***
(0.008) (0.028) (0.009) (0.052) (0.025) (0.010) (0.044) (0.009)
Log. Length Desc. 0.202*** 0.275*** 0.252*** 0.404*** 0.237*** 0.268*** 0.257*** 0.262***
(0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.027) (0.011) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.044*** 0.093*** 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.044*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.062***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.015) (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Number Screenshots 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.083*** 0.076*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.075*** 0.085***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.012) (0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Dummy: Video 0.151*** 0.083** 0.181*** 0.250*** 0.072* 0.218*** 0.024 0.208***
(0.011) (0.033) (0.012) (0.050) (0.039) (0.013) (0.068) (0.012)
Log. Average Rating 0.155*** 2.242*** 0.200*** 0.192*** 0.207*** 0.204*** 0.257*** 0.196***
(0.006) (0.102) (0.007) (0.072) (0.014) (0.008) (0.029) (0.007)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 0.588*** 0.333*** 1.143*** 0.614*** 1.505*** 1.104*** 0.155 1.272***
(0.063) (0.070) (0.066) (0.130) (0.212) (0.060) (0.126) (0.063)
App Version 0.010*** -0.066*** 0.028*** -0.012 0.018* 0.032*** 0.069*** 0.027***
(0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.026) (0.010) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004)
Log. AppsByDev -0.097*** -0.085*** -0.112*** -0.173*** -0.077*** -0.122*** -0.100*** -0.114***
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.018) (0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Log. InstByDev 0.124*** 0.099*** 0.178*** 0.289*** 0.140*** 0.192*** 0.164*** 0.184***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
Log. InstByComp -0.022*** 0.039*** -0.009*** 0.013 -0.007* -0.007*** 0.009 -0.007***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002)
Log. PriceOfComp -0.002** 0.024*** 0.010*** 0.031*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Log. RatByComp -0.273*** -0.181 -0.685*** -1.048*** -0.424*** -0.761*** -0.765** -0.716***
(0.055) (0.199) (0.061) (0.358) (0.134) (0.068) (0.304) (0.062)
Min. Android Vers. 0.094*** 0.371*** -0.012 -0.026 -0.022 -0.011 -0.076 -0.014
(0.009) (0.040) (0.010) (0.069) (0.026) (0.011) (0.051) (0.011)
Max. Android Vers. 0.159*** 0.112 0.172*** 0.028 0.187*** 0.171*** 0.146 0.171***
(0.017) (0.095) (0.019) (0.196) (0.032) (0.023) (0.127) (0.020)
Constant -3.470*** -4.694*** -3.753*** -4.497*** -3.467*** -3.980*** -3.811*** -3.865***
(0.106) (0.499) (0.122) (0.976) (0.247) (0.140) (0.669) (0.125)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 164157 13036 170658 6535 27843 149350 6218 170975
Mean of dep. Var. -0.14 3.16 0.06 1.11 -0.18 0.15 -0.08 0.11
SD of dep. Var. 1.27 1.54 1.52 2.02 1.38 1.58 1.38 1.56
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.293 0.285 0.371 0.305 0.291 0.270 0.295
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand for subsamples
of our data. App demand is measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. Columns 1 and 2 split the sample
into apps which have a high or a low stock of installations (more or less than 75000 installations). Columns 3 and 4 split the
sample into apps with and without a privacy policy. Columns 5 and 6 split them into apps which require a high (Column 5) or
low (Column 6) maturity of the user (apps are defined as appropriate for low maturity if they classified as being recommended for
’everyone’ or for ’low maturity’-users). Columns 7 and 8 split the sample into medical and health-related apps as well as into other
apps. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic permissions (#CleanPerm.). Heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.4 Robustness Checks - Detailed Version
This section provides more detailed descriptions of our robustness checks. It fills in the descriptive
details that we had to omit for the brief presentation in the paper’s main body in order to save
space.
B.4.1 Supply-side Analysis: Privacy Definition and Including Moderating Factors
In Table B9, we analyze the robustness of our supply-side findings to using alternative definitions
of privacy, to including moderating factors and the use of alternative samples.
The table shows additional supply-side results for the developer’s choice of their business model.
The dependent variable is the developer’s decision to offer their app for money or for free (DPaid).
All specifications, except those using the pairs data set, use the cross section data from April
2012. Column 1 uses as privacy measure an individual dummy for each number of privacy-sensitive
permissions (1, 2 or 3 and more permissions). Column 2 uses a cross term equal to one for apps
which simultaneously use sensitive permissions and have access to the internet. Columns 3 and 4
split the sample into normal apps (Col. 3) and games (Col. 4). Column 5 adds a cross term for
apps with a very large total number of installations (10000 or more). Column 6 adds a cross term
for apps that could be associated with a top-ranked website (on Alexa.com), i.e. for a website with
rank lower than 10000. Columns 7 and 8 analyze the most restrictive set of matched pairs (no
difference in description or only difference describes existence of ads, verified by human coders). In
all specifications we drop outliers with respect to app prices, i.e. apps with prices above 8 Euros.
All of these regressions control for the number of clean permissions and permissions that are needed
to show ads.
In columns 1-4, we varied the specification in the supply-side regressions to verify (i) that our
results do not depend on our privacy variable, and (ii) that they hold within subsamples of our
data, such as games and normal apps. The results show that our main cross section results do
not depend on the choice of the specific privacy measure. Apps that request more privacy-sensitive
permissions are more likely to be free (column 1). Column 2 shows that developers strategically use
privacy-sensitive permissions in free apps only together with internet access. This highlights that
data collection (via permissions) is more valuable for developers if they can easily transfer the data
from the app (via internet access). Columns 3 and 4 show that our baseline finding holds for both
non-game apps (column 3) and games (column 4). For both groups, we find a negative significant
effect.
Also, our supply-side results are robust to including moderating factors and to the use of a more
rigorous matched set of app pairs: In columns 5-8, we analyze the role of moderating factors on the
supply side and restrict the pairs data set even further to rule out unobserved heterogeneity as an
explanation of our results. Columns 5 and 6 show that the role of reputation as a moderating factor
is equally important for the supply side as for the demand side. In column 5 we separately analyze
apps with a large user base, and in column 6 we analyze apps that are associated with a popular
website (low traffic rank on Alexa.com). Such apps are generally less likely to be paid versions,
but if they are paid, they are more likely to require privacy-sensitive permissions. Columns 7 and
8 analyze the robustness of our supply-side results, which we obtained based on the app pairs data
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set by applying a more restrictive matching for the pairs data: here we only consider pairs with no
difference in description and code length, which was verified by human coders. These results show
again that privacy-sensitive permissions are more likely in free apps, independently of how restrictive
we are in our matching of the app pairs. Taken together, these results confirm our baseline findings
for the supply side of the market.
B.4.2 Panel estimations are robust to using alternative samples and specifications:
Beyond the panel specifications in Table B7 we run additional fixed-effect panel regressions. We
thus verfiy the robustness of our panel results to using alternative specifications. The results are
shown in Table B10.
Our demand side panel data set consists of apps which we observed in each of the five waves
between April and September 2012 and that varied their use of privacy-sensitive permissions at least
once in this period. In columns 3 and 6 we restrict our sample in addition to apps which did not
change the length of the app’s description in the Google Play Store during this period. We interpret
such a change in permission without a change in the app’s description as an indication of a change
in permissions which came without a change in functionality.
The dependent variable is the log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. Columns 1-
3 analyze the effect of introducing any privacy-sensitive permissions (measured by the indicator,
whereas Columns 4-6 use the number of privacy-sensitive permissions as the variable of interest.
In all specifications we include monthly fixed-effects and control for the number of unproblematic
permissions. We first analyzed the raw fixed effects regressions without controls (Columns 1 and 4),
and then we added control variables and dummies to control for the apps’ categories. (Columns 2
and 5). Finally we analyze our reduced sample of apps that introduced new permissions without
changing their description (Columns 3 and 6).
The estimated coefficient of interest remains essentially unchanged when looking at the specifi-
cation in column 1 where we include only a reduced set of controls, or when we restrict the data to
apps that introduced permissions but no major update to functionality (column 3). Moreover, we
see similar results when analyzing the number of sensitive permissions, rather than an indicator for
their presence (cols. 4-6).
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Table B9: Alternative Supply Side Results
Privacy Measures Non-Games vs Games Moderating Factors App Pairs
DPaid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
#Privacy=1 -0.010***
(0.003)
#Privacy=2 -0.058***
(0.003)
#Privacy≥3 -0.111***
(0.004)
DPrivacy 0.012* -0.012*** -0.057*** -0.062*** -0.037*** -0.246***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.054)
DPrivacy ×DInternet -0.055***
(0.007)
DPrivCatSpec -0.102***
(0.003)
#PrivCatSpec -0.045***
(0.001)
DPrivacy ×DNumInst 0.144***
(0.003)
DNumInst -0.322***
(0.003)
DPrivacy ×DAlexaRank 0.046**
(0.018)
DAlexaRank -0.109***
(0.016)
#Privacy -0.199***
(0.029)
#CleanPerm 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.012*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.031 0.051**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.025)
DInternet -0.223*** -0.209*** -0.216*** -0.220*** -0.206*** -0.221*** -0.209*** -0.217*** -0.392*** -0.422***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.047) (0.047)
DAds -0.122*** -0.117*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.127*** -0.139*** -0.106*** -0.114*** -0.522*** -0.531***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.051) (0.048)
DOther 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.004 -0.004 0.011*** 0.014*** -0.023 -0.015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.091) (0.088)
Log. Length Desc. 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.033*** 0.061*** 0.054*** 0.006 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.050) (0.051)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.045*** 0.032*** 0.030*** -0.014 -0.026
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.029) (0.030)
Number Screenshots 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.029 0.028
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.019)
Dummy: Video 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.027*** 0.014** 0.006** -0.001 -0.422** -0.401**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.192) (0.184)
Log. Average Rating -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.050*** 0.065*** -0.033*** -0.036*** 0.122 0.118
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.079) (0.073)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 0.184*** 0.186*** 0.177*** 0.178*** 0.118*** 0.217*** 0.223*** 0.201*** 0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (.) (.)
App Version -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.065*** -0.040*** -0.044*** -0.041* -0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.025)
Log. AppsByDev 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.034*** -0.020*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (.) (.)
Log. InstByDev -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.025*** 0.010*** -0.005*** -0.018*** 0.062*** 0.059***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.009)
Log. InstByComp -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.003 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.012)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.017*** -0.005 -0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Log. RatByComp 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.291*** 0.004 0.103*** 0.199*** 0.628* 0.498
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.039) (0.016) (0.019) (0.337) (0.324)
Min. Android Vers. -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.052*** -0.035*** -0.065*** -0.042*** -0.034 -0.074
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.167) (0.163)
Max. Android Vers. 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.023 0.025*** 0.016** 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.007) (.) (.)
Constant 0.081** 0.085** 0.080** 0.087** -0.067* 0.087 0.127*** 0.133*** -0.411 -0.167
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.088) (0.034) (0.039) (0.687) (0.667)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176000 176000 176000 176000 145972 30028 176000 145126 708 708
Num. of Groups 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.50 0.50
Mean of dep. Var. 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.50
SD of dep. Var. 0.323 0.320 0.324 0.324 0.348 0.260 0.367 0.319 0.848 0.862
Notes: The table shows additional supply-side results for the developer’s choice of their business model. The dependent variable
is the developer’s decision to offer their app for money or for free (DPaid). Column 1 uses as privacy measure an individual
dummy for each number of privacy-sensitive permissions (1, 2 or 3 and more permissions). Column 2 uses a cross term equal
to one for apps which simultaneously use sensitive permissions and have access to the internet. Columns 3 and 4 use our
category-specfic privacy measures. Within a category we flag a privacy-sensitive permission as problematic only if paid apps of
this category use this permission on average less often than the overall average paid app. Columns 5 and 6 split the sample into
normal apps (Col. 5) and games (Col. 6). Column 7 adds a cross term for apps with a very large total number of installations
(10000 or more). Column 8 adds a cross term for apps that could be associated with a top-ranked website (on Alexa.com), i.e.
for a website with rank lower than 10000. Columns 9 and 10 analyze the most restrictive set of matched pairs (no difference in
description or only difference describes existence of ads, verified by human coders). In all specifications we drop outliers with
respect to app prices, i.e. apps with prices above 8 Euros. All of these regressions control for the number of clean permissions
and permissions that are needed to show ads. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B10: Alternative Panel Demand Side Estimation Results
Log. ∆Ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DPrivacy -0.070*** -0.059*** -0.063**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.027)
#Privacy -0.023*** -0.014** -0.010
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
#CleanPerm -0.010** -0.010** -0.003 -0.000 -0.005 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
DInternet -0.003 0.003 0.033 -0.021 -0.014 0.012
(0.054) (0.054) (0.072) (0.054) (0.053) (0.071)
DAds 0.007 0.002 -0.041 -0.011 -0.014 -0.058
(0.033) (0.033) (0.043) (0.032) (0.033) (0.043)
Log. Price -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.037***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
DOther 0.022 0.024
(0.022) (0.022)
Log. Length Desc. 0.003 0.002
(0.023) (0.023)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.044*** 0.043***
(0.017) (0.017)
Number Screenshots 0.029** 0.027**
(0.011) (0.011)
Dummy: Video -0.138** -0.139**
(0.058) (0.059)
Log. Average Rating 0.267*** 0.272***
(0.098) (0.098)
Dummy: Top-Dev. -0.206*** -0.179***
(0.016) (0.014)
App Version 0.029* 0.032**
(0.015) (0.015)
Log. AppsByDev -0.161*** -0.157***
(0.029) (0.029)
Log. InstByDev -0.011 -0.011
(0.014) (0.014)
Log. InstByComp 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Log. PriceOfComp -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Log. RatByComp -0.030 -0.031
(0.129) (0.129)
Min. Android Vers. 0.058 0.056
(0.044) (0.044)
Max. Android Vers. -0.143 -0.137
(0.096) (0.097)
Constant 1.158*** 1.198** 0.749*** 1.156*** 1.201** 0.741***
(0.127) (0.561) (0.154) (0.128) (0.563) (0.155)
Category No Yes No No Yes No
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33095 33095 15220 33095 33095 15220
Num. of Groups 6619 6619 3044 6619 6619 3044
Mean of dep. Var. 1.63 1.63 1.17 1.63 1.63 1.17
SD of dep. Var. 2.23 2.23 2.10 2.23 2.23 2.10
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.033 0.020 0.026 0.033 0.020
Notes: This table shows the results from fixed-effect panel regressions. The dependent variable is the log. number of monthly
new ratings of an app. We restrict our sample to apps within our data set that varied their use of privacy-sensitive permissions
at least once between April and September 2012. Columns 1-3 analyze the effect of introducing any privacy-sensitive permissions
(measured by the indicator DPrivacy ), whereas Columns 4-6 use the number of privacy-sensitive permissions as the variable
of interest. Columns 1 and 4 show the raw fixed effects regressions without controls. In Columns 2 and 5 we add control
variables and dummies to control for the apps’ categories. Columns 3 and 6 restrict the analysis to apps that introduced new
permissions without changing the app’s description (no change in the length of description). In all specifications we include
monthly fixed-effects and control for the number of unproblematic permissions. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.4.3 Alternative Difference-in-Differences-Style Estimation Results:
Table A6 shows demand-side results from comparing the download ranks of an app in the iOS
Appstore and Google’s Play Store depending on whether its Android version uses privacy-sensitive
permissions or not. It provides results which illustrate the robustness of our DiD-style results to the
use of alternative rank measures and subsamples of the data.
Data Preparation and Additional Variables: To compare apps’ relative success in the An-
droid OS and iOS in dependence of their use of privacy-sensitive permissions, we collected in 2016
app rankings from 2012 for both OS from AppAnnie.com. We found only a small number of (mostly
successful) apps for which the app ranking from 2012 was available for both OS. Unlike in our main
data sets, which contain global success measures such as the world wide number of installations,
rankings are only available at a country-specific basis. Thus, we collected rankings for April and
September 2012 and for seven important markets: Germany, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, the UK
and the US April and September 2012. For free apps we use the ’overall free app rank’ and for paid
apps we use the ’overall paid ranking’.60 For the estimation sample we kept those apps for which
we were able to collect at least four rankings per OS (out of the up to 14 rankings per OS).
Based on that information we construct four measures of the relative app success on the two
operating systems (∆RankiOS−And):
• In column 1 of Table A6 the dependent variable is the simple difference between the iOS and
the Android country ranks we were able to collect for each app, i.e. it is the difference between
the average iOS rank (which is based on up to 14 country- and time-specific ranks) and the
Android OS average rank.
• In column 2 the dependent variable is also a difference based on the average country ranks.
However, here we construct for each OS based on the observed average ranks an in-sample
ranking which ranks apps within the OS according to its average OS-specific rank. The dif-
ference between the iOS and the Android is then computed as the difference between the two
self-generated in-sample ranks.61 This procedure guarantees that the observed apps’ ranks
have a similar distribution in Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android OS.
• In column 3 the dependent variable is again a simple difference as in column 1 but is based
only on the US ranks.
• In column 4 the dependent variable is also based only on US ranks but again uses the difference
between self-generated rankings which we created as in column 2 for each OS.
60In addition to overall rankings there are also category-specific rankings such as rankings for games, weather apps,
and education apps.
61Specifically: we compute average rankings by app and operating system based on the time- and country-specific
ranks (up to seven countries and two points in time per OS, i.e. based on up to 14 ranks). Using this information
we create a new in-sample ranking which ranks apps by the order of their average rank values and ranges from 1 to
192 for each operating system. The measure we use in the estimation is then the difference between the rank we have
computed for the iOS version and the one we have computed for the Android version (i.e. iOS rank minus Android
rank).
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Columns 5 & 6 finally also use, as in column 2, the difference between the newly created ranks based
on the average download ranks but split the sample into games (Column 6) and other apps (Column
5).
Results: The results show that the DiD-style comparison is robust to using alternative measures
of the ranking difference: All specifications, except specification 6 which covers only games, show
a significant negative effect for privacy-sensitive permissions. This corroborates the conclusion that
apps that request privacy-sensitive permissions are on average less successful in the Android OS than
in Apple’s iOS, which could be due to the fact that only in the Android OS are these permissions
visible to the user before installation of the app. These significant findings are all the more impressive
given the low number of observations and the fact that our previous results suggest a lower effect
for privacy-sensitive permissions of well-known apps.62 Also, the insignificant effect for games is in
line with our main results which show that a weaker or even an insignificant relationship between
privacy-sensitive permissions and demand exists for games. Thus, the results reaffirm our baseline
demand results as well as the results shown in our analysis of moderating factors despite using a
completely different sample of apps and using a completely different identification approach.
Table B11: Alternative Difference-in-Differences-Style Estimation Results:
Global Ranks US Ranks Non-Games vs Games
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DPrivacy -116.468*** -12.660** -182.504*** -14.988** -25.368** 1.533
(35.327) (6.088) (58.130) (6.321) (10.316) (8.488)
#CleanPerm 0.266 0.849 0.344 1.011* 1.498** -1.310
(3.473) (0.598) (5.476) (0.595) (0.694) (1.263)
Constant 264.070*** 4.262 320.040*** 2.428 10.214 6.258
(29.120) (5.018) (48.089) (5.229) (9.514) (6.209)
Observations 192 192 162 162 96 96
Mean of dep. Var. 175.94 -0.24 176.85 -3.22 -1.07 0.59
SD of dep. Var. 188.76 31.81 274.05 29.27 32.96 30.78
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.013 0.059 0.025 0.062 -0.006
Notes: This table shows further demand side results from comparing the download ranks of an app in the iOS Appstore and
Google’s Play Store depending on whether it’s Android version uses privacy-sensitive permissions or not. The dependent variable
captures differences in the ranks on the two platforms (iOS App Store ranks minus Google Play Store ranks). Colums 1, 2, 5
and 6 compare the apps’ average ranks of the seven countries we collected ranks for, whereas Columns 3 & 4 use only the US
ranks. Columns 1 & 3 use as dependent variable the difference between the simple rank averages whereas Columns 2 & 4 use
as the dependent variable the difference between the newly created ranks within the operating system, which are based on the
average download ranks we observed on AppAnnie.com. Columns 5 & 6 also use the difference between the newly created ranks
based on the average download ranks but contrast games (Column 6) with other apps (Column 5). Heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
62Such apps are clearly overrepresented in the small sample of apps for which we were able to retrieve ranks in
2016.
B16
B.4.4 Robustness of Demand-side Results to Using Alternative Demand Measures
It is crucial for the validity of our research to analyze whether our main findings for the demand-side
depend on the definition of our demand-measure. To verify that this is not the case, we varied the
dependent variable, and run our main specification with eight alternative demand measures and two
alternative measures of app popularity. The results are shown in Table B12, where we show our main
specification with alternative dependent variables based on actual installations, alternative measures
based on ratings, and when using predicted installations that we calibrated using the available
information on ratings and installations. Verifying our results for predicted installations highlights
that our findings are in line with the previous literature that has used predicted installations.
Data Preparation and Additional Variables: We estimate our main specification with eight
alternative demand measures based on ratings (cols. 1&2), the direct measure of installations (cols.
3-5), and three measures of predicted monthly new installations (cols. 6-8). In addition we provide
results with respect to apps’ average ratings (cols. 9&10). All specifications use the cross section
data from April 2012. In the following we describe the various different demand measures we use in
Table B12.
• In column 1 the dependent variable is ∆RAprSep which equals the change in the number of
ratings between April and September 2012.
• In column 2 the dependent variable is ∆R1214 which equals the change in the number of ratings
between 2012 and 2014.
• In column 3 the dependent variable is ∆IApr which equals the change in the number of instal-
lations in April 2012.
• In column 4 the dependent variable is ∆IAprSep which equals the change in the number of
installations between April and September 2012.
• In column 5 the dependent variable is ∆I1214 which equals the change in the number of
installations between 2012 and 2014.
• In column 6 the dependent variable equals the predicted change in the number of installations
in April 2012. We predict this change based on a log-log-specified estimation specification
where the dependent variable is the log. number of new installations and the explanatory
variable is the log. number of new ratings an app has received in April 2012 (see Column 2 of
Table A12).
• In column 7 the dependent variable equals the predicted change in the number of installations
between April and September 2012. We predict this change based on a log-log estimation
specification where the dependent variable is the log. number of new installations and the
explanatory variable is the log. number of new ratings an app has received between April and
September 2012 (see Column 4 of Table A12).
• In column 8 the dependent variable equals the predicted change in the number of installations
in April 2012. We predict this change based on a non-parametric estimation specification
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where the dependent variable is the log. number of new installations and the explanatory
variable is the log. number of new ratings an app has received in April 2012 (see Column 8 of
Table A12).
• In column 9 the dependent variable equals ARApr which is the average of the ratings the app
has received in April 2012.
• In column 10 the dependent variable equals ARAprSep which is the average of the ratings the
app has received between April and September 2012.
Results: Our main demand-side results remain the same, independently of whether we use
measures based on installations or measures based on ratings as well as whether we consider a
longer time window of ratings- or installation growth (cols. 1-5). Similarly, when we use predicted
changes in the number of installations (cols. 6-8), our results are also confirmed. Finally, the results
in Columns 9 and 10 indicate that apps receive worse ratings if they use privacy-sensitive permissions
and thus seem to be less popular among users.
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Table B12: Alternative Demand Measures
Ratings-Based Installations-Based Predicted New Installations Average Rating
∆RAprSep ∆R1214 ∆IApr ∆IAprSep ∆I1214 param. param. 1214non-param. ARApr ARAprSep
DPrivacy -0.093*** -0.070***-0.054*** -0.197*** -0.388*** -0.030*** -0.053*** -0.183*** -0.022*** -0.018***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.025) (0.036) (0.004) (0.007) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003)
#CleanPerm 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.010*** 0.014** -0.010 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.069*** 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
DInternet -0.220*** -0.250***-0.078*** -0.206*** -0.317*** -0.092*** -0.163*** -0.416*** -0.054*** -0.056***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.025) (0.037) (0.004) (0.007) (0.026) (0.004) (0.004)
DAds 0.326*** 0.356*** 0.248*** 0.618*** 0.925*** 0.109*** 0.192*** 0.613*** 0.009** 0.014***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.037) (0.004) (0.007) (0.025) (0.004) (0.003)
Log. Price -0.114*** -0.173***-0.038*** -0.113*** -0.307*** -0.033*** -0.058*** -0.201*** -0.002*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
DOther 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.165*** 0.168*** 0.024*** 0.042*** 0.155*** 0.006* -0.003
(0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.025) (0.035) (0.004) (0.008) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003)
Log. Length Desc. 0.373*** 0.443*** 0.157*** 0.377*** 0.564*** 0.121*** 0.214*** 0.690*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.092*** 0.104*** 0.029*** 0.077*** 0.160*** 0.029*** 0.051*** 0.146*** 0.009*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Number Screenshots 0.113*** 0.142*** 0.058*** 0.142*** 0.260*** 0.039*** 0.069*** 0.204*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Dummy: Video 0.212*** 0.302*** 0.019 0.007 0.131*** 0.094*** 0.166*** 0.408*** 0.014*** 0.012***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.022) (0.033) (0.047) (0.006) (0.010) (0.030) (0.004) (0.003)
Log. Average Rating 0.272*** 0.421*** 0.168*** 0.410*** 0.886*** 0.092*** 0.162*** 0.511***
(0.010) (0.016) (0.011) (0.020) (0.035) (0.003) (0.006) (0.024)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 1.263*** 1.668*** 0.124 -0.066 0.262 0.525*** 0.929*** 1.733*** 0.007 -0.013
(0.062) (0.084) (0.102) (0.151) (0.235) (0.027) (0.047) (0.110) (0.009) (0.009)
App Version 0.045*** 0.062*** -0.036*** -0.050*** -0.030* 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.075*** 0.004** 0.004***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001)
Log. AppsByDev -0.182*** -0.211***-0.066*** -0.154*** -0.173*** -0.052*** -0.093*** -0.346*** -0.007*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. InstByDev 0.258*** 0.311*** 0.043*** 0.111*** 0.182*** 0.085*** 0.150*** 0.476*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. InstByComp -0.025*** -0.041*** -0.007** -0.046*** -0.073*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.059*** -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.007*** 0.003** -0.006*** -0.012*** -0.020*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.006*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Log. RatByComp -1.118*** -1.451*** -0.106 -0.375** -0.632** -0.326*** -0.577*** -2.445*** 0.449*** 0.436***
(0.076) (0.108) (0.103) (0.172) (0.258) (0.028) (0.050) (0.169) (0.024) (0.020)
Min. Android Vers. -0.022* -0.022 0.294*** 0.751*** 1.316*** -0.007 -0.012 0.018 -0.000 0.004
(0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.030) (0.043) (0.005) (0.009) (0.029) (0.005) (0.004)
Max. Android Vers. 0.302*** 0.636*** 0.165*** 0.508*** 1.629*** 0.078*** 0.139*** 0.529*** 0.020** 0.006
(0.026) (0.039) (0.029) (0.048) (0.080) (0.009) (0.016) (0.057) (0.010) (0.008)
Constant -4.583*** -5.540***-3.557*** -6.936*** -13.206***-2.248*** -3.083*** -6.608*** 0.354*** 0.360***
(0.156) (0.229) (0.196) (0.324) (0.505) (0.056) (0.100) (0.345) (0.055) (0.046)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176212 124482 177193 177193 126987 177193 177193 177193 68248 102594
Mean of dep. Var. 0.97 2.40 -0.42 0.86 4.63 -0.42 0.16 2.76 1.29 1.29
SD of dep. Var. 2.03 2.52 2.34 3.89 5.16 0.72 1.27 4.25 0.35 0.35
Adjusted R2 0.360 0.388 0.037 0.086 0.201 0.294 0.294 0.272 0.043 0.052
Notes: The table shows descriptive regressions analyzing the relationship between privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand
by using various different demand and app popularity measures. Columns 1 and 2 use alternative demand measures based on
ratings, Columns 3-5 use demand measures based on installations, whereas Columns 6-8 use three measures of predicted new
installations which we estimated based on the information about the number of new ratings. Columns 9 and 10 use the average
ratings of apps as a measure of app popularity. In Column 1 (2) the dependent variable is the log. number of new ratings
between April and September 2012 (log. number of new ratings between 2012 and 2014). In Column 3 the dependent variable
is the log. number of new installations in April 2012. Columns 4 and 5 use the log. number of new installations between April
and September 2012 (Column 4) and between 2012 and 2014 (Column 5) as demand measures. In Columns 6-8 we apply three
measures of predicted download numbers. For each of the measures we exploit the cross-section information on changes in ratings
to predict changes in installation numbers. In Column 6, we use a measure of predicted monthly installation changes in April
2012 which is based on the observed change in the number of ratings in this month (see Column 2 of Table A12). In Column 7,
we use a measure of predicted installation changes between April and September 2012 which is based on the observed change in
the number of ratings in this period (see Column 4 of Table A12). In Column 8, we again use a measure of predicted monthly
installation changes in April 2012 which is based on the observed change in the number of ratings in this month (see Column 2
of Table A12), but instead of employing a parametric log-log-specification to the data, we employ a non-parametric approach to
it. In Columns 9 the dependent variable is the log. average of the ratings the app has received in April 2012, whereas in Column
10 it is the log. average of the ratings the app has received between April and September 2012. Heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.4.5 Robustness of Demand-side results to Using Alternative Privacy Measures
We verified that our results do not depend on our definition of privacy-sensitive permissions. Clearly,
such a dependency would cast doubt on the generalizeability of our findings. To test the robustness
of our findings to using alternative implementations, we estimate our main specification with seven
alternative privacy measures.
Data Preparation and Additional Variables: All specifications use the cross section data
from April 2012. In the following we describe the various different privacy measures we use in Table
B13.
1. We generated indicators for each number of permissions. This results in three dummies for 1,
2, and 3 or more permissions respectively (Column 1).
2. We asked 450 microworkers on Amazon’s mechanical turk to classify permissions as to whether
they thought they were neutral, problematic or very problematic. From these classifications we
generated a dummy variable which is equal to one if an app uses at least one privacy-sensitive
permission which was classified as problematic by the microworkers (Column 2).
3. We identified privacy-sensitive permissions that are unusual for the app’s category. We flag a
privacy-sensitive permission as category-specific problematic if paid apps of the category use
this permission less frequently than the average paid app across all categories (Column 3).
4. We used additional data from privacygrade.org by Lin, Hong, and Sadeh. (2014), which evalu-
ated apps’ intrusiveness in 2014.63 We created a dummy which equals 1 if an app got a rating
that indicated the app was privacy-intrusive in 2014 (ratings equal to ’B’, ’C’ or ’D’). (Column
4).
5. We introduce and estimate a crossterm that indicates apps, which used both at least one
privacy-sensitive permission and internet access. We use this specification to test if users
distinguish sensitive permissions that come with internet access from sensitive permissions
that come without the ability to transmit the sensitive data (Columns 5 & 6).
6. We disaggregated the privacy sensitive permissions into functionality related types of per-
missions, distinguishing location-, communication-, user ID-, or profile-specific permissions
(Column 7).
7. We used an alternative definition of privacy-sensitive permissions from previous research by
Sarma, Li, Gates, Potharaju, Nita-Rotaru, and Molloy (2012). This definition classified only
12 permissions as privacy-sensitive, and is thus more restrictive (Column 8).64
We then proceeded to run our main specification with these alternative measures/definitions of a
“privacy-sensitive” app.
63To provide this measure a group of researchers evaluated all apps with respect to how they privacy-sensitive data
Lin, Hong, and Sadeh. (2014).
64These permissions include: read phone state and ID, coarse location, fine gps location, intercept outgoing calls,
read sms or mms, receive sms, receive mms, record audio, receive wap, read contact data, read browser data, read
sensitive log data.
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Results: The results are shown in Table B13. The dependent variable is demand for the app
measured by log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. The coefficient of interest analyzes
the relationship between an app’s demand and our measures of privacy-sensitive permissions. Each
column presents the results obtained when using an alternative measure for the presence of privacy-
sensitive permissions. The results show that the weakly negative relationship between permissions
and downloads holds across almost all definitions we consider. To be precise, the coefficient that
measures the relationship between app-demand and the use privacy-sensitive permissions is negative
for almost all definitions. The only exception is the privacygrade measure, which was published in
2014 on privacygrade.org. In contrast, the number of clean/unproblematic permissions is positively
associated with demand in most specifications, which indicates that such permissions do not face
lower demand.
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Table B13: Alternative Privacy Measures
Log. ∆Ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
#Privacy=1 -0.054***
(0.010)
#Privacy=2 -0.087***
(0.014)
#Privacy≥3 -0.089***
(0.014)
DPrivacy -0.060*** -0.048*** -0.040*** -0.086***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.018)
DMTurkEP2 -0.021*
(0.013)
DPrivCatSpec -0.048***
(0.012)
DPGrade 0.148***
(0.020)
DPrivacy ×DInternet -0.057*** 0.025
(0.010) (0.019)
DID 0.046***
(0.009)
DLocation -0.200***
(0.014)
DCommunication -0.015
(0.016)
DProfile -0.034***
(0.011)
DSarmaetal -0.048***
(0.009)
#CleanPerm 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.048*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DInternet -0.202*** -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.288*** -0.192*** -0.204*** -0.201*** -0.202***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
DAds 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.260*** 0.236*** 0.235*** 0.219*** 0.235***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log. Price -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.094*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.071***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DOther 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.017 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.047***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log. Length Desc. 0.262*** 0.263*** 0.262*** 0.287*** 0.262*** 0.263*** 0.261*** 0.262***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.087*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.062***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number Screenshots 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.105*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.085***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy: Video 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.256*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.208*** 0.203***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Log. Average Rating 0.199*** 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.456*** 0.199*** 0.198*** 0.201*** 0.199***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 1.140*** 1.139*** 1.135*** 1.121*** 1.139*** 1.139*** 1.128*** 1.138***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.099) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
App Version 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.050*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log. AppsByDev -0.113*** -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.145*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.114***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. InstByDev 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.245*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.182*** 0.184***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. InstByComp -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. RatByComp -0.707*** -0.707*** -0.704*** -0.833*** -0.705*** -0.708*** -0.697*** -0.704***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.097) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Min. Android Vers. -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.036** -0.016 -0.014 -0.013 -0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Max. Android Vers. 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.170*** -0.127* 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.174*** 0.170***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.071) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant -3.878*** -3.872*** -3.880*** -3.785*** -3.878*** -3.867*** -3.914*** -3.870***
(0.122) (0.122) (0.123) (0.322) (0.123) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 177193 177193 177193 86834 177193 177193 177193 177193
Mean of dep. Var. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.51 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
SD of dep. Var. 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.71 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55
Adjusted R2 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.288 0.294 0.294 0.295 0.294
Notes: The table shows descriptive regressions analyzing the relationship between the presence of privacy sensitive permissions
and app demand. The dependent variable is demand for the app measured by log. number of monthly new ratings of an app.
The coefficient of interest analyzes the relationship between an app’s demand and our privacy measures. Each column presents
the results obtained when using an alternative privacy measure. Column 1 introduces an indicator for each number of permission
(having 1, 2, and 3 or more permissions). Column 2 uses a dummy variable which is equal to one if an app uses at least one
privacy-sensitive permission which was classified as very problematic by 450 microworkers we surveyed on Amazon’s mechanical
turk. In Column 3 we look at privacy sensitive permissions that are unusual for the app’s category. Within a category we
flag a privacy-sensitive permission as problematic only if paid apps of this category use this permission on average less often
than the overall average paid app. Column 4 uses the ’privacygrade’ by Lin, Hong, and Sadeh. (2014), that was made available
on privacygrade.org in 2014. The dummy is equal to one if the the app got a rating equal to ’B’, ’C’ or ’D’, i.e. a rating
indicating the app being privacy-intrusive. In Columns 5 & 6 we introduce a crossterm that is equal to one if an app uses both
at least one privacy-sensitive permission and has internet access. Column 7 disaggregates the privacy sensitive permissions into
functionality-related types of permissions. Column 8 uses an alternative definition of privacy-sensitive permissions from previous
research by Sarma, Li, Gates, Potharaju, Nita-Rotaru, and Molloy (2012), which defines only 12 permissions as privacy-sensitive.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.4.6 Robustness of Demand-side Results to using Alternative Estimation Techniques
Demand side results are robust to accounting for censoring, selection, network effects,
or endogeneity: In Table B14 we analyze the robustness of our main demand-side results to
the use of alternative estimation strategies that account for several potential endogeneity concerns.
Specifically we check the sensitivity of our results with respect to censoring in the dependent variable,
survivor bias, network effects, and strategic behavior of the developers when choosing requested
permissions and prices. All of these checks require different estimation strategies that are discussed
in the following.
Data Preparation, Additional Variables, and Estimation: In all specifications, the depen-
dent variable is our main measure of app demand, i.e. the log. number of monthly new ratings, and
the main variable of interest is a dummy that indicates the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions.
All columns are based on the cross section from April 2012.
Columns 1 & 2 show Tobit-regressions that account for the fact that the dependent variable
might be censored, especially might be left-censored at demand equal to zero. Column 1 sets the
left-censoring limit to zero new ratings, whereas in Column 2 in addition a right-censoring limit
equal to five is added.
Columns 3 & 4 contain results from Heckman selection models which aim to control for survivor
bias, i.e. for the fact that apps using privacy-sensitive permissions might have lower demand and
because of that might also have lower survival rates which would result in biased OLS estimates
(underestimating the true effect of permissions) if these are based on a sample of surviving apps (as
it is the case in our baseline demand estimates). In both heckman selection specifications (cols. 3
& 4) the regression equation is identical to our baseline cross-section demand specification and the
selection equation models app survival. In column 3 survival is modeled by comparing apps which
are observed throughout the period April to September 2012 to those which are observed in April,
May and June, but which are not observed in the last two monthly waves (which we consider as
an indication of their drop out). In column 4, survival is modeled by comparing apps within our
baseline cross-section from April 2012 which survive until 2014 to those which are observed in April
2012 but are not observed in 2014. In both selection models we apply Heckman’s (1979) two-step
consistent estimator and use the information on code size as a selection variable, i.e. we include the
code size only in the selection equation but not in the regression equation. In Table B14 we show
only the results for the regression equation and not those for the selection equation but show both
results together in Table B15. In addition, in Table B15 we also provide a detailed comparison of the
reference OLS estimates for both specifications. Columns 2 &4 in this table shows the full Heckman
(1979) specification, and tables 1&3 show the OLS regression that mirrors the second step of the
Heckman’s procedure.
In Column 5 we control for the existing user-base, which could affect demand through the
existence of network effects, by including a control for the stock of existing installations (i.e. the
log. number of installations).
In the following columns we estimate 2SLS models to instrument the variables of interest and
to account for the endogeneity of the developers’ privacy model choices. In Column 6 we instru-
ment the privacy-dummy by the share of competing apps which use privacy-sensitve permissions
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(ShareCompPrivacy). Competing apps are those which are identified by Google as those which
“users who viewed this [app] also viewed”. In Column 7 we instrument the privacy-dummy by the
share of the developer’s other apps which use privacy-sensitive permissions (excluding the focal app)
(ShareDevPrivacy). In Columns 8 and 9 we instrument the app price by using in both specifications
two potential cost shifters: the log. code size and the log. number of apps a developer offers in the
Google Play Store. In Column 8 we use the full cross-section, whereas in Column 9 we use only the
sample of paid apps. Again, in Table B14 we only show the main results of these specifications, i.e.
the second stage results, but provide for all four 2SLS specifications in Table B16 also the related
first stage results.
Results: The results of all specifications support our baseline findings. The results in the first
four columns suggest that neither accounting for censoring in the dependent variable (Col. 1-2),
nor accounting for survivor bias (Col. 3-4) result in drastic changes of our main estimates. If
anything, these specifications suggest a higher effect size, that is, these results suggest that privacy-
sensitive permissions come with a stronger demand reduction than the baseline specifications. The
Heckman selection models indeed support the idea that privacy-sensitive permissions come with a
lower survival rate and thus with a bias of the OLS estimates towards zero (an underestimation of
the true effect). Similar, controlling for past success and potential network effects (Col. 5) does
not change our baseline conclusions drastically. The IV-estimations in Columns 6-9 show that our
attempts to account for endogeneity in prices and permissions result in larger coefficient estimates,
as would be expected if developers of better apps were to charge higher prices or ask for more
permissions. In all four IV-specifications, in the first stage, our IV variables are highly significant
and can thus be considered relevant variables.
B.4.7 Robustness of Results to Splitting the Sample
In this robustness check we verify that the negative relationship between demand and privacy-
sensitive permissions is not driven by a specific type of app. We do so by splitting the sample
into groups of apps where privacy could matter differently. This rules out an important alternative
explanation, and highlights that the phenomenon we highlight affects the entire market.
Data Preparation and Additional Variables: To analyze the robustness of the demand-side
results across different subsamples, we split our cross section data from April 2012 into groups of
apps where the role of privacy could be of varying importance and estimate the main specification
from Table B7 for each group separately. We divide the data along four dimensions: (i) pricing
strategy (Col. 1-2), (ii) Game or normal app (Col. 3-4), (iii) user groups by maturity requirements
(Col. 5-6), and (iv) by the presence or absence of health-relevant content (Col. 7-8). More precisely,
in column 1 we consider free apps whereas in column 2 we consider paid apps. In column 3 we
analyze non-game apps whereas in column 4 we consider games. In column 5 we restrict the sample
to apps which are for users of higher maturity (age), whereas column 6 is based on apps for users
recommended for ’everyone’ or for ’low maturity’-users. Finally, in column 7 we consider apps from
the categories ’health’- and ’medical’-apps whereas in column 8 we use the remaining apps.
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Table B14: Alternative Estimation Specifications
Tobit Heckman Netw.Eff. IV-Privacy IV-Price
Log. ∆Ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DPrivacy -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.063*** -0.164*** -0.069*** -0.918*** -0.372*** -0.091*** -0.063***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.024) (0.007) (0.049) (0.017) (0.009) (0.017)
Log. Installations 0.417***
(0.002)
#CleanPerm 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.038*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.065*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.082***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
DInternet -0.325*** -0.333*** -0.184*** -0.423*** -0.168*** -0.099*** -0.177*** -0.289*** -0.005
(0.020) (0.021) (0.010) (0.030) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017)
DAds 0.436*** 0.443*** 0.234*** 0.291*** 0.203*** 0.243*** 0.253*** 0.198*** 0.043**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.023) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
Log. Price -0.172*** -0.174*** -0.068*** -0.157*** 0.040*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.108*** -0.687***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.094)
DOther 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.046*** 0.182*** 0.115*** 0.079*** 0.117***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.020) (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.020)
Log. Length Desc. 0.521*** 0.529*** 0.272*** 0.503*** 0.094*** 0.290*** 0.253*** 0.298*** 0.219***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.044*** 0.069*** 0.064***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Number Screenshots 0.152*** 0.155*** 0.095*** 0.183*** 0.068*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.106*** 0.070***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Dummy: Video 0.291*** 0.299*** 0.230*** 0.361*** 0.108*** 0.235*** 0.211*** 0.221*** 0.283***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.011) (0.027) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020)
Log. Average Rating 0.656*** 0.667*** 0.215*** 0.444*** 0.289*** 0.188*** 0.204*** 0.211*** 0.079***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.010) (0.024) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 1.186*** 1.291*** 1.192*** 1.544*** 0.499*** 1.201*** 1.038*** 1.242*** 1.490***
(0.075) (0.082) (0.044) (0.108) (0.043) (0.064) (0.058) (0.060) (0.094)
App Version 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.027*** 0.038*** -0.026*** 0.038*** 0.023*** -0.004 0.016**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Log. AppsByDev -0.332*** -0.337*** -0.115*** -0.459*** -0.025*** -0.099*** -0.093***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.025) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. InstByDev 0.406*** 0.413*** 0.181*** 0.317*** 0.029*** 0.190*** 0.206*** 0.178*** 0.105***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. InstByComp -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.008*** -0.055*** 0.015*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.012*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Log. RatByComp -2.002*** -2.017*** -0.743*** -1.684*** 0.560*** -0.799*** -0.613*** -0.750*** -0.380***
(0.122) (0.124) (0.063) (0.151) (0.050) (0.063) (0.067) (0.063) (0.111)
Min. Android Vers. 0.047** 0.045** 0.007 -0.145*** 0.313*** -0.022* 0.014 0.039*** 0.067***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.010) (0.030) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018)
Max. Android Vers. 0.409*** 0.416*** 0.175*** 0.830*** 0.158*** 0.187*** 0.182*** 0.152*** 0.177***
(0.046) (0.047) (0.022) (0.056) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.034)
Constant -8.802*** -8.975*** -3.533*** -5.781*** -6.472*** -4.141*** -4.305*** -3.970*** -3.300***
(0.266) (0.271) (0.127) (0.319) (0.100) (0.136) (0.141) (0.128) (0.197)
Category Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 177193 177193 185533 177193 177193 136040 137146 177193 48272
Mean of dep. Var. 0.10 0.10 0.10 2.40 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.50
SD of dep. Var. 1.55 1.55 1.55 2.52 1.55 1.55 1.56 1.55 1.06
Adjusted R2 0.534 0.256 0.324 0.269 0.047
Notes: The table analyzes the robustness of our main demand-side results to using alternative estimation strategies. The
dependent variable is app demand measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings, and the main variable of interest is a
dummy that indicates the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions. All columns show cross section results. Columns 1 & 2 show
Tobit-regressions that account for the fact that the dependent variable might be censored, especially might be left-censored at
demand equal to 0. Column 1 sets the left-censoring limit to 0 new ratings, whereas in Column 2 in addition a right-censoring
limit equal to 5 is set. Columns 3 & 4 contain results from Heckman selection models, where the regression equation is identical
to our baseline cross-section demand specification, i.e. the dependent variable is the log. number of monthly or biannual new
ratings, and the selection equation models app survival. In column 3 survival is modeled by comparing apps which are observed
throughout the period April to September 2012 to those which are observed in April 2012 but which cannot be observed in later
months. In column 4 survival is modeled by comparing apps within our baseline cross-section from April 2012 which survive
until 2014 to those which are observed in April 2012 but are not observed in 2014. In both selection models we apply Heckman’s
two-step consistent estimator and use the information on code size as the selection variable, i.e. we include the code size only
in the selection equation but not in the regression equation. In Column 5 we control for the existing user-base by including
a control for the stock of existing installations (log. number of installations). In Columns 6 and 7 we estimate a 2SLS model
and instrument the variable of interest to account for the endogeneity of the developers’ privacy model choice. In Column 6 we
instrument the privacy-dummy by the share of competing apps which use privacy-sensitve permissions (ShareCompPrivacy). In
Column 7 we instrument the privacy-dummy by the share of the apps of the developer which use privacy-sensitive permissions
(ShareDevPrivacy). In Columns 8 and 9 we instrument the app price by using in both specifications two potential cost shifters:
the log. code size and the log. number of apps a developer offers in the Google Play Store. In Column 8 we use the full cross-
section, whereas in Column 9 we use only the sample of paid apps. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B15: Baseline OLS and Full Heckman Selection Models
Heckman (1) Heckman (2)
OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
main
DPrivacy -0.055*** -0.063*** -0.048*** -0.164***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.024)
#CleanPerm 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
DInternet -0.187*** -0.184*** -0.228*** -0.423***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.030)
DAds 0.243*** 0.234*** 0.366*** 0.291***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.023)
Log. Price -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.169*** -0.157***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Log. AppsByDev -0.112*** -0.115*** -0.207*** -0.459***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.025)
Constant -3.520*** -3.533*** -4.958*** -5.781***
(0.122) (0.127) (0.229) (0.319)
select
DPrivacy -0.099*** -0.081***
(0.014) (0.009)
#CleanPerm -0.026*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002)
DInternet 0.026 -0.158***
(0.018) (0.010)
DAds -0.131*** -0.054***
(0.015) (0.009)
Log. Price 0.003** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
Log. AppsByDev -0.042*** -0.165***
(0.003) (0.002)
Log. Size (in KB) -0.019*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.002)
Constant 2.383*** 1.066***
(0.208) (0.129)
mills
lambda 0.486** 2.978***
(0.194) (0.281)
Category Yes No Yes No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 177193 185533 124482 177193
Mean of dep. Var. 0.10 0.10 2.40 2.40
SD of dep. Var. 1.55 1.55 2.52 2.52
Adjusted R2 0.291 0.384
Notes: The table analyzes the robustness of our main demand-side results to using alternative estimation strategies. The
dependent variable is app demand measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings, and the main variable of interest is a
dummy that indicates the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions. All columns show cross section results. Column 1 shows OLS
estimates for April 2012 (like in our baseline demand equation but without the code size variable). Column 2 & 4 contain results
from Heckman selection models, where the regression equation is identical to our baseline cross-section demand specification, i.e.
the dependent variable is the log. number of monthly or biannual new ratings, and the selection equation models app survival.
In column 2 survival is modeled by comparing apps which are observed throughout the period April to September 2012 to those
which are observed in April 2012 but which cannot be observed in later months. Column 3 contains OLS estimates for those
apps which are available both in 2012 and 2014. The dependent variable as in column 4 is the log. change in the number of
ratings between 2012 and 2014. In column 4 survival is modeled by comparing apps within our baseline cross-section from April
2012 which survive until 2014 to those which are observed in April 2012 but are not observed in 2014. In both selection models
we apply Heckman’s two-step consistent estimator and use the information on code size as the selection variable, i.e. we include
the code size only in the selection equation but not in the regression equation. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B16: IV-Specifications (1st and 2nd Stage)
IV-Privacy (1) IV-Privacy (2) IV-Price (1) IV-Price (2)
2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st
DPrivacy -0.918*** -0.372*** -0.091*** -0.337*** -0.063*** 0.072***
(0.049) (0.017) (0.009) (0.029) (0.017) (0.009)
#CleanPerm 0.065*** 0.027*** 0.044*** 0.016*** 0.043*** 0.069*** 0.082*** 0.032***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003)
DInternet -0.099*** 0.108*** -0.177*** 0.086*** -0.289*** -2.483*** -0.005 0.085***
(0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.014) (0.035) (0.017) (0.009)
DAds 0.243*** 0.032*** 0.253*** 0.014*** 0.198*** -1.442*** 0.043** 0.000
(0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.029) (0.020) (0.011)
Log. Price -0.074*** -0.003*** -0.074*** -0.001*** -0.108*** -0.687***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.094)
ShareCompPrivacy 0.279***
(0.004)
ShareDevPrivacy 0.594***
(0.003)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.069*** 0.011*** 0.064*** 0.002*** 0.381*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002)
Log. AppsByDev -0.099*** 0.017*** -0.093*** 0.005*** 0.255*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002)
DOther 0.182*** 0.144*** 0.115*** 0.090*** 0.079*** 0.170*** 0.117*** 0.122***
(0.014) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.010) (0.029) (0.020) (0.009)
Log. Length Desc. 0.290*** 0.016*** 0.253*** 0.015*** 0.298*** 0.688*** 0.219*** 0.104***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.004)
Number Screenshots 0.077*** -0.003*** 0.075*** -0.001 0.106*** 0.146*** 0.070*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Dummy: Video 0.235*** 0.041*** 0.211*** 0.017*** 0.221*** -0.002 0.283*** 0.045***
(0.014) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.012) (0.040) (0.020) (0.010)
Log. Average Rating 0.188*** -0.011*** 0.204*** -0.014*** 0.211*** -0.477*** 0.079*** -0.015**
(0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.034) (0.009) (0.008)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 1.201*** 0.064*** 1.038*** 0.032*** 1.242*** 2.787*** 1.490*** 0.425***
(0.064) (0.014) (0.058) (0.010) (0.060) (0.169) (0.094) (0.045)
App Version 0.038*** 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.005*** -0.004 -0.618*** 0.016** -0.022***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.014) (0.007) (0.004)
Log. InstByDev 0.190*** 0.008*** 0.206*** -0.001*** 0.178*** -0.219*** 0.105*** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Log. InstByComp -0.000 -0.001*** -0.003 0.003*** -0.012*** -0.220*** -0.019*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.011*** 0.001*** 0.015*** 0.001*** 0.018*** 0.204*** 0.012*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Log. RatByComp -0.799*** -0.044*** -0.613*** -0.061*** -0.750*** 1.918*** -0.380*** -0.692***
(0.063) (0.016) (0.067) (0.015) (0.063) (0.204) (0.111) (0.056)
Min. Android Vers. -0.022* -0.015*** 0.014 -0.005** 0.039*** -0.601*** 0.067*** -0.100***
(0.012) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.035) (0.018) (0.010)
Max. Android Vers. 0.187*** -0.023*** 0.182*** -0.008 0.152*** 0.328*** 0.177*** 0.062***
(0.024) (0.007) (0.024) (0.007) (0.020) (0.069) (0.034) (0.020)
Constant -4.141*** -0.195*** -4.305*** -0.069* -3.970*** -10.267*** -3.300*** 0.087
(0.136) (0.038) (0.141) (0.035) (0.128) (0.415) (0.197) (0.117)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 136040 136040 137146 137146 177193 177193 48272 48272
Mean of dep. Var. 0.10 0.44 0.10 0.43 0.10 -8.30 -0.50 0.26
SD of dep. Var. 1.55 0.50 1.56 0.50 1.55 5.26 1.06 0.73
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.475 0.324 0.635 0.269 0.320 0.047 0.277
Notes: The dependent variable is app demand measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings, and the main variable
of interest is a dummy that indicates the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions. All columns show cross section 2SLS results
(as in Table A10). Columns 1, 3, 5, and 6 contain 2nd-stage results, whereas columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 contain 1st-stage results.
In Columns 1 to 4 we instrument the privacy-dummy to account for the endogeneity of the developers’ privacy model choice.
In Columns 1 and 2 we instrument the privacy-dummy by the share of competing apps which use privacy-sensitve permissions
(ShareCompPrivacy). In Columns 3 and 4 we instrument the privacy-dummy by the share of the apps of the developer
which use privacy-sensitive permissions (ShareDevPrivacy). In Columns 5 to 8 we instrumtent the app price by using in both
specifications two potential cost shifters: the log. code size and the log. number of apps a developer offers in the Google Play
Store. In Columns 5 and 6 we use the full cross-section, whereas in Columns 7 and 8 we use only the sample of paid apps.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Results: Table B17 shows the results. In all specifications, the dependent variable is app demand
and the variable of interest is an indicator for presence of privacy sensitive permissions (DPrivacy).
App demand is measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. Column 1 shows the
results for free apps only, and column 2 for paid apps only. The estimated coefficient is much more
negative in paid apps. Columns 3 and 4 contrast non-game apps (col.3) with games (col. 4), and
shows that the association between permissions and usage is negative only for non-games. Column 5
considers only apps for mature users, and column 6 all others. The estimations suggest that privacy-
sensitive permissions matter more in apps for mature users. Column 7 focuses on non-health apps
and column 8 on health related apps. All specifications control for the app’s observed characteristics
on the Play Store (the app’s price, description, ratings, categorical dummies, etc.), and also control
for internet access, and ad-specific permissions. Moreover, all specifications control for the number
of unproblematic permissions (CleanPerm. The results show that our main demand-side result, the
negative relationship between demand and permissions, can be found for almost all types of apps,
except for games. The varying size of the coefficients indicates that the app’s type matters for the
strength of the relationship between demand and permissions. Users of free apps and games seem
more willing to share data, and apps for mature users or health-related apps are less demanded when
using privacy-sensitive permissions.
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Table B17: Alternative Estimation Samples
Free vs. Paid Non-Games vs. Games High vs. Low Maturity Med.&Health vs. Oth.
Log. ∆Ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DPrivacy -0.026** -0.121*** -0.082*** -0.020 -0.109*** -0.054*** -0.151*** -0.060***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.022) (0.019) (0.010) (0.043) (0.009)
#CleanPerm 0.037*** 0.054*** 0.037*** 0.098*** 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.029** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003)
DInternet -0.256*** -0.075*** -0.211*** -0.201*** -0.108*** -0.211*** -0.106** -0.203***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.024) (0.019) (0.010) (0.041) (0.009)
DAds 0.241*** 0.039** 0.228*** 0.157*** 0.292*** 0.222*** 0.180*** 0.238***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.024) (0.025) (0.010) (0.042) (0.009)
Log. Price 0.000 0.099*** -0.068*** -0.095*** -0.050*** -0.076*** -0.056*** -0.072***
(.) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
DOther 0.016 0.022 0.023** 0.144*** 0.116*** 0.040*** 0.057 0.053***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.027) (0.025) (0.010) (0.044) (0.009)
Log. Length Desc. 0.280*** 0.135*** 0.255*** 0.291*** 0.237*** 0.268*** 0.257*** 0.262***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.080*** 0.011*** 0.050*** 0.117*** 0.044*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.062***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Number Screenshots 0.105*** 0.057*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.075*** 0.085***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Dummy: Video 0.271*** 0.225*** 0.204*** 0.177*** 0.072* 0.218*** 0.024 0.208***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.024) (0.039) (0.013) (0.068) (0.012)
Log. Average Rating 0.371*** 0.083*** 0.167*** 0.355*** 0.207*** 0.204*** 0.257*** 0.196***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.020) (0.014) (0.008) (0.029) (0.007)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 1.151*** 1.169*** 1.026*** 1.295*** 1.505*** 1.104*** 0.155 1.272***
(0.088) (0.082) (0.074) (0.092) (0.212) (0.060) (0.126) (0.063)
App Version 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.017* 0.018* 0.032*** 0.069*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004)
Log. AppsByDev -0.169*** -0.047*** -0.105*** -0.180*** -0.077*** -0.122*** -0.100*** -0.114***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Log. InstByDev 0.236*** 0.100*** 0.179*** 0.203*** 0.140*** 0.192*** 0.164*** 0.184***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
Log. InstByComp -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.003 -0.007* -0.007*** 0.009 -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.019*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Log. RatByComp -0.823*** 0.148* -0.696*** -1.085*** -0.424*** -0.761*** -0.765** -0.716***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.067) (0.147) (0.134) (0.068) (0.304) (0.062)
Min. Android Vers. -0.029** 0.125*** -0.025** 0.039 -0.022 -0.011 -0.076 -0.014
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.028) (0.026) (0.011) (0.051) (0.011)
Max. Android Vers. 0.171*** 0.140*** 0.155*** 0.250*** 0.187*** 0.171*** 0.146 0.171***
(0.024) (0.030) (0.021) (0.053) (0.032) (0.023) (0.127) (0.020)
Constant -3.557*** -3.416*** -3.398*** -5.120*** -3.467*** -3.980*** -3.811*** -3.865***
(0.152) (0.172) (0.140) (0.306) (0.247) (0.140) (0.669) (0.125)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 128921 48272 147143 30050 27843 149350 6218 170975
Mean of dep. Var. 0.33 -0.50 0.07 0.26 -0.18 0.15 -0.08 0.11
SD of dep. Var. 1.65 1.06 1.52 1.70 1.38 1.58 1.38 1.56
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.262 0.280 0.370 0.305 0.291 0.270 0.295
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand for subsamples
of our data. App demand is measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. Columns 1 and 2 split the sample
into apps which are for free or for paid. Columns 3 and 4 split the sample into normal apps and games. Columns 5 and 6 split
them into apps which require a high (Column 5) or low (Column 6) maturity of the user (apps are defined as appropriate for low
maturity if they classified as being recommended for ’everyone’ or for ’low maturity’-users). Columns 7 and 8 split the sample
into medical and health-related apps as well as into other apps. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic
permissions (#CleanPerm.). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B.4.8 Excluding the Most and Least Successfull Apps from Estimation
In Table B18 we further analyze the robustness of the main demand-side results to excluding the
most or least successful apps from the analysis. This robustness check guarantees, that our results
are not driven by the apps in the tails of the distribution in our dependent variable.
Data Preparation and Additional Variables: For this robustness check, we excluded the most
and least successful apps. First we excluded the most succesful apps, i.e. the upper 5 percentiles with
respect to the number of new ratings in April 2012 in Columns 1 and 2. Analogously, we exclude the
least successful apps, without any new ratings in April 2012 (the least successful ones) in Columns 3
and 4. In Columns 5 and 6 we exclude both groups. Moreover we generated a dummy which equals
1 for apps which had accumulated more than 10000 installations (Col. 2, 4 & 6). As before app
demand is measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. All specification use the
cross section from April 2012.
Results: The results in columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table B18 are shown without accounting for
apps with a very high stock of installations. In Columns 2, 4 and 6 we account for such highly
successful apps, by adding a dummy which equals one if the app had accumulated a stock of at
least 10000 installations in the past, and also add an interaction of this dummy with the privacy-
dummy. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic permissions (CleanPerm.),
and for the app’s observed characteristics on the Play Store (the app’s price, description, ratings,
categorical dummies, etc.). We also control for internet access, and ad-specific permissions. The
coefficient of interest analyzes the relationship between an app’s downloads and our measures of
privacy sensitive permissions. While the coefficient is negative for all specifications, it becomes
smaller and statistically insignificant when excluding only the least successful ones (column 3).
Thus, the table highlights that the negative relationship between privacy-sensitive permission and
demand holds across a wide range of apps and does not depend on the inclusion of the distribution
tails. In addition, it indicates that the stock of installations affects the sensitivity of users with
respect to the existence of privacy-sensitive permissions.
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Table B18: Excluding the Most and Least Successful Apps
W/o Top-Apps W/o Flop-Apps W/o Top- and Flop-Apps
Log. ∆Ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DPrivacy -0.064*** -0.079*** -0.011 -0.086*** -0.030*** -0.050***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
DNumInst 1.545*** 1.303*** 0.946***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
DPrivacy ×DNumInst 0.036** 0.126*** 0.009
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
#CleanPerm 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.017*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
DInternet -0.114*** -0.093*** -0.197*** -0.172*** -0.092*** -0.090***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
DAds 0.170*** 0.154*** 0.182*** 0.188*** 0.102*** 0.116***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Log. Price -0.055*** -0.026*** -0.071*** -0.023*** -0.046*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DOther 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.028** 0.038*** 0.014 0.020**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Log. Length Desc. 0.193*** 0.138*** 0.214*** 0.151*** 0.132*** 0.099***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Log. Size (in KB) 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.069*** 0.057*** 0.035*** 0.030***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Number Screenshots 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.040*** 0.041***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy: Video 0.131*** 0.101*** 0.167*** 0.110*** 0.099*** 0.068***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
Log. Average Rating 0.137*** 0.140*** 0.558*** 0.576*** 0.316*** 0.352***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
Dummy: Top-Dev. 0.558*** 0.345*** 0.859*** 0.644*** 0.414*** 0.296***
(0.052) (0.044) (0.055) (0.048) (0.049) (0.042)
App Version 0.020*** -0.007*** 0.032*** -0.004 0.020*** -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Log. AppsByDev -0.091*** -0.068*** -0.128*** -0.094*** -0.083*** -0.064***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log. InstByDev 0.134*** 0.073*** 0.177*** 0.094*** 0.109*** 0.057***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. InstByComp -0.016*** -0.018*** 0.010*** 0.002 -0.003 -0.008***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log. PriceOfComp 0.002*** -0.001** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log. RatByComp -0.611*** -0.128*** -0.518*** 0.091 -0.354*** 0.043
(0.052) (0.045) (0.083) (0.073) (0.068) (0.061)
Min. Android Vers. 0.008 0.145*** -0.001 0.205*** 0.024** 0.168***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Max. Android Vers. 0.138*** 0.144*** 0.113*** 0.149*** 0.072*** 0.103***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.035) (0.030) (0.027) (0.024)
Constant -2.777*** -2.924*** -3.228*** -3.462*** -1.535*** -1.906***
(0.103) (0.090) (0.192) (0.167) (0.151) (0.135)
Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 168767 168767 79847 79847 71421 71421
Mean of dep. Var. -0.12 -0.12 1.44 1.44 1.09 1.09
SD of dep. Var. 1.23 1.23 1.44 1.44 1.04 1.04
Adjusted R2 0.231 0.416 0.240 0.409 0.149 0.303
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the presence of privacy-sensitive permissions and app demand for subsamples
of our data where we exclude the tails of the distribution with respect to our dependent variable, i.e. the most and the least
successful apps. App demand is measured by the log. number of monthly new ratings of an app. In Columns 1 and 2 we exclude
the most succesful apps, i.e. the upper 5 percentiles with respect to the number of new ratings in April 2012. In Columns 3 and
4 we exclude the least successful apps, i.e. those without any new ratings in April 2012. In Columns 5 and 6 we exclude both
groups, i.e. the upper 5 percent of most successful apps and those having no new rating in April 2012. In Columns 2, 4 and 6
we add a dummy which is equal to one if the app in the past had accumulated a stock of at least 10000 or more installations
and also add an interaction of this dummy with the privacy-dummy. All specifications control for the number of unproblematic
permissions (#CleanPerm.). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
B31
B.5 AppAnnie.com
Figure B1: Ranking Information on AppAnnie.com in 2016
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